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Abstract—Databases can leak confidential information when
users combine query results with probabilistic data dependencies
and prior knowledge. Current research offers mechanisms that
either handle a limited class of dependencies or lack tractable
enforcement algorithms. We propose a foundation for Database
Inference Control based on PROBLOG, a probabilistic logic
programming language. We leverage this foundation to develop
ANGERONA, a provably secure enforcement mechanism that
prevents information leakage in the presence of probabilistic
dependencies. We then provide a tractable inference algorithm
for a practically relevant fragment of PROBLOG. We empirically
evaluate ANGERONA’s performance showing that it scales to
relevant security-critical problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting the confidentiality of sensitive data stored in data-
bases requires protection from both direct and indirect access.
The former happens when a user observes query results, and
the latter happens when a user infers sensitive information
by combining results with external information, such as data
dependencies or prior knowledge. Controlling indirect access
to data is often referred to as Database Inference Control [30]
(DBIC). This topic has attracted considerable attention in
recent years, and current research considers different sources
of external information, such as the database schema [15],
[37], [39], [42], [57], [63], [64], the system’s semantics [37],
statistical information [3], [16], [22]–[24], exceptions [37],
error messages [44], user-defined functions [44], and data
dependencies [10], [12], [54], [55], [67], [68], [72].
An important and relevant class of data dependencies
are probabilistic dependencies, such as those found in ge-
nomics [43], [47], [49], social networks [40], and location
tracking [52]. Attackers can exploit these dependencies to
infer sensitive information with high confidence. To effectively
prevent probabilistic inferences, DBIC mechanisms should
(1) support a large class of probabilistic dependencies, and
(2) have tractable runtime performance. The former is needed
to express different attacker models. The latter is necessary
for mechanisms to scale to real-world databases.
Most existing DBIC mechanisms support only precise data
dependencies [10], [12], [67], [68], [72] or just limited classes
of probabilistic dependencies [14], [15], [39], [45], [54], [55],
[71]. As a result, they cannot reason about the complex
probabilistic dependencies that exist in many realistic settings.
Mardziel et al.’s mechanism [51] instead supports arbitrary
probabilistic dependencies, but no complexity bounds have
been established and their algorithm appears to be intractable.
Contributions. We develop a tractable and practically useful
DBIC mechanism based on probabilistic logic programming.
First, we develop ATKLOG, a language for formalizing
users’ beliefs and how they evolve while interacting with the
system. ATKLOG builds on PROBLOG [20], [21], [31], a state-
of-the-art probabilistic extension of DATALOG, and extends
its semantics by building on three key ideas from [18], [46],
[51]: (1) users’ beliefs can be represented as probability distri-
butions, (2) belief revision can be performed by conditioning
the probability distribution based on the users’ observations,
and (3) rejecting queries as insecure may leak information.
By combining DATALOG with probabilistic models and belief
revision based on users’ knowledge, ATKLOG provides a
natural and expressive language to model users’ beliefs and
thereby serves as a foundation for DBIC in the presence of
probabilistic inferences.
Second, we identify acyclic PROBLOG programs, a class
of programs where probabilistic inference’s data complexity
is PTIME. We precisely characterize this class and develop
a dedicated inference engine. Since PROBLOG’s inference is
intractable in general, we see acyclic programs as an essential
building block to effectively using ATKLOG for DBIC.
Finally, we present ANGERONA1, a novel DBIC mechanism
that secures databases against probabilistic inferences. We
prove that ANGERONA is secure with respect to any ATKLOG-
attacker. In contrast to existing mechanisms, ANGERONA
provides precise tractability and completeness guarantees for
a practically relevant class of attackers. We empirically show
that ANGERONA scales to relevant problems of interest.
Structure. In §II, we illustrate the security risks associated
with probabilistic data dependencies. In §III, we present our
system model, which we formalize in §IV. We introduce
ATKLOG in §V and in §VI we present our inference engine
for acyclic programs. In §VII, we present ANGERONA. We
discuss related work in §VIII and draw conclusions in §IX. A
prototype of our enforcement mechanism is available at [36].
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Hospitals and medical research centres store large quantities
of health-related information for purposes ranging from diag-
1Angerona is the Roman goddess of silence and secrecy, and She is the
keeper of the city’s sacred, and secret, name.
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nosis to research. As this information is extremely sensitive,
the databases used must be carefully secured [13], [28]. This
task is, however, challenging due to the dependencies between
health-related data items. For instance, information about
someone’s hereditary diseases or genome can be inferred from
information about her relatives. Even seemingly non-sensitive
information, such as someone’s job or habits, may leak sen-
sitive health-related information such as her predisposition to
diseases. Most of these dependencies can be formalized using
probabilistic models developed by medical researchers.
Consider a database storing information about the smoking
habits of patients and whether they have been diagnosed with
lung cancer. The database contains the tables patient , smokes ,
cancer , father , and mother . The first table contains all
patients, the second contains all regular smokers, the third con-
tains all diagnosed patients, and the last two associate patients
with their parents. Now consider the following probabilistic
model: (a) every patient has a 5% chance of developing cancer,
(b) for each parent with cancer, the likelihood that a child
develops cancer increases by 15%, and (c) if a patient smokes
regularly, his probability of developing cancer increases by
25%. We intentionally work with a simple model since, despite
its simplicity, it illustrates the challenges of securing data with
probabilistic dependencies. We refer the reader to medical
research for more realistic probabilistic models [4], [69].
The database is shared between different medical re-
searchers, each conducting a research study on a subset of the
patients. All researchers have access to the patient , smokes ,
father , and mother tables. Each researcher, however, has
access only to the subset of the cancer table associated with
the patients that opted-in to his research study. We want to
protect our database against a malicious researcher whose goal
is to infer the health status of patients not participating in
the study. This is challenging since restricting direct access
to the cancer table is insufficient. Sensitive information may
be leaked even by queries involving only authorized data. For
instance, the attacker may know that the patient Carl , which
has not disclosed his health status, smokes regularly. From
this, he can infer that Carl ’s probability of developing lung
cancer is, at least, 30%. If, additionally, Carl ’s parents opted-
in to the research study and both have cancer, the attacker
can directly infer that the probability of Carl developing lung
cancer is 60% by accessing his parents’ information.
Security mechanisms that ignore such probabilistic depen-
dencies allow attackers to infer sensitive information. An
alternative is to use standard DBIC mechanisms and encode
all dependencies as precise, non-probabilistic, dependencies.
This, however, would result in an unusable system. Medical
researchers, even honest ones, would be able to access the
health-related status only of those patients whose relatives also
opted-in to the user study, independently of the amount of
leaked information, which may be negligible. Hence, to secure
the database and retain usability, it is essential to reason about
the probabilistic dependencies.
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Fig. 1: System model.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 depicts our system model. Users interact with
two components: a database system and an inference control
system, which consists of a Policy Decision Point (PDP) and
a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). We assume that all com-
munication between users and the components and between
the components themselves is over secure channels.
Database System. The database system manages the system’s
data. Its state is a mapping from tables to sets of tuples.
Users. Each user has a unique account used to retrieve
information from the database system by issuing SELECT
commands. Note that these commands do not change the
database state. This reflects settings where users have only
read-access to a database. Each command is checked by the
inference control system and is executed if and only if the
command is authorized by the security policy.
Security policy. The system’s security policy consists of
a set of negative permissions specifying information to be
kept secret. These permissions express bounds on users’
beliefs, formalized as probability distributions, about the actual
database content. Negative permissions are formalized using
commands of the form SECRET q FOR u THRESHOLD l, where
q is a query, u is a user identifier, and l is a rational
number, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1. This represents the requirement that
“A user u’s belief in the result of q must be less than l.”
Namely, the probability assigned by u’s belief to q’s result
must be less than l. Requirements like “A user u is not
authorized to know the result of q” can be formalized as
SECRET q FOR u THRESHOLD 1. The system also supports
commands of the form SECRET q FOR USERS NOT IN {u1,
. . . , un} THRESHOLD l, which represents the requirement that
“For all users u 6∈ {u1, . . . , un}, u’s belief in the result of q
must be less than l.”
Attacker. An attacker is a system user with an assigned user
account, and each user is a potential attacker. An attacker’s
goal is to violate the security policy, that is, to read or infer
information about one of the SECRETs with a probability of
at least the given threshold.
An attacker can interact with the system and observe its
behaviour in response to his commands. Furthermore, he
can reason about this information and infer information by
exploiting domain-specific relationships between data items.
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We assume that attackers know the database schema as well
as any integrity constraints on it.
Attacker Model. An attacker model represents each user’s
initial beliefs about the actual database state and how he
updates his beliefs by interacting with the system and ob-
serving its behaviour in response to his commands. These
beliefs may reflect the attacker’s knowledge of domain-specific
relationships between the data items or prior knowledge.
Inference Control System. The inference control system
protects the confidentiality of database data. It consists of
a PEP and a PDP, configured with a security policy P and
an attacker model ATK . For each user, the inference control
system keeps track of the user’s beliefs according to ATK .
The system intercepts all commands issued by the users.
When a user u issues a command c, the inference control
system decides whether u is authorized to execute c. If c
complies with the policy, i.e., the users’ beliefs still satisfy P
even after executing c, then the system forwards the command
to the database, which executes c and returns its result to u.
Otherwise, it raises a security exception and rejects c.
IV. FORMAL MODEL
A. Database Model
We introduce here background and notation for databases
and queries. Our formalization follows [2].
Let R be a countably infinite set representing identifiers of
relation schemas. A database schema D is a pair 〈Σ,dom〉,
where Σ is a first-order signature and dom is a fixed domain.
For simplicity, we consider just a single domain. Extensions
to the many-sorted case are straightforward [2]. The signature
Σ consists of a set of relation schemas R ∈ R, each schema
with arity |R|, and one constant symbol for each constant in
dom. We interpret constants by themselves in the semantics.
A state s of D is a finite Σ-structure with domain dom
that interprets each relation schema R by an |R|-ary relation
over dom. We denote by ΩD the set of all states. Given
a schema R ∈ D, s(R) denotes the tuples that belong to
(the interpretation of) R in the state s. We assume that the
domain dom is finite, as is standard for many application
areas combining databases and probabilistic reasoning [20],
[33], [47], [65]. In this case, the set of all states ΩD is finite.
A query q over a schema D is of the form {x |φ}, where x
is a sequence of variables, φ is a relational calculus formula
over D, and φ’s free variables are those in x. A boolean query
is a query { |φ}, also written as φ, where φ is a sentence. The
result of executing a query q on a state s, denoted by [q]s, is
a boolean value in {>,⊥}, if q is a boolean query, or a set of
tuples otherwise. Furthermore, given a sentence φ, JφK denotes
the set {s ∈ ΩD | [φ]s = >}. We denote by RC (respectively
RC bool ) the set of all relational calculus queries (respectively
sentences). We consider only domain-independent queries and
we employ the standard relational calculus semantics [2].
An integrity constraint over D is a relational calculus
sentence γ over D. Given a state s, we say that s satisfies
the constraint γ iff [γ]s = >. Given a set of constraints Γ,
patient
Alice
Bob
Carl
smokes
Bob
Carl
father
Bob Carl
mother
Alice Carl
Fig. 2: The template for all database states, where the content
of the cancer table is left unspecified.
ΩΓD denotes the set of all states satisfying the constraints in
Γ, i.e., ΩΓD = {s ∈ ΩD |
∧
γ∈Γ[γ]
s = >}.
Example IV.1. The database associated with the example
in §II consists of five relational schemas patient , smokes ,
cancer , father , and mother , where the first three schemas
have arity 1 and the last two have arity 2. We assume that
there are only three patients Alice, Bob, and Carl, so the
domain dom is {Alice, Bob, Carl}. The integrity constraints
are as follows:
• Alice, Bob, and Carl are patients.
patient(Alice) ∧ patient(Bob) ∧ patient(Carl)
• Alice and Bob are Carl’s parents.
∀x, y. (father(x, y)↔ (x = Bob ∧ y = Carl))∧
∀x, y. (mother(x, y)↔ (x = Alice ∧ y = Carl))
• Alice does not smoke, whereas Bob and Carl do.
¬smokes(Alice) ∧ smokes(Bob) ∧ smokes(Carl)
Given these constraints, there are just 8 possible database
states in ΩΓD, which differ only in their cancer relation. The
content of the cancer relation is a subset of {Alice, Bob,
Carl}, whereas the content of the other tables is shown in
Figure 2. We denote each possible world as sC , where the set
C ⊆ {Alice, Bob, Carl} denotes the users having cancer. 
B. Security Policies
Existing access control models for databases are inadequate
to formalize security requirements capturing probabilistic de-
pendencies. For example, SQL cannot express statements like
“A user u’s belief that φ holds must be less than l.” We
present a simple framework, inspired by knowledge-based
policies [51], for expressing such requirements.
A D-secret is a tuple 〈U, φ, l〉, where U is either a finite set
of users in U or a co-finite set of users, i.e., U = U \ U ′ for
some finite U ′ ⊂ U , φ is a relational calculus sentence over D,
and l is rational number 0 ≤ l ≤ 1 specifying the uncertainty
threshold. Abusing notation, when U consists of a single user
u, we write u instead of {u}. Informally, 〈U, φ, l〉 represents
that for each user u ∈ U , u’s belief that φ holds in the actual
database state must be less than l. Therefore, a command of the
form SECRET q FOR u THRESHOLD l can be represented as 〈u,
q, l〉, whereas a command SECRET q FOR USERS NOT IN {u1,
. . . , un} THRESHOLD l can be represented as 〈U\{u1, . . . , un},
q, l〉. Finally, a D-security policy is a finite set of D-secrets.
Given a D-security policy P , we denote by secrets(P, u) the
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set of D-secrets associated with the user u, i.e., secrets(P,
u) = {〈u, φ, l〉 | 〈U, φ, l〉 ∈ P∧u ∈ U}. Note that the function
secrets is computable since the set U is always either finite
or co-finite.
Our framework also allows the specification of lower
bounds. Requirements of the form “A user u’s belief that φ
holds must be greater than l” can be formalized as 〈u,¬φ,
1− l〉 (since the probability of ¬φ is 1−P (φ), where P (φ) is
φ’s probability). Security policies can be extended to support
secrets over non-boolean queries. A secret 〈u, {x | φ(x)},
l〉 can be seen as a shorthand for the set {〈u, φ[x 7→ t],
l〉 | t ∈ ⋃s∈ΩΓD [{x | φ(x)}]s}, i.e., u’s belief in any tuple
t being in the query’s result must be less than l.
Example IV.2. Let Mallory denote the malicious researcher
from §II and D be the schema from Example IV.1. Consider
the requirement from §II: Mallory’s belief in a patient hav-
ing cancer must be less than 50%. This can be formalized
as 〈Mallory , cancer(Alice), 1/2〉, 〈Mallory , cancer(Bob),
1/2〉, and 〈Mallory , cancer(Carl), 1/2〉, or equivalently as
〈Mallory , {p | cancer(p)}, 1/2〉. In contrast, the requirement
“For all users u that are not Carl , u’s belief in Carl hav-
ing cancer must be less than 50%” can be formalized as
〈U \{Carl}, cancer(Carl), 1/2〉, where Carl denotes the user
identifier associated with Carl. 
C. Formalized System Model
We now formalize our system model. We first define a sys-
tem configuration, which describes the database schema and
the integrity constraints. Afterwards, we define the system’s
state. Finally, we define a system run, which represents a
possible interaction of users with the system.
A system configuration is a tuple 〈D,Γ〉, where D is a
database schema and Γ is a set of D-integrity constraints. Let
C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration. A C-system state is a
tuple 〈db, U, P 〉, where db ∈ ΩΓD is a database state, U ⊂ U is
a finite set of users, and P is a D-security policy. A C-query
is a pair 〈u, φ〉 where u ∈ U is a user and φ is a relational
calculus sentence over D.2 We denote by ΩC the set of all
system states and by QC the set of all queries.
A C-event is a triple 〈q, a, res〉, where q is a C-query in
QC , a ∈ {>,⊥} is a security decision, where > stands for
“authorized query” and ⊥ stands for “unauthorized query”,
and res ∈ {>,⊥, †} is the query’s result, where > and ⊥
represent the usual boolean values and † represents that the
query was not executed as access was denied. Given a C-
event e = 〈q, a, res〉, we denote by q(e) (respectively a(e)
and res(e)) the query q (respectively the decision a and the
result res). A C-history is a finite sequence of C-events. We
denote by HC the set of all possible C-histories. Moreover,
given a sequence h, |h| denotes its length, h(i) its i-th element,
and hi the sequence containing the first i elements of h. We
2Without loss of generality, we focus only on boolean queries [2]. We can
support non-boolean queries as follows. Given a database state s and a query
q := {x | φ}, if the inference control mechanism authorizes the boolean
query
∧
t∈[q]s φ[x 7→ t] ∧ (∀x. φ →
∨
t∈[q]s x = t), then we return q’s
result, and otherwise we reject q as unauthorized.
also denote by h0 the empty sequence , and · denotes the
concatenation operator.
We now formalize Policy Decision Points. A C-PDP is a
function f : ΩC × QC × HC → {>,⊥} taking as input a
system state, a query, and a history and returning the security
decision, accept (>) or deny (⊥).
Let C be a system configuration, s = 〈db, U, P 〉 be a C-
state, and f be a C-PDP. A C-history h is compatible with
s and f iff for each 1 ≤ i ≤ |h|, (1) f(s, q(h(i)), hi−1) =
a(h(i)), (2) if a(h(i)) = ⊥, then res(h(i)) = †, and (3) if
a(h(i)) = >, then res(h(i)) = [φ]db , where q(h(i)) = 〈u,
φ〉. In other words, h is compatible with s and f iff it was
generated by the PDP f starting in state s.
A (C, f)-run is a pair 〈s, h〉, where s is a system state in
ΩC and h is a history in HC compatible with s and f . Since
all queries are SELECT queries, the system state does not
change along the run. Hence, our runs consist of a state and
a history instead of e.g., an alternating sequence of states and
actions (as is standard for runs). We denote by runs(C, f) the
set of all (C, f)-runs. Furthermore, given a run r = 〈〈db, U,
P 〉, h〉, we denote by ri the run 〈〈db, U, P 〉, hi〉, and we use
dot notation to access to r’s components. For instance, r.db
denotes the database state db and r.h denotes the history.
Example IV.3. Consider the run r = 〈〈db, U, P 〉, h〉, where
the database state db is the state s{A,B,C}, where Alice, Bob,
and Carl have cancer, the policy P is defined in Example IV.2,
the set of users U contains only Mallory , and the history h
is as follows (here we assume that all queries are authorized):
1) Mallory checks whether Carl smokes. Thus, h(1) =
〈〈Mallory , smokes(Carl)〉,>,>〉.
2) Mallory checks whether Carl is Alice’s and Bob’s
son. Therefore, h(2) is 〈〈Mallory , father(Bob, Carl) ∧
mother(Alice, Carl)〉,>,>〉.
3) Mallory checks whether Alice has cancer. Thus, h(3) =
〈〈Mallory , cancer(Alice)〉,>,>〉.
4) Mallory checks whether Bob has cancer. Thus, h(4) =
〈〈Mallory , cancer(Bob)〉,>,>〉. 
D. Attacker Model
To reason about DBIC, it is essential to precisely define
(1) how users interact with the system, (2) how they reason
about the system’s behaviour, (3) their initial beliefs about the
database state, and (4) how these beliefs change by observing
the system’s behaviour. We formalize this in an attacker model.
Each user has an initial belief about the database state.
Following [18], [19], [29], [51], we represent a user’s beliefs as
a probability distribution over all database states. Furthermore,
users observe the system’s behaviour and derive information
about the database content. We formalize a user’s observations
as an equivalence relation over runs, where two runs are
equivalent iff the user’s observations are the same in both runs,
as is standard in information-flow [7], [8]. A user’s knowledge
is the set of all database states that he considers possible
given his observations. Finally, we use Bayesian conditioning
to update a user’s beliefs given his knowledge.
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Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration and f be a C-
PDP. A C-probability distribution is a discrete probability
distribution given by a function P : ΩΓD → [0, 1] such that∑
db∈ΩΓD P (db) = 1. Given a set E ⊆ Ω
Γ
D, P (E) denotes∑
s∈E P (s). Furthermore, given two sets E
′, E′′ ⊆ ΩΓD such
that P (E′) 6= 0, P (E′′ | E′) denotes P (E′′ ∩ E′)/P (E′) as
is standard. We denote by PC the set of all possible C-
probability distributions. Abusing notation, we extend prob-
ability distributions to formulae: P (ψ) = P (JψK), whereJψK = {db ∈ ΩΓD | [ψ]db = >}.
We now introduce indistinstinguishability, an equivalence
relation used in information-flow control [41]. Let C be a
system configuration and f be a C-PDP. Given a history h
and a user u ∈ U , h|u denotes the history obtained from h
by removing all C-events from users other than u, namely
|u = , and if h = 〈〈u′, q〉, a, res〉 · h′, then h|u = h′|u
in case u 6= u′, and h|u = 〈〈u, q〉, a, res〉 · h′|u if u = u′.
Given two runs r = 〈〈db, U, P 〉, h〉 and r′ = 〈〈db′, U ′, P ′〉,
h′〉 in runs(C, f) and a user u ∈ U , we say that r and r′ are
indistinguishable for u, written r ∼u r′, iff h|u = h′|u. This
means that r and r′ are indistinguishable for a user u iff the
system’s behaviour in response to u’s commands is the same
in both runs. Note that ∼u depends on both C and f , which we
generally leave implicit. Given a run r, [r]∼u is the equivalence
class of r with respect to ∼u, i.e, [r]∼u = {r′ ∈ runs(C,
f) | r′ ∼u r}, whereas JrK∼u is set of all databases associated
to the runs in [r]∼u , i.e., JrK∼u = {db | ∃U,P, h. 〈〈db, U, P 〉,
h〉 ∈ [r]∼u}.
Definition IV.1. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a configuration and f be
a C-PDP. A (C, f)-attacker model is a function ATK : U →
PC associating to each user u ∈ U a C-probability distribution
representing u’s initial beliefs. Additionally, for all users u ∈
U and all states s ∈ ΩΓD, we require that ATK (u)(s) > 0. The
semantics of ATK is JATK K(u, r) = λs ∈ ΩΓD.ATK (u)(s |JrK∼u), where u ∈ U and r ∈ runs(C, f). 
The semantics of an attacker model ATK associates to each
user u and each run r the probability distribution obtained by
updating u’s initial beliefs given his knowledge with respect
to the run r. We informally refer to JATK K(u, r)(JφK) as u’s
beliefs in a sentence φ (given a run r).
Example IV.4. The attacker model for the example from
§II is as follows. Let XAlice, XBob, and XCarl be three
boolean random variables, representing the probability that the
corresponding patient has cancer. They define the following
joint probability distribution, which represents a user’s ini-
tial beliefs about the actual database state: P (XAlice, XBob,
XCarl) = P (XAlice) · P (XBob) · P (XCarl | XAlice, XBob).
The probability distributions of these variables are given in
Figure 3 and they are derived from the probabilistic model
in §II. We associate each outcome (x, y, z) of XAlice, XBob,
XCarl with the corresponding database state sC , where C is
the set of patients such that the outcome of the corresponding
variable is >. For each user u ∈ U , the distribution Pu is
defined as Pu(sC) = P (XAlice = x,XBob = y,XCarl = z),
XAlice
> 1/20
⊥ 19/20
XBob
> 6/20
⊥ 14/20
XCarl
XAlice XBob > ⊥
> > 12/20 8/20
> ⊥ 9/20 11/20
⊥ > 9/20 11/20
⊥ ⊥ 6/20 14/20
Fig. 3: Probability distribution for the random variables
XAlice, XBob, and XCarl from Example IV.4.
State Probability
s∅ 0.4655
s{A} 0.01925
s{B} 0.15675
s{C} 0.1995
State Probability
s{A,B} 0.006
s{A,C} 0.01575
s{B,C} 0.12825
s{A,B,C} 0.009
Fig. 4: Probability distribution over all database states. Each
state is denoted as sC , where C is the content of the cancer
table. Here we denote the patients’ names with their initials.
where x (respectively y and z) is > if Alice (respectively Bob
and Carl) is in C and ⊥ otherwise. Figure 4 shows the prob-
abilities associated with each state in ΩΓD, i.e., a user’s initial
beliefs. Finally, the attacker model is ATK = λu ∈ U .Pu. 
E. Confidentiality
We first define the notion of a secrecy-preserving run for a
secret 〈u, φ, l〉 and an attacker model ATK . Informally, a run
r is secrecy-preserving for 〈u, φ, l〉 iff whenever an attacker’s
belief in the secret φ is below the threshold l, then there is
no way for the attacker to increase his belief in φ above the
threshold. Our notion of secrecy-preserving runs is inspired
by existing security notions for query auditing [29].
Definition IV.2. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a configuration, f be a C-
PDP, and ATK be a (C, f)-attacker model. A run r is secrecy-
preserving for a secret 〈u, φ, l〉 and ATK iff for all 0 ≤ i < |r|,JATK K(u, ri)(φ) < l implies JATK K(u, ri+1)(φ) < l. 
We now formalize our confidentiality notion. A PDP pro-
vides data confidentiality for an attacker model ATK iff all
runs are secrecy-preserving for ATK . Note that our security
notion can be seen as a probabilistic generalization of opac-
ity [60] for the database setting. Our notion is also inspired
by the semantics of knowledge-based policies [51].
Definition IV.3. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration,
f be a C-PDP, and ATK be a (C, f)-attacker model. We say
that the PDP f provides data confidentiality with respect to C
and ATK iff for all runs r = 〈〈db, U, P 〉, h〉 in runs(C, f),
for all users u ∈ U , for all secrets s ∈ secrets(P, u), r is
secrecy-preserving for s and ATK . 
A PDP providing confidentiality ensures that if an attacker’s
initial belief in a secret φ is below the corresponding threshold,
then there is no way for the attacker to increase his belief in
φ above the threshold by interacting with the system. This
guarantee does not however apply to trivial non-secrets, i.e.,
those secrets an attacker knows with a probability at least the
threshold even before interacting with the system. No PDP can
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prevent their disclosure since the disclosure does not depend
on the attacker’s interaction with the database.
Example IV.5. Let r be the run given in Example IV.3,
ATK be the attacker model in Example IV.4, and u be
the user Mallory. In the following, φ1, φ2, and φ3 denote
cancer(Carl), cancer(Bob), and cancer(Alice) respectively,
i.e., the three secrets from Example IV.2. Furthermore, we
assume that the policy contains an additional secret 〈Mallory ,
φ4, 1/2〉, where φ4 := ¬cancer(Alice).
Figure 5 illustrates Mallory’s beliefs about φ1, . . . , φ4 and
whether the run is secrecy-preserving for the secrets φ1,
. . . , φ4. The probabilities in the tables can be obtained by
combining the states in JriK∼u , for 0 ≤ i ≤ 4, and JφjK, for
1 ≤ j ≤ 4, with the probabilities from Figure 4. As shown in
Figure 5, the run is not secrecy-preserving for the secrets φ1
and φ2 as it completely discloses that Alice and Bob have
cancer, in the third and fourth steps respectively. Secrecy-
preservation is also violated for the secret φ1, even though r
does not directly disclose any information about Carl ’s health
status. Indeed, in the last step of the run, Mallory’s belief in
φ1 is 0.6, which is higher than the threshold 1/2, even though
his belief in φ1 before learning that Bob had cancer was below
the threshold. Note that φ4 is a trivial non-secret: even before
interacting with the system, Mallory’s belief in φ4 is 0.95. 
F. Discussion
Our approach assumes that the attacker’s capabilities are
well-defined. While this, in general, is a strong assumption,
there are many domains where such information is known.
There are, however, domains where this information is
lacking. In these cases, security engineers must (1) determine
the appropriate beliefs capturing the desired attacker models,
and (2) formalize them. The latter can be done, for instance,
using ATKLOG (see §V). Note however that precisely eliciting
the attackers’ capabilities is still an open problem in DBIC.
V. ATKLOG
A. Probabilistic Logic Programming
PROBLOG [20], [21], [31] is a probabilistic logic pro-
gramming language with associated tool support. An exact
inference engine for PROBLOG is available at [1].
Conventional logic programs are constructed from terms,
atoms, literals, and rules. In the following, we consider only
function-free logic programs, also called DATALOG programs.
In this setting, terms are either variable identifiers or constants.
Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite domain,
and Var be a countably infinite set of variable identifiers. A
(Σ,dom)-atom R(v1, . . . , vn) consists of a predicate symbol
R ∈ Σ and arguments v1, . . . , vn such that n is the arity of
R, and each vi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is either a variable identifier
in Var or a constant in dom. We denote by AΣ,dom the
set {R(v1, . . . , v|R|) | R ∈ Σ ∧ v1, . . . , v|R| ∈ dom ∪ Var}
of all (Σ,dom)-atoms. A (Σ,dom)-literal l is either a (Σ,
dom)-atom a or its negation ¬a, where a ∈ AΣ,dom. We
denote by LΣ,dom the set AΣ,dom ∪ {¬a | a ∈ AΣ,dom} of
all (Σ,dom)-literals. Given a literal l, vars(l) denotes the set
of its variables, args(l) the list of its arguments, and pred(l)
the predicate symbol used in l. As is standard, we say that a
literal l is positive if it is an atom in AΣ,dom and negative
if it is the negation of an atom. Furthermore, we say that a
literal l is ground iff vars(l) = ∅.
A (Σ,dom)-rule is of the form h← l1, . . . , ln, e1, . . . , em,
where h ∈ AΣ,dom is a (Σ,dom)-atom, l1, . . . , ln ∈ LΣ,dom
are (Σ,dom)-literals, and e1, . . . , em are equality and in-
equality constraints over the variables in h, l1, . . . , lm.3 Given
a rule r, we denote by head(r) the atom h, by body(r) the
literals l1, . . . , ln, by cstr(r) the constraints e1, . . . , em, and
by body(r, i) the i-th literal in r’s body, i.e., body(r, i) = li.
Furthermore, we denote by body+(r) (respectively body−(r))
all positive (respectively negative) literals in body(r). As is
standard, we assume that the free variables in a rule’s head
are a subset of the free variables of the positive literals in
the rule’s body, i.e., vars(head(r)) ⊆ ⋃l∈body+(r) vars(l) ∪⋃
(x=c)∈cstr(r)∧c∈dom{x}. Finally, a (Σ,dom)-logic program
is a set of (Σ,dom)-ground atoms and (Σ,dom)-rules. We
consider only programs p that do not contain negative cycles
in the rules as is standard for stratified DATALOG [2].
To reason about probabilities, PROBLOG extends logic
programming with probabilistic atoms. A (Σ,dom)-proba-
bilistic atom is a (Σ,dom)-atom a annotated with a value
0 ≤ v ≤ 1, denoted v::a. PROBLOG supports both proba-
bilistic ground atoms and rules having probabilistic atoms in
their heads. PROBLOG also supports annotated disjunctions
v1::a1; . . . ; vn::an, where a1, . . . , an are ground atoms and(∑
1≤i≤n vi
)
≤ 1, which denote that a1, . . . , an are mutually
exclusive probabilistic events happening with probabilities v1,
. . . , vn. Annotated disjunctions can either be used as ground
atoms or as heads in rules. Both annotated disjunctions and
probabilistic rules are just syntactic sugar and can be expressed
using ground probabilistic atoms and standard rules [20], [21],
[31]; see Appendix A.
A (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program p defines a probability
distribution over all possible (Σ,dom)-structures, denotedJpK. Note that we consider only function-free PROBLOG
programs. Hence, in our setting, PROBLOG is a probabilistic
extension of DATALOG. Appendix A contains a formal account
of PROBLOG’s semantics.
Medical Data. We formalize the probability distribution
from Example IV.4 as a PROBLOG program. We reuse the
database schema and the domain from Example IV.1 as
the first-order signature and the domain for the PROBLOG
program. First, we encode the template shown in Fig-
ure 2 using ground atoms: patient(Alice), patient(Bob),
patient(Carl), smokes(Bob), smokes(Carl), father(Bob,
Carl), and mother(Alice, Carl). Second, we encode the
probability distribution associated with the possible values of
the cancer table using the following PROBLOG rules, which
3Without loss of generality, we assume that equality constraints involving
a variable v and a constant c are of the form v = c.
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i
JATK K(u, ri)(JφK) JATK K(u, ri+1)(JφK) Secrecy
φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4
0 0.3525 0.3 0.05 0.95 0.3525 0.3 0.05 0.95 X X X ∗
1 0.3525 0.3 0.05 0.95 0.3525 0.3 0.05 0.95 X X X ∗
2 0.3525 0.3 0.05 0.95 0.495 0.3 1 0 X X X ∗
3 0.495 0.3 1 0 0.6 1 1 0 X X X ∗
4 0.6 1 1 0 – – – – – – – –
Fig. 5: Evolution of Mallory’s beliefs in the secrets φ1, . . . , φ4 for the run r and the attacker model ATK from Example IV.5.
In the table, X and X denote that secrecy-preservation is violated and satisfied respectively, whereas ∗ denotes trivial secrets.
have probabilistic atoms in their heads:
1/20::cancer(x)← patient(x)
5/19::cancer(x)← smokes(x)
3/14::cancer(y)← father(x, y), cancer(x),
mother(z, y),¬cancer(z)
3/14::cancer(y)← father(x, y),¬cancer(x),
mother(z, y), cancer(z)
3/7::cancer(y)← father(x, y), cancer(x),
mother(z, y), cancer(z)
The coefficients in the above example are derived from §II.
For instance, the probability that a smoking patient x whose
parents are not not in the cancer relation has cancer is 30%.
The coefficient in the first rule is 1/20 since each patient has
a 5% probability of having cancer. The coefficient in the
second rule is 5/19, which is (6/20− 1/20) · (1− 1/20)−1, i.e.,
the probability that cancer(x) is derived from the second rule
given that it has not been derived from the first rule. This
ensures that the overall probability of deriving cancer(x) is
6/20, i.e., 30%. The coefficients for the last two rules are
derived analogously.
Informally, a probabilistic ground atom 1/2::cancer(Bob)
expresses that cancer(Bob) holds with a probability 1/2.
Similarly, the rule 1/20::cancer(x) ← patient(x) states that,
for any x such that patient(x) holds, then cancer(x) can
be derived with probability 1/20. This program yields the
probability distribution shown in Figure 4.
B. ATKLOG’s Foundations
We first introduce belief programs, which formalize an
attacker’s initial beliefs. Afterwards, we formalize ATKLOG.
Belief Programs. A belief program formalizes an attacker’s
beliefs as a probability distribution over the database states.
A database schema D′ = 〈Σ′,dom〉 extends a schema
D = 〈Σ,dom〉 iff Σ′ contains all relation schemas in Σ. The
extension D′ may extend Σ with additional predicate sym-
bols necessary to encode probabilistic dependencies. Given
an extension D′, a D′-state s′ agrees with a D-state s iff
s′(R) = s(R) for all R in D. Given a D-state s, we denote
by EXT (s,D,D′) the set of all D′-states that agree with s.
A (Σ′,dom)-PROBLOG program p, where D′ = 〈Σ′,
dom〉 extends D, is a belief program over D. The D-
semantics of p is JpKD = λs ∈ ΩD. ∑s′∈EXT(s,D,D′)JpK(s′).
Given a system configuration C = 〈D,Γ〉, a belief program
p over D complies with C iff JpKD is a C-probability
distribution. With a slight abuse of notation, we lift the
semantics of belief programs to sentences: JpKD = λφ ∈
RCbool .
∑
s′∈{s∈ΩD|[φ]s=>}JpKD(s′).
ATKLOG. An ATKLOG model specifies the initial beliefs of
all users in U using belief programs.
Let D be a database schema and C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system
configuration. A C-ATKLOG model ATK is a function associ-
ating to each user u ∈ U , where U ⊂ U is a finite set of users,
a belief program pu and to all users u ∈ U\U a belief program
p0, such that for all users u ∈ U , JATK (u)KD complies with
C and for all database states s ∈ ΩΓD, JATK (u)KD(s) > 0,
i.e., all database states satisfying the integrity constraints are
possible. Informally, a C-ATKLOG model associates a distinct
belief program to each user in U , and it associates to each user
in U \ U the same belief program p0.
Given a C-PDP f , a C-ATKLOG model ATK defines the
(C, f)-attacker model λu ∈ U .JATK (u)KD that associates to
each user u ∈ U the probability distribution defined by the
belief program ATK (u). The semantics of this (C, f)-attacker
model is: λu ∈ U .λr ∈ runs(C, f).λs ∈ ΩΓD. JATK (u)KD(s |JrK∼u). Informally, given a C-ATKLOG model ATK , a C-
PDP f , and a user u, u’s belief in a database state s, given a
run r, is obtained by conditioning the probability distribution
defined by the belief program ATK (u) given the set of
database states corresponding to all runs r′ ∼u r.
VI. TRACTABLE INFERENCE FOR PROBLOG PROGRAMS
Probabilistic inference in PROBLOG is intractable in gen-
eral. Its data complexity, i.e., the complexity of inference
when only the programs’ probabilistic ground atoms are part
of the input and the rules are considered fixed and not part
of the input, is #P -hard; see Appendix B. This limits the
practical applicability of PROBLOG (and ATKLOG) for DBIC.
To address this, we define acyclic PROBLOG programs, a class
of programs where the data complexity of inference is PTIME.
Given a PROBLOG program p, our inference algorithm
consists of three steps: (1) we compute all of p’s derivations,
(2) we compile these derivations into a Bayesian Network
(BN) bn , and (3) we perform the inference over bn . To
ensure tractability, we leverage two key insights. First,
we exploit guarded negation [9] to develop a sound over-
approximation, called the relaxed grounding, of all derivations
of a program that is independent of the presence (or absence)
of the probabilistic atoms. This ensures that whenever a
ground atom can be derived from a program (for a possible
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assignment to the probabilistic atoms), the atom is also part of
this program’s relaxed grounding. This avoids grounding p for
each possible assignment to the probabilistic atoms. Second,
we introduce syntactic constraints (acyclicity) that ensure that
bn is a forest of poly-trees. This ensures tractability since
inference for poly-tree BNs can be performed in polynomial
time in the network’s size [47].
We also precisely characterize the expressiveness of acyclic
PROBLOG programs. In this respect, we prove that acyclic
programs are as expressive as forests of poly-tree BNs, one of
the few classes of BNs with tractable inference.
As mentioned in §V, probabilistic rules and annotated dis-
junctions are just syntactic sugar. Hence, in the following we
consider PROBLOG programs consisting just of probabilistic
ground atoms and non-probabilistic rules. Note also that we
treat ground atoms as rules with an empty body.
A. Preliminaries
Negation-guarded Programs. A rule r is negation-
guarded [9] iff all the variables occurring in negative literals
also occur in positive literals, namely for all negative literals
l in body−(r), vars(l) ⊆ ⋃l′∈body+(r) vars(l′). To illustrate,
the rule C(x) ← A(x),¬B(x) is negation-guarded, whereas
C(x) ← A(x),¬B(x, y) is not since the variable y does
not occur in any positive literal. We say that a program p
is negation-guarded if all rules r ∈ p are.
Relaxed Grounding. The relaxed grounding of a program
p is obtained by considering all probabilistic atoms as cer-
tain and by grounding all positive literals. For all negation-
guarded programs, the relaxed grounding of p is a sound over-
approximation of all possible derivations in p. Given a program
p and a rule r ∈ p, rg(p) denotes p’s relaxed grounding and
rg(p, r) denotes the set of r’s ground instances. We formalize
relaxed groundings in Appendix B.
Example VI.1. Let p be the program consisting of the
facts 1/2::A(1), A(2), A(3), D(1), E(2), F (1), O(1, 2), and
2/3::O(2, 3), and the rules ra = B(x) ← A(x), D(x),
rb = B(x) ← A(x), E(x), and rc = B(y) ← B(x),¬F (x),
O(x, y). The relaxed grounding of p consists of the initial
facts together with B(1), B(2), and B(3), whereas rg(p, rc)
consists of B(2)← B(1),¬F (1), O(1, 2) and B(3)← B(2),
¬F (2), O(2, 3). 
Dependency and Ground Graphs. The dependency graph
of a program p, denoted graph(p), is the directed labelled
graph having as nodes all the predicate symbols in p and
having an edge a
r,i−→ b iff there is a rule r such that a
occurs in i-th literal in r’s body and b occurs in r’s head.
Figure 6 depicts the dependency graph from Example VI.1.
The ground graph of a program p is the graph obtained from
its relaxed grounding. Hence, there is an edge a
r,gr ,i−−−→ b
from the ground atom a to the ground atom b iff there is
a rule r and a ground rule gr ∈ rg(p, r) such that body(gr ,
i) ∈ {a,¬a} and head(gr) = b. Figure 7 depicts the ground
graph from Example VI.1. Note that there are no incoming or
A
B
F
D
O
E ra, 1rb, 1
rc, 1
rc,
2 rc , 3
rb , 2 ra,
2
Fig. 6: Dependency graph for the program in Example VI.1.
A(1) D(1)
B(1)
A(2) E(2)
F (1) O(1, 2)B(2)
F (2)A(3) O(2, 3)
B(3)
ra , r ′
a , 1 ra
, r
′
a
, 2
rc, r
1
c, 2
r
b , r ′
b , 1
r
c
,
r
2 c
,
1
rb
, r
′
b
, 2
rc, r
1
c, 3
rc , r 2
c , 2
r
c
,
r
2 c
,
1
rc
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2
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Fig. 7: Ground graph for the program in Example VI.1. The
ground rules r′a, r
′
b, r
1
c , and r
2
c are as follows: r
′
a = B(1)←
A(1), D(1), r′b = B(2) ← A(2), E(2), r1c = B(2) ← B(1),
¬F (1), O(1, 2), and r2c = B(3)← B(2),¬F (2), O(2, 3).
outgoing edges from A(3) because the node is not involved
in any derivation.
Propagation Maps. We use propagation maps to track how
information flows inside rules. Given a rule r and a literal l ∈
body(r), the (r, l)-vertical map is the mapping µ from {1, . . . ,
|l|} to {1, . . . , |head(r)|} such that µ(i) = j iff args(l)(i) =
args(head(r))(j) and args(l)(i) ∈ Var . Given a rule r and
literals l and l′ in r’s body, the (r, l, l′)-horizontal map is the
mapping µ from {1, . . . , |l|} to {1, . . . , |l′|} such that µ(i) = j
iff args(l)(i) = args(l′)(j) and args(l)(i) ∈ Var .
We say that a path links to a literal l if information
flows along the rules to l. This can be formalized by posing
constraints on the mapping obtained by combining horizontal
and vertical maps along the path. Formally, given a literal
l and a mapping ν : N → N, a directed path pr1 r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn ν-downward links to l iff there is a
0 ≤ j < n − 1 such that the function µ := µ′ ◦ µj ◦ . . . ◦ µ1
satisfies µ(k) = ν(k) for all k for which ν(k) is defined, where
for 1 ≤ h ≤ j, µh is the (rh, body(rh, ih))-vertical map, and
µ′ is the horizontal map connecting body(rj+1, ij+1) with l.
Similarly, a directed path pr1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn ν-
upward links to l iff there is a 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 such that the
function µ := µ′−1◦µ−1j+1◦. . .◦µ−1n−1 satisfies µ(k) = ν(k) for
all k for which ν(k) is defined, where µh is the (rh, body(rh,
ih))-vertical map, for j < h ≤ n − 1, and µ′ is the (rj , l)-
vertical map. A path P links to a predicate symbol a iff there
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is an atom a(x) such that P links to a(x).
Example VI.2. The horizontal map connecting A(x) and
D(x) in ra, i.e., the (ra, A(x), D(x))-horizontal map, is
{1 7→ 1}. The horizontal map connecting A(x) and E(x) in
rb is {1 7→ 1} as well. Hence, the path A ra,1−−→ B downward
links to D and the path A
rb,1−−→ B downward links to E
for the mapping {1 7→ 1}. Furthermore, the path B rc,1−−→ B
downward links to O for {1 7→ 1} since the (rc, B(x), O(x,
y))-horizontal map is {1 7→ 1}. Finally, the path B rc,1−−→ B
upward links to O for {2 7→ 1} since the (rc, O(x, y))-vertical
map is {2 7→ 1}. 
B. Acyclic PROBLOG programs
A sufficient condition for tractable inference is that p’s
ground graph is a forest of poly-trees. This requires that p’s
ground graph neither contains directed nor undirected cycles,
or, equivalently, the undirected version of p’s ground graph
is acyclic. To illustrate, the ground graph in Figure 7 is a
poly-tree. The key insight here is that a cycle among ground
atoms is caused by a (directed or undirected) cycle among
p’s predicate symbols. In a nutshell, acyclicity requires that
all possible cycles in graph(p) are guarded. This ensures that
cycles in graph(p) do not lead to cycles in the ground graph.
Additionally, acyclicity requires that programs are negation-
guarded. This ensures that the relaxed grounding and the
ground graph are well-defined. In the following, let p be a
(Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program.
Annotations. Annotations represent properties of the relations
induced by the program p, and they are syntactically derived
by analysing p’s ground atoms and rules.
Let a, a′ ∈ Σ be two predicate symbols such that |a| =
|a′|. A disjointness annotation DIS (a, a′) represents that the
relations induced by a and a′ (given p’s relaxed grounding)
are disjoint. We say that DIS (a, a′) can be derived from p iff
no rules in p contain a or a′ in their heads, and there is no
v ∈ dom|a| where both a(v) and a′(v) appear as (possibly
probabilistic) ground atoms in p. Hence, the relations induced
by a and a′ are disjoint.
Let n ∈ N and A ⊆ Σ be a set of predicate symbols
such that |a| = 2n for all a ∈ A. An ordering annotation
ORD(A) represents that the transitive closure of the union
of the relations induced by predicates in A given p’s relaxed
grounding is a strict partial order over domn. The annotation
ORD(A) can be derived from the program p iff there is no
rule r ∈ p that contains any of the predicates in A in its head
and the transitive closure of
⋃
a∈A{((v1, . . . , vn), (vn+1, . . . ,
v2n)) | ∃k. k::a(v1, . . . , v2n) ∈ p} is a strict partial order
over domn. Hence, the closure of the relation
⋃
a∈A{((v1,
. . . , vn), (vn+1, . . . , v2n)) | a(v1, . . . , v2n) ∈ rg(p)} induced
by the relaxed grounding is a strict partial order.
Let a ∈ Σ be a predicate symbol and K ⊆ {1, . . . ,
|a|}. A uniqueness annotation UNQ(a,K) represents that the
attributes in K are a primary key for the relation induced by
a given the relaxed grounding. We say that UNQ(a,K) can
be derived from a program p iff no rule contains a in its head
and for all v, v′ ∈ dom|a|, if (1) v(i) = v′(i) for all i ∈ K,
and (2) there are k and k′ such k::a(v) ∈ p and k′::a(v′) ∈ p,
then v = v′. This ensures that whenever a(v), a(v′) ∈ rg(p)
and v(i) = v′(i) for all i ∈ K, then v = v′.
A Σ-template T is a set of annotations. In Appendix B, we
relax our syntactic rules for deriving annotations.
Example VI.3. We can derive DIS (D,E) from the program
in Example VI.1 since no rule generates facts for D and E and
the relations defined by the ground atoms are {1} and {2}.
We can also derive ORD({O}) since the relation defined by
O’s ground atoms is {(1, 2), (2, 3)}, whose transitive closure
is a strict partial order. Finally, we can derive UNQ(O, {1}),
UNQ(O, {2}), and UNQ(O, {1, 2}) since both arguments of
O uniquely identify the tuples in the relation induced by O.
Unsafe structures. An unsafe structure models a part of the
dependency graph that may introduce cycles in the ground
graph. We define directed and undirected unsafe structures
which may respectively introduce directed and undirected
cycles in the ground graph.
A directed unsafe structure in graph(p) is a directed cycle C
in graph(p). We say that a directed unsafe structure C covers
a directed cycle C ′ iff C is equivalent to C ′.
An undirected unsafe structure in graph(p) is quadruple
〈D1, D2, D3, U〉 such that (1) D1, D2, and D3 are directed
paths whereas U is an undirected path, (2) D1 and D2 start
from the same node, (3) D2 and D3 end in the same node, and
(4) D1 ·U ·D3 ·D2 is an undirected cycle in graph(p). We say
that an unsafe structure 〈D1, D2, D3, U〉 covers an undirected
cycle U ′ in graph(p) iff D1 ·U ·D3 ·D2 is equivalent to U ′.
Example VI.4. The cycle introduced by the rule rc is captured
by the directed unsafe structure B
rc,1−−→ B, while the cycle
introduced by ra and rb is captured by the structure 〈A ra,1−−→
B,A
rb,1−−→ B, , 〉, where  denotes the empty path. 
Connected Rules. A connected rule r ensures that a ground-
ing of r is fully determined either by the assignment to the
head’s variables or to the variables of any literal in r’s body.
Formally, a strongly connected rule r guarantees that for any
two groundings gr ′, gr ′′ of r, if head(gr ′) = head(gr ′′), then
gr ′ = gr ′′. In contrast, a weakly connected rule r guaran-
tees that for any two groundings gr ′, gr ′′ of r, if body(gr ′,
i) = body(gr ′′, i) for some i, then gr ′ = gr ′′. This is done by
exploiting uniqueness annotations and the rule’s structure.
Before formalizing connected rules, we introduce join trees.
A join tree represents how multiple predicate symbols in a rule
share variables. In the following, let r be a rule and T be a
template. A join tree for a rule r is a rooted labelled tree (N,
E, root , λ), where N ⊆ body(r), E is a set of edges (i.e., un-
ordered pairs over N2), root ∈ N is the tree’s root, and λ is the
labelling function. Moreover, we require that for all n, n′ ∈ N ,
if n 6= n′ and (n, n′) ∈ E, then λ(n, n′) = vars(n)∩vars(n′)
and λ(n, n′) 6= ∅. A join tree (N,E, root , λ) covers a literal
l iff l ∈ N . Given a join tree J = (N,E, root , λ) and a
node n ∈ N , the support of n, denoted support(n), is the
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set vars(head(r)) ∪ {x | (x = c) ∈ cstr(r) ∧ c ∈ dom} ∪
{vars(n′) | n′ ∈ anc(J, n)}, where anc(J, n) is the set of n’s
ancestors in J , i.e., the set of all nodes (different from n) on
the path from root to n. A join tree J = (N,E, root , λ) is
T -strongly connected iff for all positive literals l ∈ N , there
is a set K ⊆ {i | x = args(l) ∧ x(i) ∈ support(l)} such that
UNQ(pred(l),K) ∈ T and for all negative literals l ∈ N ,
vars(l) ⊆ support(l). In contrast, a join tree (N,E, root , λ)
is T -weakly connected iff for all (a(x), a′(x′)) ∈ E, there are
K ⊆ {i | x(i) ∈ L} and K ′ ⊆ {i | x′(i) ∈ L} such that
UNQ(a,K),UNQ(a′,K ′) ∈ T , where L = λ(a(x), a′(x′)).
We now formalize strongly and weakly connected rules.
A rule r is T -strongly connected iff there exist T -strongly
connected join trees J1, . . . , Jn that cover all literals in r’s
body. This guarantees that for any two groundings gr ′, gr ′′ of
r, if head(gr ′) = head(gr ′′), then gr ′ = gr ′′.
Given a rule r, a set of literals L, and a template T , a literal
l ∈ body(r) is (r, T , L)-strictly guarded iff (1) vars(l) ⊆⋃
l′∈L∩body+(r) vars(l
′)∪{x | (x = c) ∈ cstr(r)∧c ∈ dom},
and (2) there is a positive literal a(x) ∈ L and an annotation
UNQ(a,K) ∈ T such that {x(i) | i ∈ K} ⊆ vars(l). A rule
r is weakly connected for T iff there exists a T -weakly con-
nected join tree J = (N,E, root , λ) such that N ⊆ body+(r),
and all literals in body(r) \N are (r, T , N)-strictly guarded.
This guarantees that for any two groundings gr ′, gr ′′ of r, if
body(gr ′, i) = body(gr ′′, i) for some i, then gr ′ = gr ′′.
Example VI.5. Let T be the template from Example VI.3.
The rule rc := B(y) ← B(x),¬F (x), O(x, y) is T -strongly
connected. Indeed, the join tree having O(x, y) as root and
B(x) and ¬F (x) as leaves is such that (1) there is a uniqueness
annotation UNQ(O, {2}) in T such that the second variable
in O(x, y) is included in those of rc’s head, (2) the variables
in B(x) and ¬F (x) are a subset of those of their ancestors,
and (3) the tree covers all literals in rc’s body. The rule is also
T -weakly connected: the join tree consisting only of O(x, y)
is T -weakly connected and the literals B(x) and ¬F (x) are
strictly guarded. Note that the rules ra and rb are trivially both
strongly and weakly connected. 
Guarded undirected structures. Guarded undirected
structures ensure that undirected cycles in the dependency
graph do not correspond to undirected cycles in the ground
graph by exploiting disjointness annotations. Formally, an
undirected unsafe structure 〈D1, D2, D3, U〉 is guarded by
a template T iff either (D1, D2) is T -head-guarded or
(D2, D3) is T -tail-guarded.
A pair of non-empty paths (P1, P2) sharing the same initial
node a is T -head guarded iff (1) if P1 = P2, all rules in P1
are weakly connected for T , or (2) if P1 6= P2, there is an
annotation DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ T , a set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |a|}, and
a bijection ν : K → {1, . . . , |pr |} such that P1 ν-downward
links to pr and P2 ν-downward links to pr ′. Given two ground
paths P ′1 and P
′
2 corresponding to P1 and P2, the first condition
ensures that P ′1 = P
′
2 whereas the second ensures that P
′
1 or
P ′2 are not in the ground graph.
Similarly, a pair of non-empty paths (P1, P2) sharing the
same final node a is T -tail guarded iff (1) if P1 = P2, all
rules in P1 are strongly connected for T , or (2) if P1 6= P2,
there is an annotation DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ T , a set K ⊆ {1, . . . ,
|a|}, and a bijection ν : K → {1, . . . , |pr |}, such that P1
ν-upward links to pr and P2 ν-upward links to pr ′.
Example VI.6. The only non-trivially guarded undirected
cycle in the graph from Figure 6 is the one represented by the
undirected unsafe structure 〈A ra,1−−→ B,A rb,1−−→ B, , 〉. The
structure is guarded since the paths A
ra,1−−→ B and A rb,1−−→ B
are head guarded by DIS (D,E). Indeed, for the same ground
atom A(v), for some v ∈ {1, 2, 3}, only one of ra and rb can
be applied since D and E are disjoint. 
Guarded directed structures. Guarded directed structures
exploit ordering annotations to ensure that directed cycles in
the dependency graph do not correspond to directed cycles
among ground atoms. A directed unsafe structure pr1
r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn,in−−−→ pr1 is guarded by a template T iff there is
an annotation ORD(O) ∈ T , integers 1 ≤ y1 < y2 <
. . . < ye = n, literals o1(x1), . . . , oe(xe) (where o1, . . . ,
oe ∈ O), a non-empty set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |pr1|}, and a bijection
ν : K → {1, . . . , |o|/2} such that for each 0 ≤ k < e,
(1) pryk
ryk ,iyk−−−−−→ . . . ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→ pryk+1 ν-downward
connects to ok+1(xk+1), and (2) pryk+1−1
ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→
pryk+1 ν
′-upward connects to ok+1(xk+1), where ν′(i) =
ν(x) + |o1|/2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |o1|/2, and y0 = 1.
Example VI.7. The directed unsafe structure B rc,1−−→ B is
guarded by ORD({O}) in the template from Example VI.3.
Indeed, the strict partial order induced by O breaks the cycle
among ground atoms belonging to B. In particular, the path
B
rc,1−−→ B both downward links and upward links to O(x, y);
see Example VI.2. 
Acyclic Programs. Let p be a negation-guarded program
and T be the template containing all annotations that can
be derived from p. We say that p is acyclic iff (a) for all
undirected cycles U in graph(p) that are not directed cycles,
there is a T -guarded undirected unsafe structure that covers
U , and (b) for all directed cycles C in graph(p), there is a T -
guarded directed unsafe structure that covers C. This ensures
the absence of cycles in the ground graph.
Proposition VI.1. Let p be a PROBLOG program. If p is
acyclic, then the ground graph of p is a forest of poly-trees.
Example VI.8. The program p from Example VI.1 is acyclic.
This is reflected in the ground graph in Figure 7. The pro-
gram q = p ∪ {E(1)}, however, is not acyclic: we cannot
derive DIS (D,E) from q and the undirected unsafe structure
〈A ra,1−−→ B,A rb,1−−→ B, , 〉 is not guarded. As expected, q’s
ground graph contains an undirected cycle between A(1) and
B(1), as shown in Figure 8. 
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Fig. 8: Ground graph for the program in Example VI.1
extended with the atom E(1). The additional edges and nodes
are represented using dashed lines. The ground rules r′a, r
′
b,
r1c , and r
2
c are as in Figure 7, and r
′ = B(1)← A(1), E(1).
X[B(2)] X[F (2)] X[O(2, 3)]
X[rc, r
2
c , B(3)]
Selected CPTs.
X[rc, r
2
c , B(3)]
X[B(2)] X[F (2)] X[O(2, 3)] > ⊥
> > > 0 1
> > ⊥ 0 1
> ⊥ > 1 0
> ⊥ ⊥ 0 1
⊥ > > 0 1
⊥ > ⊥ 0 1
⊥ ⊥ > 0 1
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 0 1
Fig. 9: Portion of the resulting BN for the atoms B(2), F (2),
and O(2, 3), the rule rc = B(y)← B(x),¬F (x), O(x, y), and
the ground rule r2c = B(3)← B(2),¬F (2), O(2, 3), together
with the CPT encoding r2c ’s semantics.
Expressiveness. Acyclicity trades off the programs
expressible in PROBLOG for a tractable inference procedure.
Acyclic programs, nevertheless, can encode many relevant
probabilistic models.
Proposition VI.2. Any forest of poly-tree BNs can be repre-
sented as an acyclic PROBLOG program.
To clarify this proposition’s scope, observe that poly-tree
BNs are one of the few classes of BNs with tractable inference
procedures. From Proposition VI.2, it follows that a large
class of probabilistic models with tractable inference can be
represented as acyclic programs. This supports our thesis that
our syntactic constraints are not overly restrictive. In Appendix
B, we relax acyclicity to support a limited form of annotated
disjunctions and rules sharing a part of their bodies, which
are needed to encode the example from §V and for Proposi-
tion VI.2. We also provide all the proofs.
C. Inference Engine
Our inference algorithm for acyclic PROBLOG programs
consists of three steps: (1) we compute the relaxed grounding
of p (cf. §VI-A), (2) we compile the relaxed grounding into a
Bayesian Network (BN), and (3) we perform the inference us-
ing standard algorithms for poly-tree Bayesian Networks [47].
Encoding as BNs. We compile the relaxed grounding rg(p)
into the BN bn(p). The boolean random variables in bn(p) are
as follows: (a) for each atom a in rg(p) and ground literal a
or ¬a occurring in any gr ∈ ⋃r∈p rg(p, r), there is a random
variable X[a], (b) for each rule r ∈ p and each ground atom a
such that there is gr ∈ rg(p, r) satisfying a = head(gr), there
is a random variable X[r, a], and (c) for each rule r ∈ p, each
ground atom a, and each ground rule gr ∈ rg(p, r) such that
a = head(gr), there is a random variable X[r, gr , a].
The edges in bn(p) are as follows: (a) for each ground atom
a, rule r, and ground rule gr , there is an edge from X[r, gr , a]
to X[r, a] and an edge from X[r, a] to X[a], and (b) for each
ground atoms a and b, rule r, and ground rule gr , there is an
edge from X[b] to X[r, gr , a] if b occurs in gr ’s body.
Finally, the Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) of the
variables in bn(p) are as follows. The CPT of variables of the
form X[a] and X[r, a] is just the OR of the values of their
parents, i.e., the value is > with probability 1 iff at least one
of the parents has value >. For variables of the form X[r,
gr , a] such that body(r) 6= ∅, then the variable’s CPT encode
the semantics of the rule r, i.e., the value of X[r, gr , a] is >
with probability 1 iff all positive literals have value > and
all negative literals have value ⊥. In contrast, for variables of
the form X[r, gr , a] such that body(r) = ∅, then the variable
has value > with probability v and ⊥ with probability 1− v,
where r is of the form v::a (if r = a then v = 1).
To ensure that the size of the CPT of variables of the form
X[r, a] is independent of the size of the relaxed grounding,
instead of directly connecting variables of the form X[r, gr , a]
with X[r, a], we construct a binary tree of auxiliary variables
where the leaves are all variables of the form X[r, gr , a] and
the root is the variable X[r, a]. Figure 9 depicts a portion of
the BN for the program in Example VI.1.
Complexity. We now introduce the main result of this section.
Theorem VI.1. The data complexity of inference for acyclic
PROBLOG programs is PTIME.
This follows from (1) the relaxed grounding and the en-
coding can be computed in PTIME in terms of data com-
plexity, (2) the encoding ensures that, for acyclic programs,
the resulting Bayesian Network is a forest of poly-trees,
and (3) inference algorithms for poly-tree BNs [47] run in
polynomial time in the BN’s size. In Appendix B, we extend
our encoding to handle additional features such as annotated
disjunctions, and we prove its correctness and complexity.
VII. ANGERONA
ANGERONA is a DBIC mechanism that provably secures
databases against probabilistic inferences. ANGERONA is
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Algorithm 1: ANGERONA Enforcement Algorithm.
Input: A system state s = 〈db, U, P 〉, a history h, an action
〈u, q〉, a system configuration C, and a C-ATKLOG
model ATK .
Output: The security decision in {>,⊥}.
begin
for 〈u, ψ, l〉 ∈ secrets(P, u) do
if secure(C,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ, l〉)
if pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u, q〉)
h′ := h · 〈〈u, q〉,>,>〉
if ¬secure(C,ATK , h′, 〈u, ψ, l〉)
return ⊥
if pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u,¬q〉)
h′ := h · 〈〈u, q〉,>,⊥〉
if ¬secure(C,ATK , h′, 〈u, ψ, l〉)
return ⊥
return >
function secure(〈D,Γ〉,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ, l〉)
p := ATK (u)
for φ ∈ knowledge(h, u) do
p := p ∪ PL(φ) ∪ {evidence(head(φ), true)}
p := p ∪ PL(ψ)
return JpKD(head(ψ)) < l
function pox (〈D,Γ〉,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ〉)
p := ATK (u)
for φ ∈ knowledge(h, u) do
p := p ∪ PL(φ) ∪ {evidence(head(φ), true)}
p := p ∪ PL(ψ)
return JpKD(head(ψ)) > 0
parametrized by an ATKLOG model representing the attacker’s
capabilities and it leverages PROBLOG’s inference capabilities.
A. Checking Query Security
Algorithm 1 presents ANGERONA. It takes as input a system
state s = 〈db, U, P 〉, a history h, the current query q issued by
the user u, a system configuration C, and an ATKLOG model
ATK formalizing the users’ beliefs. ANGERONA checks
whether disclosing the result of the current query q may violate
any secrets in secrets(P, u). If this is the case, the algorithm
concludes that q’s execution would be insecure and returns ⊥.
Otherwise, it returns > and authorizes q’s execution. Note that
once we fix a configuration C and an ATKLOG model ATK ,
ANGERONA is a C-PDP as defined in §IV-C.
To check whether a query q may violate a secret 〈u, ψ,
l〉 ∈ secrets(P, u), ANGERONA first checks whether the secret
has been already violated. If this is not the case, ANGERONA
checks whether disclosing q violates any secret. This requires
checking that u’s belief about the secret ψ stays below the
threshold independently of the result of the query q; hence,
we must ensure that u’s belief is below the threshold both in
case the query q holds in the actual database and in case q
does not hold (this ensures that the access control decision
itself does not leak information). ANGERONA, therefore, first
checks whether there exists at least one possible database state
where q is satisfied given h, using the procedure pox . If this
is the case, the algorithm extends the current history h with
the new event recording that the query q is authorized and its
result is > and it checks whether u’s belief about ψ is still
below the corresponding threshold once q’s result is disclosed,
using the secure procedure. Afterwards, ANGERONA checks
whether there exists at least a possible database state where q
is not satisfied given h, it extends the current history h with
another event representing that the query q does not hold, and
it checks again whether disclosing that q does not hold in the
current database state violates the secret. Note that checking
whether there is a database state where q is (or is not) satisfied
is essential to ensure that the conditioning that happens in
the secure procedure is well-defined, i.e., the set of states we
condition on has non-zero probability.
ANGERONA uses the secure subroutine to determine
whether a secret’s confidentiality is violated. This subroutine
takes as input a system configuration, an ATKLOG model
ATK , a history h, and a secret 〈u, ψ, l〉. It first computes
the set knowledge(h, u) containing all the authorized queries
in the u-projection of h, i.e., knowledge(h, u) = {φ |
∃i. h|u(i) = 〈〈u, φ〉,>,>〉} ∪ {¬φ | ∃i. h|u(i) = 〈〈u, φ〉,>,
⊥〉}. Afterwards, it generates a PROBLOG program p by ex-
tending ATK (u) with additional rules. In more detail, it trans-
lates each relational calculus sentence φ ∈ knowledge(h, u) to
an equivalent set of PROBLOG rules PL(φ). The translation
PL(φ) is standard [2]. For example, given a query φ = (A(1)∧
B(2)) ∨ ¬C(3), the translation PL(φ) consists of the rules
{(h1 ← A(1)), (h2 ← B(2)), (h3 ← ¬C(3)), (h4 ← h1, h2),
(h5 ← h4), (h5 ← h3)}, where h1, . . . , h5 are fresh predicate
symbols. We denote by head(φ) the unique predicate symbol
associated with the sentence φ by the translation PL(φ). In
our example, head(φ) is the fresh predicate symbol h5. The
algorithm then conditions the initial probability distribution
ATK (u) based on the sentences in knowledge(h, u). This is
done using evidence statements, which are special PROBLOG
statements of the form evidence(a, v), where a is a ground
atom and v is either true or false; see Appendix A. For
each sentence φ ∈ knowledge(h, u), the program p contains
a statement evidence(head(φ), true). Finally, the algorithm
translates ψ to a set of logic programming rules and checks
whether ψ’s probability is below the threshold l.
The pox subroutine takes as input a system configuration,
an ATKLOG model ATK , a history h, and a query 〈u, ψ〉.
It determines whether there is a database db′ that satisfies
ψ and complies with the history h|u. Internally, the routine
again constructs a PROBLOG program starting from ATK ,
knowledge(h, u), and ψ. Afterwards, it uses the program to
check whether the probability of ψ given h|u is greater than 0.
Given a run 〈s, h〉 and a user u, the secure and pox
subroutines condition u’s initial beliefs based on the sentences
in knowledge(h, u), instead of using the set JrK∼u as in the
ATKLOG semantics. The key insight is that, as we prove in
Appendix C, the set of possible database states defined by the
sentences in knowledge(h, u) is equivalent to JrK∼u , which
contains all database states derivable from the runs r′ ∼u r.
This allows us to use PROBLOG to implement ATKLOG’s
semantics without explicitly computing JrK∼u .
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Example VII.1. Let ATK be the attacker model in Exam-
ple IV.4, u be the user Mallory, the database state be s{A,B,C},
where Alice, Bob, and Carl have cancer, and the policy P
be the one from Example IV.2. Furthermore, let q1, . . . , q4 be
the queries issued by Mallory in Example IV.3. ANGERONA
permits the execution of the first two queries since they do
not violate the policy. In contrast, it denies the execution of
the last two queries as they leak sensitive information. 
Confidentiality. As we prove in Appendix C, ANGERONA
provides the desired security guarantees for any ATKLOG-
attacker. Namely, it authorizes only those queries whose
disclosure does not increase an attacker’s beliefs in the secrets
above the corresponding thresholds. ANGERONA also provides
precise completeness guarantees: it authorizes all secrecy-
preserving queries. Informally, a query 〈u, q〉 is secrecy-
preserving given a run r and a secret 〈u, ψ, l〉 iff disclosing
the result of 〈u, q〉 in any run r′ ∼u r does not violate the
secret.
Theorem VII.1. Let a system configuration C and a C-
ATKLOG model ATK be given, and let ANGERONA be the C-
PDP f . ANGERONA provides data confidentiality with respect
to C and λu ∈ U . JATK (u)KD, and it authorizes all secrecy-
preserving queries.
Complexity. ANGERONA’s complexity is dominated by the
complexity of inference. We focus our analysis only on
data complexity, i.e., the complexity when only the ground
atoms in the PROBLOG programs are part of the input while
everything else is fixed. A literal query is a query consisting
either of a ground atom a(c) or its negation ¬a(c). We call
an ATKLOG model acyclic if all belief programs in it are
acyclic. Furthermore, a literal secret is a secret 〈U, φ, l〉 such
that φ is a literal query. We prove in Appendix C that for
acyclic ATKLOG models, literal queries, and literal secrets,
the PROBLOG programs produced by the secure and pox
subroutines are acyclic. We can therefore use our dedicated
inference engine from §VI to reason about them. Hence,
ANGERONA can be used to protect databases in PTIME in
terms of data complexity. Literal queries are expressive enough
to formulate queries about the database content such as “does
Alice have cancer?”.
Theorem VII.2. For all acyclic ATKLOG attackers, for all
literal queries q, for all runs r whose histories contain only
literal queries and contain only secrets expressed using literal
queries, ANGERONA’s data complexity is PTIME.
Discussion. Our tractability guarantees apply only to acyclic
ATKLOG models, literal queries, and literal secrets. Never-
theless, ANGERONA can still handle relevant problems of
interest. As stated in §VI, acyclic models are as expressive
as poly-tree Bayesian Networks, one of the few classes of
Bayesian Networks with tractable inference. Hence, for many
probabilistic models that cannot be represented as acyclic
ATKLOG models, exact probabilistic inference is intractable.
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Fig. 10: ANGERONA execution time in seconds.
Literal queries are expressive enough to state simple facts
about the database content. More complex (non-literal) queries
can be simulated using (possibly large) sequences of literal
queries. Similarly, policies with non-literal secrets can be
implemented as sets of literal secrets, and the Boole–Fre´chet
inequalities [38] can be used to derive the desired thresholds.
In both cases, however, our completeness guarantees hold only
for the resulting literal queries, not for the original ones.
Finally, whenever our tractability constraints are violated,
ANGERONA can still be used by directly using PROBLOG’s
inference capabilities. In this case, one would retain the
security and completeness guarantees (Theorem VII.1) but
lose the tractability guarantees (Theorem VII.2).
B. Implementation and Empirical Evaluation
To evaluate the feasibility of our approach in practice, we
implemented a prototype of ANGERONA, available at [36].
The prototype implements our dedicated inference algorithm
for acyclic PROBLOG programs (§VI), which computes the
relaxed grounding of the input program p, constructs the
Bayesian Networks BN , and performs the inference over
BN using belief propagation [47]. For inference over BN ,
we rely on the GRRM library [66]. Observe that evidence
statements in PROBLOG are encoded by fixing the values of
the corresponding random variables in the BN. Note also that
computing the relaxed grounding of p takes polynomial time
in terms of data complexity, where the exponent is determined
by p’s rules. A key optimization is to pre-compute the relaxed
grounding and construct BN off-line. This avoids grounding p
and constructing the (same) Bayesian Network for each query.
In our experiments we measure this time separately.
We use our prototype to study ANGERONA’s efficiency
and scalability. We run our experiments on a PC with an
Intel i7 processor and 32GB of RAM. For our experiments,
we consider the database schema from §IV. For the belief
programs, we use the PROBLOG program given in §V, which
can be encoded as an acyclic program when the parent-child
relation is a poly-tree. We evaluate ANGERONA’s efficiency
and scalability in terms of the number of ground atoms in
the belief programs. We generate synthetic belief programs
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containing 1,000 to 100,000 patients and for each of these
instances, we generate 100 random queries of the form R(t),
where R is a predicate symbol and t is a tuple. For each
instance and sequence of queries, we check the security of
each query with our prototype, against a policy containing
100 randomly generated secrets specified as literal queries.
Figure 10 reports the execution times for our case study.
Once the BN is generated, ANGERONA takes under 300
milliseconds, even for our larger examples, to check a query’s
security. During the initialization phase of our dedicated
inference engine, we ground the original PROBLOG program
and translate it into a BN. Most of the time is spent in
the grounding process, whose data complexity is polynomial,
where the polynomial’s degree is determined by the number
of free variables in the belief program. Our prototype uses
a naive bottom-up grounding technique, and for our larger
examples the initialization times is less than 2.5 minutes. We
remark, however, that the initialization is performed just once
per belief program. Furthermore, it can be done offline and its
performance can be greatly improved by naive parallelization.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Database Inference Control. Existing DBIC approaches
protect databases (either at design time [54], [55] or at
runtime [14], [15], [39]) only against restricted classes of
probabilistic dependencies, e.g., those arising from functional
and multi-valued dependencies. ATKLOG, instead, supports
arbitrary probabilistic dependencies, and even our acyclic
fragment can express probabilistic dependencies that are not
supported by [14], [15], [39], [54], [55]. Weise [71] proposes a
DBIC framework, based on possibilistic logic, that formalizes
secrets as sentences and expresses policies by associating
bounds to secrets. Possibility theory differs from probability
theory, which results in subtle differences. For instance, there
is no widely accepted definition of conditioning for possibility
distributions, cf. [11]. Thus, the probabilistic model from §II
cannot be encoded in Weise’s framework [71].
Statistical databases store information associated to dif-
ferent individuals and support queries that return statistical
information about an entire population [16]. DBIC solutions
for statistical databases [3], [16], [22]–[24] prevent leakages
of information about single individuals while allowing the
execution of statistical queries. These approaches rely on
various techniques, such as perturbating the original data,
synthetically generating data, or restricting the data on which
the queries are executed. Instead, we protect specific secrets in
the presence of probabilistic data dependencies and we return
the original query result, without modifications, if it is secure.
Differential Privacy. Differential Privacy [25], [26] is widely
used for privacy-preserving data analysis. Systems such as
ProPer [27] or PINQ [53] provide users with automated ways
to perform differentially private computations. A differentially
private computation guarantees that the presence (or absence)
of an individual’s data in the input data set affects the proba-
bility of the computation’s result only in limited way, i.e., by at
most a factor e where  is a parameter controlling the privacy-
utility trade-off. While differential privacy does not make any
assumption about the attacker’s beliefs, we assume that the
attacker’s belief is known and we guarantee that for all secrets
in the policy, no user can increase his beliefs, as specified
in the attacker model, over the corresponding thresholds by
interacting with the system.
Information Flow Control. Quantified Information Flow [6],
[17], [48], [50] aims at quantifying the amount of information
leaked by a program. Instead of measuring the amount of
leaked information, we focus on restricting the information
that an attacker may obtain about a set of given secrets.
Non-interference has been extended to consider probabil-
ities [5], [58], [70] for concurrent programs. Our security
notion, instead, allows those leaks that do not increase an
attacker’s beliefs in a secret above the threshold, and it can be
seen as a probabilistic extension of opacity [60], which allows
any leak except leaking whether the secret holds.
Mardziel et al. [51] present a general DBIC architecture,
where users’ beliefs are expressed as probabilistic programs,
security requirements as threshold on these beliefs, and the
beliefs are updated in response to the system’s behaviour.
Our work directly builds on top of this architecture. However,
instead of using an imperative probabilistic language, we
formalize beliefs using probabilistic logic programming, which
provides a natural and expressive language for formalizing de-
pendencies arising in the database setting, e.g., functional and
multi-valued dependencies, as well as common probabilistic
models, like Bayesian Networks.
Mardziel et al. [51] also propose a DBIC mechanism based
on abstract interpretation. They do not provide any precise
complexity bound for their mechanism. Their algorithm’s
complexity class, however, appears to be intractable, since
they use a probabilistic extension of the polyhedra abstract
domain, whose asymptotic complexity is exponential in the
number of program variables [62]. In contrast, ANGERONA
exploits our inference engine for acyclic programs to
secure databases against a practically relevant class of
probabilistic inferences, and it provides precise tractability
and completeness guarantees.
We now compare (unrestricted) ATKLOG with the impera-
tive probabilistic language used in [51]. ATKLOG allows one
to concisely encode probabilistic properties specifying rela-
tions between tuples in the database. For instance, a property
like “the probability of A(x) is 1/2n, where n is the number
of tuples (x, y) in B” can be encoded as 1/2::A(x) ← B(x,
y). Encoding this property as an imperative program is more
complex; it requires a for statement to iterate over all variables
representing tuples in B and an if statement to filter the
tuples. In contrast to [51], ATKLOG provides limited support
for numerical constraints (as we support only finite domains).
Mardziel et al. [51] formalize queries as imperative proba-
bilistic programs. They can, therefore, also model probabilistic
queries or the use of randomization to limit disclosure. While
all these features are supported by ATKLOG, our goal is to
protect databases from attackers that use standard query lan-
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guages like SQL. Hence, we formalize queries using relational
calculus and ignore probabilistic queries. Similarly to [51], our
approach can be extended to handle some uncertainty on the
attackers’ capabilities. In particular, we can associate to each
user a finite number of possible beliefs, instead of a single
one. However, like [51], we cannot handle infinitely many
alternative beliefs.
Probabilistic Programming. Probabilistic programming is an
active area of research [35]. Here, we position PROBLOG with
respect to expressiveness and inference. Similarly to [33], [51],
PROBLOG can express only discrete probability distributions,
and it is less expressive than languages supporting continuous
distributions [32], [34], [61]. Current exact inference algo-
rithms for probabilistic programs are based on program anal-
ysis techniques, such as symbolic execution [32], [61] or ab-
stract interpretation [51]. In this respect, we present syntactic
criteria that ensure tractable inference for PROBLOG. Sampson
et al. [59] symbolically execute probabilistic programs and
translate them to BNs to verify probabilistic assertions. In
contrast, we translate PROBLOG programs to BNs to perform
exact inference and our translation is tailored to work together
with our acyclicity constraints to allow tractable inference.
IX. CONCLUSION
Effectively securing databases that store data with proba-
bilistic dependencies requires an expressive language to cap-
ture the dependencies and a tractable enforcement mechanism.
To address these requirements, we developed ATKLOG, a
formal language providing an expressive and concise way
to represent attackers’ beliefs while interacting with the sys-
tem. We leveraged this to design ANGERONA, a provably
secure DBIC mechanism that prevents the leakage of sensitive
information in the presence of probabilistic dependencies.
ANGERONA is based on a dedicated inference engine for a
fragment of PROBLOG where exact inference is tractable.
We see these results as providing a foundation for building
practical protection mechanisms, which include probabilistic
dependencies, as part of real-world database systems. As
future work, we plan to extend our framework to dynamic
settings where the database and the policy change. We also
intend to explore different fragments of PROBLOG and rela-
tional calculus for which exact inference is practical
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APPENDICES
Here, we provide additional details about numerous as-
pects of the paper, such as acyclic PROBLOG programs and
ANGERONA. We also provide complete proofs of all our
results.
Structure. Appendix A reviews PROBLOG’s syntax and
semantics. In Appendix B, we formalize acyclicity for
PROBLOG programs, we present our encoding from acyclic
programs to poly-tree Bayesian Networks, we prove the cor-
rectness of this encoding, and we give complexity results
for inference for acyclic PROBLOG programs. Finally, Ap-
pendix C contains additional details about ANGERONA as well
as all the security and complexity proofs.
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APPENDIX A
PROBLOG
Here, we provide a formal account of PROBLOG, which
follows [20], [21], [31]. In addition to PROBLOG’s semantics,
we present here again some (revised) aspects of PROBLOG’s
syntax, which we introduced in §V. As mentioned in §V, we
restrict ourselves to the function-free fragment of PROBLOG.
Syntax. As introduced in §V, a (Σ,dom)-probabilistic atom
is an atom a ∈ AΣ,dom annotated with a value 0 ≤ v ≤ 1,
denoted v::a. If v = 1, then we write a(c) instead of
1::a(c). A (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program is a finite set of
ground probabilistic (Σ,dom)-atoms and (Σ,dom)-rules.
Note that ground atoms a ∈ AΣ,dom are represented as 1::a.
Observe also that rules do not involve probabilistic atoms
(as formalized in §V). This is without loss of generality: as
we show below probabilistic rules and annotated disjunctions
can be represented using only probabilistic atoms and non-
probabilistic rules. We denote by prob(p) the set of all
probabilistic ground atoms v::a in p, i.e., prob(p) := {v::a ∈
p | 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 ∧ a ∈ AΣ,dom}, and by rules(p) the non-
probabilistic rules in p, i.e., rules(p) := p\prob(p). As already
stated in §V, we consider only programs p that do not contain
negative cycles in the rules. Finally, we say that a PROBLOG
program p is a logic program iff v = 1 for all v::a ∈ prob(p),
i.e., p does not contain probabilistic atoms.
Semantics. Given a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program p, a p-
grounded instance is a PROBLOG program A ∪R, where the
set of ground atoms A is a subset of {a | v::a ∈ prob(p)}
and R = rules(p). Informally, a grounded instance of p is
one of the logic programs that can be obtained by selecting
some of the probabilistic atoms in p and keeping all rules in
p. A p-probabilistic assignment is a total function associating
to each probabilistic atom v::a in prob(p) a value in {>,
⊥}. We denote by A(p) the set of all p-probabilistic assign-
ments. The probability of a p-probabilistic assignment f is
prob(f) = Πv::a∈prob(p)
(
Πf(v::a)=>v ·Πf(v::a)=⊥(1− v)
)
.
Given a p-probabilistic assignment f , instance(p, f) denotes
the p-grounded instance {a | ∃v. f(v::a) = >} ∪ rules(p).
Finally, given a p-grounded instance p′, WFM (p′) denotes
the well-founded model associated with the logic program p′,
as defined by standard logic programming semantics [2].
The semantics of a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program p is
defined as a probability distribution over all possible p-
grounded instances. Note that PROBLOG’s semantics relies
on the closed world assumption, namely every fact that is
not in a given model is considered false. The semantics of
p, denoted by JpK, is as follows: JpK(p′) = ∑f∈Fp,p′ prob(f),
where Fp,p′ = {f ∈ A(p) | p′ = instance(p, f)}. We remark
that a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program p implicitly defines a
probability distribution over (Σ,dom)-structures. Indeed, the
probability of a given (Σ,dom)-structure s is the sum of the
probabilities of all p-grounded instances whose well-founded
model is s. With a slight abuse of notation, we extend the
semantics of p to (Σ,dom)-structures and ground atoms as
follows: JpK(s) = ∑f∈M(p,s) prob(f), where s is a (Σ,
dom)-structure and M(p, s) is the set of all assignments f
such that WFM (instance(p, f)) = s. Finally, p’s semantics
can be lifted to sentences as follows: JpK(φ) = Σs∈JφKJpK(s),
where JφK = {s ∈ ΩΓD | [φ]s = >}.
Evidence. PROBLOG supports expressing evidence inside
programs [20]. To express evidence, i.e., to condition a
distribution on some event, we use statements of the form
evidence(a, v), where a is a ground atom and v ∈ {true,
false}. Let p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program p with
evidence evidence(a1, v1), . . . , evidence(an, vn), and p′ be
the program without the evidence statements. Furthermore, let
POX (p′) be the set of all (Σ,dom)-structures s complying
with the evidence, i.e., the set of all states s such that ai holds
in s iff vi = true. Then, JpK(s), for a (Σ,dom)-structure
s ∈ POX (p), is Jp′K(s) · (∑s′∈POX (p)Jp′K(s′))−1.
Syntactic Sugar. Following [20], [21], [31], we extend
PROBLOG programs with two additional constructs: annotated
disjunctions and probabilistic rules. As shown in [20], these
constructs are just syntactic sugar. A probabilistic rule is a
PROBLOG rule where the head is a probabilistic atom. The
probabilistic rule v::h← l1, . . . , ln can be encoded using the
additional probabilistic atoms v::sw( ) and the rule h ← l1,
. . . , ln, sw(x), where sw is a fresh predicate symbol, x is the
tuple containing the variables in vars(h) ∪ ⋃1≤i≤n vars(li),
and v::sw( ) is a shorthand representing the fact that there is
a probabilistic atom v::sw(t) for each tuple t ∈ dom|x|.
An annotated disjunction v1::a1; . . . ; vn::an, where a1, . . . ,
an are ground atoms and
(∑
1≤i≤n vi
)
≤ 1, denotes that a1,
. . . , an are mutually exclusive probabilistic events happening
with probabilities v1, . . . , vn. It can be encoded as:
p1::sw1( )
...
pn::swn( )
a1(t1)← sw1(t1)
...
an(tn)← ¬sw1(t1), . . . ,¬swn−1(tn−1), swn(tn),
where each pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is vi ·
(
1−∑1≤j<i vj)−1.
Probabilistic rules can be easily extended to support annotated
disjunctions in their heads.
Example A.1. Let Σ be a first-order signature with two predi-
cate symbols V and W , both with arity 1, dom be the domain
{a, b}, and p be the program consisting of the facts 1/4::T (a)
and 1/2::T (b), the annotate disjunction 1/4::W (a); 1/2::W (b),
and the rule 1/2::T (x)←W (x).
The probability associated to each (Σ,dom)-structure by
the program p is shown in the following table.
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W
∅ {a} {b} {a, b}
T
∅ 3/32 3/64 3/32 0
{a} 1/32 5/64 1/32 0
{b} 3/32 3/64 9/32 0
{a, b} 1/32 5/64 3/32 0
The empty structure has probability 3/32. The only grounded
instance whose well-formed model is the empty database is
the instance i1 that does not contain grounded atoms. Its
probability is 3/32 because the probability that T (a) is not
in i1 is 3/4, the probability that T (b) is not in i1 is 1/2, and
the probability that neither W (a) nor W (b) are in i1 is 1/4
and all these events are independent.
The probability of some structures is determined by more
than one grounded instance. For example, the probability of
the structure s where s(T ) = {a, b} and s(W ) = {a} is
5/64. There are two grounded instances i2 and i3 whose well-
founded model is s. The instance i2 has probability 1/16
and it consists of the atoms T (b),W (a), sw(a) and the rule
T (x)←W (x), sw(x), whereas the instance i3 has probability
1/64 and it consists of the atoms T (a), T (b),W (a) and the
rule T (x) ← W (x), sw(x). Note that before computing
the ground instances, we translated probabilistic rules and
annotated disjunctions into standard PROBLOG rules. 
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APPENDIX B
ACYCLIC PROBLOG PROGRAMS
The belief programs in ATKLOG are based on PROBLOG,
which is a very expressive probabilistic language and it can
be used to encode a wide range of probabilistic models. As a
result, performing exact inference in PROBLOG is intractable
in general, i.e., it is #P -hard in terms of data complexity.
We identify acyclic PROBLOG programs, a restricted class
of PROBLOG programs where exact inference can be done
efficiently, in linear time in terms of data complexity.
We first introduce acyclic programs. Afterwards, we intro-
duce relaxed acyclic programs, a generalization of acyclic
programs, and we provide an encoding of relaxed acyclic
programs as a Bayesian Network. Observe that here we state
again (sometimes with some generalizations) some of the
concepts we introduced in the main paper. Note also that in the
main paper we do not distinguish between acyclic programs
and relaxed acyclic programs.
A. Acyclic Programs
Here, we define acyclic PROBLOG programs. Intuitively, an
acyclic program is a PROBLOG program whose probability
distribution can be represented using a poly-tree Bayesian
Network. While inference for general Bayesian Networks is
intractable, i.e., NP -hard, inference for poly-tree Bayesian
Networks can be done in linear time in the size of the
corresponding Bayesian Network.
1) Acyclic PROBLOG Programs: In the following, let Σ
be a first-order signature, dom be a finite domain, and p
be a (Σ,dom)-program. Without loss of generality, in the
following we assume that (1) inside rules (not ground atoms),
constants are used just inside equality and inequality atoms,
i.e., instead of B(x, 7) ← D(x, y) we consider only the
equivalent rule B(x, k) ← D(x, y), k = 7, and (2) there are
no distinct v1 and v2 such that v1::a(c) ∈ p and v2::a(c) ∈ p
(this is without loss of generality since multiple occurrences
of the same ground atom with different probabilities can be
represented as a single ground atom an adjusted probability).
Observe that in the following we re-define, extend, or make
more precise the definitions from §VI.
Dependency Graph. The p-dependency graph, denoted
graph(p), is the directed labelled graph (N,E) where N = Σ
and E = {pred(body(r, i)) r,i−→ pred(head(r)) | r ∈ p ∧ i ∈
N}.
Directed Paths and Cycles. A directed path in graph(p) is
a path pr1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn in graph(p) such that
for all 1 ≤ j < n, pj = pj+1. Two directed paths pr1 r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn and pr ′1
r′1,i
′
1−−−→ . . . r
′
m−1,im−1−−−−−−−→ pr ′m are
head-connected iff pr1 = pr
′
1. Similarly, two directed paths
pr ′1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn and pr1
r′1,i
′
1−−−→ . . . r
′
m−1,im−1−−−−−−−→
pr ′m are tail-connected iff prn = pr
′
m. Note that an empty
path consists of just one node in N , i.e., one predicate symbol.
A directed cycle in graph(p) is a directed path pr1
r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn in graph(p) such that prn = pr1. Given a
directed path P = pr1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn in graph(p),
we denote by start(P ) the predicate symbol pr1 and by
end(P ) the predicate symbol prn. We say that a directed
cycle C is simple iff (1) each edge occurs at most once in
C, and (2) there is a predicate symbol pr such that pr occurs
twice in C and for all pr ′ 6= pr , pr ′ occurs at most once in
C.
Undirected Paths and Cycles. A directed path P1 in
graph(p) is connected with P2 iff end(P1) = end(P2),
start(P1) = start(P2), or end(P1) = start(P2). An undi-
rected path in graph(p) is a sequence of directed paths P1, . . . ,
Pn such that, for all 1 ≤ i < n, Pi is connected with Pi+1.
An undirected cycle in graph(p) is a sequence of directed
paths P1, . . . , Pn such that (1) P1, . . . , Pn is an undirected
path and (2) Pn is connected with P1. Note that a directed path
(respectively cycle) is also an undirected path (respectively
cycle). We say that two (directed or undirected) cycles are
equivalent iff they are the same cycle.
Undirected Unsafe Structures. An undirected unsafe struc-
ture in graph(p) is quadruple 〈D1, D2, D3, U〉 such that (1)
D1, D2, D3 are directed paths in graph(p), (2) U is an
undirected path in graph(p), (3) D1 and D2 are non-empty or
D2 and D3 are non-empty, (4) D1 and D2 are head-connected,
(5) D2 and D3 are tail-connected, and (6) D1, U,D3, D2 is an
undirected cycle in graph(p). An undirected unsafe structure
〈D1, D2, D3, U〉 covers an undirected cycle U ′ iff D1, U,D3,
D2 is equivalent to U ′.
Directed Unsafe Structures. A directed unsafe structure in
graph(p) is a directed cycle C in graph(p). A directed unsafe
structure C covers a directed cycle C ′ iff C is equivalent to
C ′.
Deriving Ordering Annotations. A Σ-ordering annotation
is ORD(A), where A ⊆ Σ and there is a k ∈ N such that for
all a ∈ A, |a| = 2k. Let  be a well-founded partial order
over 2Σ. We say that the ordering annotation ORD(A) can be
derived from the program p given , written p,|= ORD(A),
iff one of the following conditions hold:
1) For all pr ∈ A, there is no rule r in p such that
pred(head(r)) = pr and body(r) 6= ∅, there is no
pr ′ ∈ Σ such that pr ′ ≺ pr and p,|= ORD(pr ′),
and the transitive closure of the relation R =
⋃
pr∈A{(c,
v) | ∃r ∈ p. ((head(r) = pr(c, v) ∨ ∃v′. head(r) =
v′::pr(c, v)) ∧ body(r) = ∅) ∧ |c| = |v| = |pr |/2} is strict
partial order.
2) There is a set A′ ⊆ Σ such that (1) A′  A, (2) p,
|= ORD(A′), (3) there is a pr ∈ Σ and a pr ′ ∈ A′
such that (a) |pr | = |pr ′|, (b) A = (A′ \ {pr ′}) ∪ {pr},
and (c) for all rules r in p such that pred(head(r)) =
pr, there are sequences of variables x and y and an i,
such that head(r) = pr(x, y), body(r, i) = pr ′(x, y),
and |x| = |y|.
A Σ-ordering template O is a set of ordering annotations. We
say that p complies with O with respect to  iff for all ordering
annotations a ∈ O, p,|= a holds. We say that p complies
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with O iff there exists a well-founded partial order  over Σ
such that p complies with O with respect to . Intuitively, a
program p complies with an ordering template O iff all sets
of predicates in O represent strict partial orders in all possible
models of p.
Deriving Disjointness Annotations. A Σ-disjointness anno-
tation is DIS (a, a′), where a, a′ ∈ Σ and |a| = |a′|. Let
 be a well-founded partial order over Σ2. We say that the
disjointness annotation DIS (pr , pr ′) can be derived from the
program p given , written p,|= DIS (pr , pr ′), iff one of
the following conditions hold:
1) There are no rules r ∈ p such that body(r) 6= ∅ and
pred(head(r)) = pr or pred(head(r)) = pr ′, and there
is no (pr1, pr2) ∈ Σ2 such that (pr1, pr2) ≺ (pr , pr ′)
and p,|= DIS (pr1, pr2), and the sets {c | pr(c) ∈
p∨∃v. v::pr(c) ∈ p} and {c | ∃r ∈ p. head(r) = pr ′(c)∨
∃v. v::pr ′(c) ∈ p} are disjoint.
2) There are no rules r ∈ p such that body(r) 6= ∅ and
pred(head(r)) = pr , and there is (pr , pr ′1) ∈ Σ2 such
that (a) p,|= DIS (pr , pr ′1), (b) (pr , pr ′1) ≺ (pr , pr ′),
and (c) for all rules r ∈ p such that head(r) = pr ′(x)
there is 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)| such that body(r, i) = pr ′1(x).
3) There are no rules r ∈ p such that body(r) 6= ∅ and
pred(head(r)) = pr ′, there is (pr1, pr
′) ∈ Σ2 such that
(a) p,|= DIS (pr1, pr ′), (b) (pr1, pr ′) ≺ (pr , pr ′), and
(c) for all rules r ∈ p such that head(r) = pr(x) there
is 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)| such that body(r, i) = pr1(x).
4) There is (pr1, pr
′
1) ∈ Σ2 such that (a) p,|= DIS (pr1,
pr ′1), (b) (pr1, pr
′
1) ≺ (pr , pr ′), and (c) for all rules
r, r′ ∈ p such that head(r) = pr(x) and head(r′) =
pr ′(x′), there are 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)|, 1 ≤ i′ ≤ |body(r′)|,
and (pr1, pr
′
1) ∈ D such that body(r, i) = pr1(x),
body(r′, i′) = pr ′1(x
′).
A Σ-disjointness template D is a set of disjointness annota-
tions. We say that p complies with D iff there exists a well-
founded partial order  over Σ2 such that for all disjointness
annotations a ∈ D, p,|= a holds. Intuitively, a program
p complies with a disjointness template D iff all pairs of
predicates (pr , pr ′) involved in a disjointness annotation in
D are pairwise disjoint in all possible models of p.
Deriving Uniqueness Annotations. A Σ-uniqueness anno-
tation is UNQ(a,K), where a ∈ Σ and K is a non-empty
subset of {1, . . . , |a|}. Let  be a well-founded order over Σ.
We say that the uniqueness annotation UNQ(pr ,K) can be
derived from p given , written p,|= UNQ(pr ,K), iff one
of the following conditions hold:
1) There are no rules r ∈ p such that body(r) 6= ∅ and
pred(head(r)) = pr , and there is no pr ′ such that pr ′ ≺
pr , and for all t, v in {c | pr(c) ∈ p∨∃v. v::pr(c) ∈ p},
if t(i) = v(i) for all i ∈ K, then t = v.
2) Both the following conditions hold:
a) For each rule r ∈ p such that head(r) = pr(x)
and body(r) 6= ∅, there is a mapping µ′ associating
to each predicate pr ′ ≺ pr a set K such that (a) p,
|= UNQ(pr ′, µ(pr ′)), and (b) the following hold:
V ⊆
⋃
l∈bound(head(r),K,body+(r),µ′)
vars(l),
where V = {x(i) | i 6∈ K ∧ x(i) ∈ Var}, u(y,K) =
{y(i) | i ∈ K}, and
bound(h,K,L, µ′) =
⋃
b(y)∈L∧b≺pr∧
u(y,µ′(b))⊆u(args(h),K)
{b(y)}∪
⋃
b(y)∈L∧b≺pr∧
∃l′∈bound(h,K,L,µ′).(u(y,µ′(b))⊆vars(l′))
{b(y)}.
b) For all rules r1, r2 ∈ p, if r1 6= r2, pred(head(r1))
= pred(head(r2)) = pr , and K 6= {1, . . . , |pr |}, then
there is a value i ∈ K such that args(head(r1)) ∈
dom, args(head(r2)) ∈ dom, and args(head(r1)) 6=
args(head(r1)).
A Σ-uniqueness template U is a set of uniqueness annotations.
We say that p complies with U with respect to  iff for all
uniqueness annotations a ∈ U , p,|= a holds. We say that p
complies with U iff there exists a well-founded partial order
 over Σ such that p complies with U with respect to .
Intuitively, a program complies with a uniqueness template U
iff for all predicates pr each set K such that UNQ(pr ,K) ∈ U
represents a primary key for pr .
Propagation Maps. We use propagation maps to track how
information flows inside rules. Given a rule r and a literal
l ∈ body(r), the (r, l)-vertical map is the mapping µ from
{1, . . . , |l|} to {1, . . . , |head(r)|} such that µ(i) = j iff
args(l)(i) = args(head(r))(j) and args(l)(i) ∈ Var . Given a
rule r and literals l, l′ in r’s body, the (r, l, l′)-horizontal map
is the mapping µ from {1, . . . , |l|} to {1, . . . , |l′|} such that
µ(i) = j iff args(l)(i) = args(l′)(j) and args(l)(i) ∈ Var .
We say that a path links to a literal l if information flows
along the rules to l. This can be formalized by posing con-
straints on the mapping obtained by combining horizontal and
vertical maps along the path. Formally, given a literal l and a
mapping ν : N→ N, a directed path pr1 r1,i1−−−→ . . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→
prn ν-downward links to l iff there is a 0 ≤ j < n− 1 such
that the function µ := µ′ ◦ µj ◦ . . . ◦ µ1 satisfies µ(k) = ν(k)
for all k for which ν(k) is defined, where for 1 ≤ h ≤ j, µh is
the vertical map connecting body(rh, ih) and rh, and µ′ is the
horizontal map connecting body(rj+1, ij+1) with l. Similarly,
a directed path pr1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn ν-upward links
to l iff there is a 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 such that the function
µ := µ′−1 ◦ µ−1j+1 ◦ . . . ◦ µ−1n−1 satisfies µ(k) = ν(k) for all k
for which ν(k) is defined, where µh is the (rh, body(rh, ih))-
vertical map, for j < h ≤ n− 1, and µ′ is the (rj , l)-vertical
map. A path P links to a predicate symbol a iff there is an
atom a(x) such that P links to a(x).
Negation-guarded Programs. A rule r is negation-
guarded [9] iff for all negative literals l in r, vars(l) ⊆⋃
l′∈body+(r) vars(l
′). We say that a program p is negation-
guarded if all rules r ∈ p are negation-guarded.
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Join Trees. A join tree represents how multiple predicate
symbols in a rule share variables. A join tree for a rule r
is a rooted labelled tree (N,E, root , λ), where N ⊆ body(r),
E is a set of edges (i.e., unordered pairs over N2), root ∈ N
is the tree’s root, and λ is the labelling function. Moreover,
we require that for all n, n′ ∈ N , if n 6= n′ and (n, n′) ∈ E,
then λ(n, n′) = vars(n) ∩ vars(n′) and λ(n, n′) 6= ∅. A join
tree (N,E, root , λ) covers a literal l iff l ∈ N . Given a join
tree J = (N,E, root , λ) and a node n ∈ N , the support of
n, denoted support(n), is the set vars(head(r)) ∪ {x | (x =
c) ∈ cstr(r) ∧ c ∈ dom} ∪ {vars(n′) | n′ ∈ anc(J, n)},
where anc(J, n) is the set of n’s ancestors in J , i.e., the set
of all nodes on the path from root to n (if such a path exists).
Let U be a uniqueness template. A join tree J = (N,E,
root , λ) is U-strongly connected iff for all positive literals l ∈
N , there is a set K ⊆ {i | x = args(l) ∧ x(i) ∈ support(l)}
such that UNQ(pred(l),K) ∈ U and for all negative literals
l ∈ N , vars(l) ⊆ support(l). In contrast, a join tree (N,E,
root , λ) is U-weakly connected iff for all (a(x), a′(x′)) ∈ E,
there are K ⊆ {i | x(i) ∈ L} and K ′ ⊆ {i | x′(i) ∈ L}
such that UNQ(a,K),UNQ(a′,K ′) ∈ U , where L = λ(a(x),
a′(x′)).
Connected rules. A connected rule r ensure that a grounding
of r is fully determined either by the assignment to the head’s
variables (strongly connected rule) or to the variable of any
literal in r’s body (weakly connected rule). This is done by
exploiting uniqueness annotations and the rule’s structure. In
the following, let U be a uniqueness template.
We say that a rule r is strongly connected for U iff there
exist join trees J1, . . . , Jn such that (a) the trees cover all
literals in body(r), and (b) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ji is strongly
connected for U . We call J1, . . . , Jn a witness for the strong
connectivity of r with respect to U . A strongly connected
rule r guarantees that for any two groundings r′, r′′ of r, if
head(r′) = head(r′′), then r′ = r′′.
Given a rule r, a set of literals L, and a uniqueness template
U , we say that a literal l ∈ body(r) is (r,U , L)-strictly guarded
iff (1) vars(l) ⊆ ⋃l′∈L∩body+(r) vars(l′) ∪ {x | (x = c) ∈
cstr(r)∧ c ∈ dom}, and (2) there is a positive literal a(x) ∈
L ∩ body+(r) and an annotation UNQ(a,K) ∈ U such that
{x(i) | i ∈ K} ⊆ vars(l). We say that a rule r is weakly
connected for U iff there exists a join tree J = (N,E, root , λ)
such that (a) J is weakly connected for U , (b) N ⊆ body+(r),
and (c) all literals in body(r)\N are (r,U , N)-strictly guarded.
We call J a witness for the weak connectivity of r with respect
to U . A weakly connected rule r guarantees that for any two
groundings r′, r′′ of r, if body(r′, i) = body(r′′, i) for some
i, then r′ = r′′.
Guarded Cycles. A set of predicates O guards a directed
cycle pr1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn rn,in−−−→ pr1 iff there
are integers 1 ≤ y1 < y2 < . . . < ye = n, literals
o1(x1), . . . , oe(xe) (where oj ∈ O and |xj | = |oj |), a
non-empty set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |pr1|}, and a bijection ν :
K → {1, . . . , |o1|/2} such that for each 0 ≤ k < e,
(1) pryk
ryk ,iyk−−−−−→ . . . ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→ pryk+1 ν-downward
connects to ok+1(xk+1), and (2) pryk+1−1
ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→
pryk+1 ν
′-upward connects to ok+1(xk+1), where ν′(i) =
ν(x) + |o1|/2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |o1|/2, and y0 = 1. A directed
cycle C is guarded by an ordering template O iff there is an
annotation ORD(A) ∈ O such that A guards C.
Head-Guarded Paths. A pair of head-connected non-empty
directed paths (P1, P2) is (D,U)-head guarded iff one of the
following conditions hold:
• if P1 = P2, then all rules in P1 are weakly connected for
U , or
• if P1 6= P2, then there is an annotation DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈
D, a set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |a|}, and a bijection ν : K → {1,
. . . , |pr |} such that P1 ν-downward links to pr and P2
ν-downward links to pr ′.
Given two ground paths P ′1 and P
′
2 corresponding to P1 and
P2, the first condition ensures that P ′1 = P
′
2 whereas the
second ensures that P ′1 or P
′
2 are not in the ground graph.
Tail-Guarded Paths. A pair of tail-connected non-empty
directed paths (P1, P2) are (D,U)-tail guarded iff one of the
following conditions hold:
• if P1 = P2, then all rules in P1 are strongly connected
for U , or
• if P1 6= P2, there is an annotation DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D, a
set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |a|}, and a bijection ν : K → {1, . . . ,
|pr |}, such that P1 ν-upward links to pr and P2 ν-upward
links to pr ′.
Guarded Unsafe Structures. An undirected unsafe structure
〈D1, D2, D3, U〉 is (O,D,U)-guarded iff either (D1, D2) is
(D,U)-head-guarded or (D2, D3) is (D,U)-tail-guarded. In
contrast, a directed unsafe structure C is (O,D,U)-guarded
iff C is guarded by O.
Acyclic Programs. A (Σ,dom)-program p is (O,D,U)-
acyclic, where O is a Σ-ordering template, D is a Σ-
disjointness template, and U is a Σ-uniqueness template, iff
1) p complies with O, D, and U ,
2) p is a negation-guarded program, and
3) for all undirected cycles U in graph(p) that are not simple
directed cycles, there is an undirected unsafe structure S
in graph(p) that covers U , and is (O,D,U)-guarded
4) for all directed cycles C in graph(p), there is a directed
unsafe structure S in graph(p) that covers C, and is (O,
D,U)-guarded
A (Σ,dom)-program p is acyclic iff there are a Σ-ordering
template O, a Σ-disjointness template D, and a Σ-uniqueness
template U such that p is (O,D,U)-acyclic.
2) Exact Grounding: We now introduce the exact ground-
ing of a PROBLOG program p given a p-probabilistic assign-
ment. The exact grounding encodes the PROBLOG semantics.
Let p be a PROBLOG program and f be a p-probabilistic
assignment. Furthermore, let µ be the mapping from predicate
symbols in p to N: µ(a) = max t∈paths(p,a)(w(t)), where
paths(p, a) is the set of all directed paths that ends in a in p’s
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dependency graph and the weight of each path is
w(t) =

0 if t = 
w(t′) if t = a1
r1,i1−−−→ a2 r2,i2−−−→ . . . rn,in−−−→ an+1
∧t′ = a2 r2,i2−−−→ . . . rn,in−−−→ an+1
∧body(r1, i1) ∈ A+Σ,dom
1 + w(t′) if t = a1
r1,i1−−−→ a2 r2,i2−−−→ . . . rn,in−−−→ an+1
∧t′ = a2 r2,i2−−−→ . . . rn,in−−−→ an+1
∧body(r1, i1) 6∈ A+Σ,dom
We remark that µ is a valid stratification for the program p.
From more details about logic programming with stratified
negation we refer the reader to [2].
The functions gf (p, j, i), gf (p, j), and gf (p) are defined as
follows:
gf (p, 0, 0) ={a(c) | a(c) ∈ p ∧ µ(a) = 0}∪
{a(c) | ∃v. v::a(c) ∈ p ∧ f(v::a(c)) = >
∧ µ(a) = 0}
gf (p, 0, i) =gf (p, 0, i− 1)∪
{head(r)Θ | Θ ∈ ASS(r) ∧ r ∈ p∧
∀l ∈ body+(r). lΘ ∈ gf (p, 0, i− 1)∧
body−(r) = ∅ ∧ µ(pred(head(r))) = 0}
gf (p, j, 0) =gf (p, j − 1)∪
{a(c) | a(c) ∈ p ∧ µ(a) = j}∪
{a(c) | ∃v. v::a(c) ∈ p ∧ f(v::a(c)) = >
∧ µ(a) = j}
gf (p, j, i) =gf (p, j, i− 1)∪
{head(r)Θ | Θ ∈ ASS(r) ∧ r ∈ p∧
∀l ∈ body+(r). lΘ ∈ gf (p, j, i− 1)∧
∀l ∈ body−(r). lΘ 6∈ gf (p, j − 1)∧
∧ µ(pred(head(r))) = j}
gf (p, j) =
⋃
i∈N
gf (p, j, i)
gf (p) =
⋃
j∈N
gf (p, j)
Furthermore, the functions gf (p, r, j, i), gf (p, r, j), and gf (p,
r) are defined as follows:
gf (p, a(c), j, i) ={a(c) | a(c) ∈ p ∧ µ(a) = j}
gf (p, v::a(c), j, i) ={a(c) | v::a(c) ∈ p ∧ f(v::a(c)) = >∧
µ(a) = j}
gf (p, r, 0, 0) =∅
gf (p, r, 0, i) =gf (p, r, 0, i− 1)∪
{hΘ← l1Θ, . . . , lnΘ |
r = h← l1, . . . , ln∧
Θ ∈ ASS(r)∧
∀l ∈ body+(r). lΘ ∈ gf (p, 0, i− 1)∧
body−(r) = ∅ ∧ µ(pred(h)) = 0}
gf (p, r, j, 0) =gf (p, r, j − 1)
gf (p, r, j, i) =gf (p, r, j, i− 1)∪
{hΘ← l1Θ, . . . , lnΘ |
r = h← l1, . . . , ln∧
Θ ∈ ASS(r)∧
∀l ∈ body+(r). lΘ ∈ gf (p, j, i− 1)∧
∀l ∈ body−(r). lΘ 6∈ gf (p, j − 1)∧
µ(pred(h)) = j}
gf (p, r, j) =
⋃
i∈N
gf (p, r, j, i)
gf (p, r) =
⋃
j∈N
gf (p, r, j)
The fact below follows directly from gf ’s definition and
the notion of well-founded models for stratified logic pro-
grams [2].
Fact B.1. For any PROBLOG program p and any p-
probabilistic assignment f , gf (p) = WMF (instance(p, f)).
3) Relaxed Grounding: Here we introduce the notion of
relaxed grounding. This is a key notion for our acyclicity
and correctness proofs and it is also a key component of our
compilation from PROBLOG programs to poly-tree Bayesian
Networks.
Given a PROBLOG acyclic program p, the relaxed ground-
ing of p is a set M of ground atoms and rules containing all
possible ground atoms and rules that can be derived in any
ground instance of p. We remark that a relaxed grounding is
an over-approximation of the ground atoms and/or rules that
could be derived by the ground instances of p.
Formally, let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-acyclic PROBLOG, and i ∈ N be
an natural number. The function ground(p, i) is defined as
follows: ground(p, 0) = {a(c) | a(c) ∈ p ∨ ∃v. v::a(c) ∈ p},
and ground(p, i) = ground(p, i− 1) ∪ {hΘ | Θ ∈ ASS (r) ∧
∃r. r ∈ p ∧ h = head(r) ∧ ∀l ∈ body+(r). lΘ ∈ ground(p,
i − 1) ∧ ∀i, j. consistent(body(r, i)Θ, body(r, j)Θ)}, where
ASS (r) is the set of all mappings Var → dom that
satisfy the equality and inequality constraints in r while
consistent(a(v),¬a(v)) = consistent(¬a(v), a(v)) = ⊥ and
consistent(l, l′) = > otherwise. The function ground(p,
r, i), where r ∈ p, is defined as follows: ground(p, a(c),
i) = {a(c)}, ground(p, v::a(c), i) = {a(c)}, ground(p, r,
0) = ∅, and ground(p, r, i) is the set {hΘ ← l1Θ, . . . ,
lnΘ | Θ ∈ ASS (r) ∧ ∀li ∈ body+(r). liΘ ∈ ground(p,
i−1)∧∀i, j. consistent(liΘ, ljΘ)}, where r = h← l1, . . . , ln.
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Finally, the relaxed grounding of p, denoted by ground(p), is
the set ground(p) =
⋃
i∈N ground(p, i), whereas ground(p,
r) =
⋃
i∈N ground(p, r, i).
The fact below follows directly from ground ’s definition
and the definition of acyclic PROBLOG programs.
Fact B.2. For any acyclic PROBLOG program p and any
p-probabilistic assignment f , gf (p) ⊆ ground(p) and gf (p,
r) ⊆ ground(p, r).
4) Ground Graphs: Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom
be a finite domain, and p be a (Σ,dom)-acyclic PROBLOG
program. The ground graph of p, denoted gg(p), is the directed
graph (N,E) defined as follows:
• There is one node a(c) in N per literal a(c) or ¬a(c)
used in a ground rule r′ ∈ ground(p, r) for some r ∈ p.
For each rule r ∈ p, ground rule s ∈ ground(p, r), and
position 1 ≤ j ≤ |body(r′)|, there is a node (r, s, j).
• There is an edge from b(v) to (r, s, j) if body(s, j) = b(v)
or body(s, j) = ¬b(v). There is an edge from (r, s, j) to
a(c) if head(s) = a(c).
5) Proofs about Templates: Here we prove preliminary re-
sults about the semantic relationships enforced by the ordering,
disjointness, and uniqueness templates.
Proposition B.1. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be
a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, O
be a Σ-ordering template, and  be a well-founded partial
order over 2Σ. If p complies with O with respect to 
and ORD(A) ∈ O, then if pr1(a1, a2), pr2(a2, a3), . . . ,
prn−1(an−1, an) are in ground(p) and {pr1, . . . , prn−1} ⊆
A, then a1 6= an.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, O be a Σ-
ordering template, and  be a well-founded partial order
over 2Σ. We assume that p complies with O with respect
to , ORD(A) ∈ O, pr1(a1, a2), . . . , prn−1(an−1, an) are
in ground(p), and {pr1, . . . , prn−1} ⊆ A. We now prove,
by induction over , that the transitive closure of the unions
of the relations induced by pr1, . . . , prn−1 over ground(p)
is a strict partial order over dom|pr|/2. From this, it follows
that if pr1(a1, a2), pr2(a2, a3), . . . , prn−1(an−1, an) are in
ground(p), then a1 6= an.
Base Case. Let A be a set such that there is no A′  A
such that p,|= ORD(A′). From this, ORD(A) ∈ O, and p
complies with O with respect to , it follows that (1) for all
pr ∈ A, there is no rule r in p such that pred(head(r)) =
pr and body(r) 6= ∅, and (2) the transitive closure of the
relation R =
⋃
pr∈A{(c, v) | ∃r ∈ p. ((head(r) = pr(c, v) ∨
∃v′. head(r) = v′::pr(c, v)) ∧ body(r) = ∅) ∧ |c| = |v| =
|pr |/2} is strict partial order. From this and {(c, v) | ∃pr ∈
A. pr(c, v) ∈ ground(p) ∧ |c| = |v| = |pr |/2} ⊆ R, it follows
that the transitive closure of the union of the relations induced
by pr over ground(p) is a strict partial order over dom|pr|/2.
Induction Step. Assume that the relation induced by any
A′ ≺ A over ground(p) is a strict partial order over dom|pr′|/2
if p,|= ORD(A′), where pr ′ is any predicate symbol in A′.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is at least
one A′ ≺ A such that p,|= ORD(A′) (otherwise the proof
is the same as in the base case). We now prove that also
the relation induced by A over ground(p) is a strict partial
order over dom|pr|/2. Let pr , A′, pr1 be such that A =
(A′\{pr1})∪{pr}, A′ ≺ A, p,|= ORD(A′), and pr1 ∈ A′.
Note that the previous values always exist. We now prove that
also the relation induced by A over ground(p) is a strict partial
order over dom|pr|/2. Since pr ∈ A, A = (A′ \{pr1})∪{pr},
pr1 ∈ A′, and ORD(A) ∈ O, it follows that for all rules r in p
such that pred(head(r)) = pr, there are sequences of variables
x and y and an i, head(r) = pr(x, y), body(r, i) = pr1(x, y),
and |x| = |y|. From this, it follows that the {(v, w) | pr(v,
w) ∈ ground(p)} ⊆ {(v, w) | pr1(v, w) ∈ ground(p)}.
From the induction hypothesis, it follows that the transitive
closure of
⋃
pr ′∈A′{(v, w) | pr ′(v, w) ∈ ground(p)} is a
strict partial order over dom|pr
′|/2. From this, pr1 ∈ A′,
A = (A′ \ {pr1}) ∪ {pr}, pr1 ∈ A′, and {(v, w) | pr(v,
w) ∈ ground(p)} ⊆ {(v, w) | pr1(v, w) ∈ ground(p)}, it
follows that the transitive closure of
⋃
pr ′∈A{(v, w) | pr ′(v,
w) ∈ ground(p)} is a strict partial order over dom|pr′|/2. This
completes the proof of our claim.
Proposition B.2. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be
a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, D be
a Σ-disjointness template, and  be a well-founded partial
order over Σ2. If p complies with D with respect to  and
DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D, then there is no tuple v such that pr(v) ∈
ground(p) and pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p).
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, D be a Σ-
disjointness template, and  be a well-founded partial order
over Σ2. Furthermore, we assume that p complies with D with
respect to  and DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D. We prove, by induction
over , that for any DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D, there is no tuple v
such that pr(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p).
Base Case. Let (pr , pr ′) be a pair in Σ2 such that there
is no (pr1, pr
′
1) ≺ (pr , pr ′) and p,|= DIS (pr , pr ′). From
this, DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D, and p complies with D, it follows
that (1) there are no rules r ∈ p such that body(r) 6= ∅ and
pred(head(r)) = pr or pred(head(r)) = pr ′, and (2) the
sets A = {c | pr(c) ∈ p ∨ ∃v′.v′::pr(c) ∈ p} and A′ =
{c | ∃r ∈ p. head(r) = pr ′(c) ∨ ∃v′.v′::pr ′(c) ∈ p} are
disjoint. From this, it follows that there is no tuple v such that
pr(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p).
Induction Step. Assume that there is no tuple v such that
pr1(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′1(v) ∈ ground(p) for any (pr1,
pr ′1) ≺ (pr , pr ′) such that p,|= DIS (pr1, pr ′1). We now
prove that there is no tuple v such that pr(v) ∈ ground(p)
and pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p). There are four cases:
• There are no rules r ∈ p such that body(r) 6= ∅ and
pred(head(r)) = pr , and there is a (pr , pr ′1) ∈ Σ2 such
that (a) DIS (pr , pr ′1) ∈ D, (b) (pr , pr ′1) ≺ (pr , pr ′),
and (c) for all rules r ∈ p such that head(r) = pr ′(x)
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there is 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)| such that body(r, i) = pr ′1(x).
From (pr , pr ′1) ≺ (pr , pr ′), DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D, and the
induction’s hypothesis, it follows that there is no tuple v
such that pr(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′1(v) ∈ ground(p).
Furthermore, the relation associated with pr ′ is a subset
of the relation associated to pr ′1. Therefore, there is no
tuple v such that pr(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′(v) ∈
ground(p).
• There are no rules r ∈ p such that body(r) 6= ∅ and
pred(head(r)) = pr ′, and there is a (pr1, pr
′) ∈ Σ2 such
that (a) DIS (pr1, pr
′) ∈ D, (b) (pr1, pr ′) ≺ (pr , pr ′),
and (c) for all rules r ∈ p such that head(r) = pr(x)
there is 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)| such that body(r, i) = pr1(x).
From (pr1, pr
′) ≺ (pr , pr ′), DIS (pr1, pr ′) ∈ D, and the
induction’s hypothesis, it follows that there is no tuple v
such that pr1(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p).
Furthermore, the relation associated with pr is a subset of
the relation associated to pr1. Therefore, there is no tuple
v such that pr(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p).
• There is a (pr1, pr
′
1) ∈ Σ2 such that (a) DIS (pr1,
pr ′1) ∈ D, (b) (pr1, pr ′1) ≺ (pr , pr ′), and (c) for
all rules r, r′ ∈ p such that head(r) = pr(x) and
head(r′) = pr ′(x′), there are 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)|, 1 ≤
i′ ≤ |body(r′)| such that body(r, i) = pr1(x), body(r′,
i′) = pr ′1(x
′). From (pr1, pr
′
1) ≺ (pr , pr ′), DIS (pr1,
pr ′1) ∈ D, and the induction’s hypothesis, it follows that
there is no tuple v such that pr1(v) ∈ ground(p) and
pr ′1(v) ∈ ground(p). Furthermore, the relation associated
with pr is a subset of the relation associated with pr1 and
the relation associated with pr ′ is a subset of the relation
associated with pr ′1. Therefore, there is no tuple v such
that pr(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p).
This completes the proof of our claim.
Proposition B.3. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a
finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, U be a
Σ-uniqueness template, and  be a well-founded order over Σ.
If p complies with U with respect to  and UNQ(pr ,K) ∈ U ,
then for all tuples pr(v), pr(w) ∈ ground(p), if v(i) = w(i)
for all i ∈ K, then v = w.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, U be a Σ-
uniqueness template, and  be a well-founded partial order
over U . Furthermore, we assume that p complies with U with
respect to  and UNQ(pr ,K) ∈ U . We prove, by induction
over , that for all UNQ(pr ,K) ∈ U , and all tuples pr(v),
pr(w) ∈ ground(p), if v(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ K, then v = w.
Without loss of generality, in the following we assume that
K 6= {1, . . . , |pr |}. If this is not the case, then our claim
holds trivially.
Base Case. Let pr be a predicate such that there is no pr ′ ≺
pr . From this and UNQ(pr ,K) ∈ U , it follows that there are
no rules r in p such that body(r) 6= ∅ and pred(head(r)) =
pr , and for all w, v in A = {c | pr(c) ∈ p∨∃v.v::pr(c) ∈ p},
if v(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ K, then v = w. From this and
{c | pr(c) ∈ ground(p)} ⊆ A, it follows that for all tuples
pr(v), pr(w) ∈ ground(p), if v(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ K, then
v = w.
Induction Step. Assume that the claim holds for any pr ′ ≺
pr and K ⊆ {1, . . . , |pr |} such that UNQ(pr ,K) ∈ U (we
denote this induction hypothesis as (♣)). We now prove that
the claim holds for pr as well. Without loss of generality, we
assume that there is at least one rule r such that body(r) 6= ∅
and pred(head(r)) = pr (otherwise the proof is identical to
the base case). Assume, for contradiction’s sake, that there
are two ground atoms pr(v), pr(w) ∈ ground(p) such that
v(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ K but v 6= w. There are two cases:
• pr(v) and pr(w) are generated by two ground instances
of the same rule r. From v 6= w, it follows that there
is j 6∈ K such that v(j) 6= w(j). From this and
the fact that both atoms are generated by the same
rule r, it follows that there is a variable x such that
x ∈ {x(i) | i 6∈ K} and x = x(j), where x =
args(head(r)). From this and pr ∈ U , it follows that
x ∈ ⋃l∈bound(head(r),K,body+(r),µ′) vars(l). We claim
that the value of x is determined by the values of the
variables whose positions are in K. From this and the
fact that v and w agree on all values whose positions are
in K, it follows that v = w, leading to a contradiction.
We now prove our claim that the value of x is deter-
mined by the values of the variables whose positions
are in K. The value of the variable x is determined by
the grounding of one of the atoms in bound(head(r),
K, body+(r), µ′). We first slightly modify the defi-
nition of bound . We denote by bd0(h,K,L, µ′) the
function
⋃
b(y)∈L∧b≺pr∧
u(y,µ′(b))⊆u(args(h),K)
{b(y)} and by bd i(h,
K,L, µ′), where i > 0, the function bd i−1(h,K,L,
µ′)∪⋃ b(y)∈L∧b≺pr∧
∃l′∈boundi−1(h,K,L,µ′).(u(y,µ′(b))⊆vars(l′))
{b(y)}. It
is easy to see that (1) bound(head(r),K, body+(r),
µ′) =
⋃
i∈N bd
i(h,K,L, µ′), and (2) the fix-point is
always reached in a finite amount of steps (bounded
by |body+(r)|). We now prove by induction on i that
the groundings of the literals in bd i(h,K,L, µ′) is
always determined by the values of the variables in
u(args(head(r)),K). From this, our claim trivially fol-
lows. For the base case, let i = 0. Then, for any literal
b(y) ∈ bd0(h,K,L, µ′), it follows that (a) b ≺ pr ,
and (b) u(y, µ′(b)) ⊆ u(args(head(r)),K). From this,
p complies with U , and the induction’s hypothesis (♣),
it follows that the variables in UNQ(b, µ′(b)) uniquely
determine the grounding of b(y). From this and u(y,
µ′(b)) ⊆ u(args(head(r)),K), it follows that the vari-
ables in u(args(head(r)),K) uniquely determine the
grounding of b(y). For the induction’s step, assume that
the claim hold for all j < i (we denote this induction
hypothesis as (♠)). Let b(y) ∈ bd i(h,K,L, µ′) (without
loss of generality, b(y) 6∈ bd i−1(h,K,L, µ′)). From this,
it follows that b  pr and there is a l′ ∈ bound i−1(h,
K,L, µ′) such that u(y, µ′(b)) ⊆ vars(l′). From the
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induction hypothesis (♠), it follows that the grounding of
l′ is directly determined by the grounding of the values
of the variables in u(args(head(r)),K). Furthermore,
from b  pr , p,|= UNQ(b, µ′(b)), and the induction
hypothesis (♣), it follows that the values of the variables
in u(y, µ′(b)) uniquely determine the grounding of b(y).
Therefore, the values of the variables in u(args(head(r)),
K) uniquely determine the grounding of b(y). This
completes the proof of the claim.
• pr(v) and pr(w) are generated by ground instances
of two different rules r1 and r2. From this, UNQ(pr ,
K) ∈ U , and K 6= {1, . . . , |pr |}, it follows that it follows
that there is a value i ∈ K such that args(head(r1)) ∈
dom, args(head(r2)) ∈ dom, and args(head(r1)) 6=
args(head(r1)). Therefore, there is an i ∈ K such that
v(i) 6= w(i). This contradicts the fact that v(i) = w(i)
for all i ∈ K.
This completes the proof of our claim.
6) Proofs about Propagation Maps: Here we prove some
results about propagation maps, which we afterwards use in
proving the main result.
Proposition B.4. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a
finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, r be a
rule in p, and l be the i-th literal in body(r). Furthermore, let
µ be the (r, l)-vertical map. Given a rule r′ ∈ ground(p, r),
then b(j) = h(µ(j)) for any j such that µ(j) is defined, where
h = args(head(r′)) and b = args(body(r′, i)).
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, r be a rule
in p, and l be the i-th literal in body(r). Furthermore,
let µ be the (r, l)-vertical map and r′ ∈ ground(p, r).
From the definition of ground(p, r), it follows that there
is an assignment Θ from variables to elements in dom
such that r′ = rΘ. From this, b(j) = Θ(args(l)(j)) and
h(µ(j)) = Θ(args(head(r))(µ(j))). Note that from the
definition of (r, l)-vertical map it follows that args(l)(j) =
args(head(r))(µ(j)). From this, b(j) = h(µ(j)) whenever
µ(j) is defined.
Proposition B.5. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a
finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, r be a
rule in p, l be the i-th literal in body(r), and l′ be the j-th
literal in body(r). Furthermore, let µ be the (r, l, l′)-horizontal
map. Given a rule r′ ∈ ground(p, r), then b1(k) = b2(µ(k))
for any k such that µ(k) is defined, where b1 = args(body(r′,
i)) and b2 = args(body(r′, j)).
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, r be a rule
in p, l be the i-th literal in body(r), and l′ be the j-
th literal in body(r). Furthermore, let µ be the (r, l, l′)-
horizontal map and r′ ∈ ground(p, r). From the definition
of ground(p, r), it follows that there is an assignment Θ from
variables to elements in dom such that r′ = rΘ. From this,
b1(j) = Θ(args(l)(j)) and b2(µ(j)) = Θ(args(l′)(µ(j))).
Note that from the definition of (r, l, l′)-vertical map it follows
that args(l)(j) = args(l′)(µ(j)). From this, b1(j) = b2(µ(j))
whenever µ(j) is defined.
Proposition B.6. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom
be a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program,
P = pr1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn be a directed path in
graph(p), and ν : N → N be a mapping. Furthermore, let
P ′ = a1 → (r1, s1, i1) → a2 → (r2, s2, i2) → . . . → (rn−1,
sn−1, in−1)→ an be a directed path in gg(p) corresponding
to P . If P ν-downward links to l, where l is the k-th literal in
rj , then b1(m) = v2(ν(m)) whenever ν(m) is defined, where
b1 = args(body(s1, i1)) and v2 = args(body(sj , k)).
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, P = pr1
r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn be a directed path in graph(p), and
ν : N → N be a mapping. Furthermore, let P ′ = a1 →
(r1, s1, i1) → a2 → (r2, s2, i2) → . . . → (rn−1, sn−1,
in−1) → an be a directed path in gg(p) corresponding to
P . Assume that P ν-downward links to l, where l is the
k-th literal in rj . From this, it follows that the function
µ := µ′ ◦ µj ◦ . . . ◦ µ1 satisfies µ(m) = ν(m) for all m
for which ν(k) is defined, where for 1 ≤ h ≤ j, µh is
the vertical map connecting body(rh, ih) and rh, and µ′ is
the horizontal map connecting body(rj+1, ij+1) with l. By
repeatedly applying Proposition B.4 to the rules in P ′, we
have that b1(m) = bj(φ(m)) whenever φ(m) is defined,
where b1 = args(body(s1, i1)), bj = args(body(sj , ij)), and
φ = µj ◦ . . . ◦ µ1. Moreover, by applying Proposition B.5,
we have that bj(m) = v2(µ′(m)) whenever µ′(m) is defined,
where bj = args(body(sj , ij)) and v2 = args(body(sj , k)).
Therefore, we have that b1(m) = v2(µ(m)) whenever µ′(m)
is defined (by composing the previous results). From this and
µ(m) = ν(m) for all m for which ν(m) is defined, it follows
that b1(m) = v2(ν(m)) whenever µ′(m) is defined.
Proposition B.7. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom
be a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program,
P = pr1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn be a directed path in
graph(p), and ν : N → N be a mapping. Furthermore, let
P ′ = a1 → (r1, s1, i1) → a2 → (r2, s2, i2) → . . . → (rn−1,
sn−1, in−1)→ an be a directed path in gg(p) corresponding
to P . If P ν-upward links to l, where l is the k-th literal in
rj , then bn(m) = v2(ν(m)) whenever ν(m) is defined, where
bn = args(head(rn−1)) and v2 = args(body(sj , k)).
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, P = pr1
r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn be a directed path in graph(p), and
ν : N→ N be a mapping. Furthermore, let P ′ = a1 → (r1, s1,
i1) → a2 → (r2, s2, i2) → . . . → (rn−1, sn−1, in−1) → an
be a directed path in gg(p) corresponding to P . Assume that
P ν-upward links to l, where l is the k-th literal in rj . From
this, it follows that the function µ := µ′−1 ◦µ−1j+1 ◦ . . . ◦µ−1n−1
satisfies µ(k) = ν(k) for all k for which ν(k) is defined,
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where µh is the (rh, body(rh, ih))-vertical map, for j <
h ≤ n − 1, and µ′ is the (rj , l)-vertical map. By repeatedly
applying Proposition B.4 to the rules in P ′, we obtain that
bj+1(φ
−1(m)) = bn(m) whenever φ−1(m) is defined, where
bj+1 = args(body(sj+1, ij+1)), bn = args(head(sn−1)),
and φ−1 = µ−1j+1 ◦ . . . ◦ µ−1n−1. Furthermore, by applying
Proposition B.4 to the (rj , l)-vertical map, we have that
v2(µ
′−1(m)) = bj+1(m) whenever µ′
−1
(m) is defined, where
bj+1 = args(head(sj)) and v2 = args(body(sj , k)). From
this and µ(m) = ν(m) for all m for which ν(m) is de-
fined, it follows that bn(m) = v2(ν(m)) whenever ν(m) is
defined.
7) Proofs about Connected Rules: We now prove that,
for strongly connected rules, the grounding of a rule’s head
uniquely determines the grounding of the rule’s body (Propo-
sition B.8), whereas for weakly connected rules the grounding
of one of the atoms in the body determines the head’s
grounding (Proposition B.9).
Proposition B.8. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a
finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, r be a
rule in p, and U be a Σ-uniqueness template. If p complies
with U and r is strongly connected for U , then for all r1,
r2 ∈ ground(p, r), if head(r1) = head(r2), then r1 = r2.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, r be a rule in p,
and U be a Σ-uniqueness template. Furthermore, we assume
that (1) p complies with U , and (2) there are join trees J1,
. . . , Jn such that (a) the trees cover all literals in body(r),
and (b) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ji is strongly connected for U .
Finally, let r1, r2 ∈ ground(p, r) be two ground rules such
that head(r1) = head(r2). Assume, for contradiction’s sake,
that r1 6= r2. Therefore, there is a position 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)|
such that body(r1, i) 6= body(r2, i). Let J = (N,E, root , λ)
be one of the join trees that cover l = body(r, i). We claim
that the grounding of head(r) determines the grounding of all
literals in J . From this, it follows that body(r1, i) = body(r2,
i) leading to a contradiction.
We now prove our claim that the grounding of head(r)
determines the grounding of all literals in J . Let V (J, i) be
the set of all the nodes in J at distance at most i from the
root root . Furthermore, we denote by ground(r, r′, J, i) the set
{body(r′, j) | body(r, j) ∈ V (J, i)}. We prove, by induction
on i, that for all i and all ground rules r1 and r2 instances of r,
if head(r1) = head(r2), then ground(r, r1, J, i) = ground(r,
r2, J, i). From this, it follows that the grounding of head(r)
determines the grounding of all literals in J .
Base case. For i = 0, there is a j such that V (J, 0) = {body(r,
j)}. From this, it follows that ground(r, r1, J, 0) = {body(r1,
j)} and ground(r, r2, J, 0) = {body(r2, j)}. Furthermore,
anc(J, body(r, j)) = ∅. There are two cases depending on
whether body(r, j) is a positive literal or not:
1) If body(r, j) is a positive literal of the form a(x),
then body(r1, j) = a(c1) and body(r2, j) = a(c2).
From the fact that J is strongly connected for U , it
follows that there is a set of variables K ⊆ {i |
x(i) ∈ support(a(x))} such that UNQ(a,K) ∈ U . From
support(a(x)) = vars(head(r)) ∪ {x | (x = c) ∈
cstr(r)∧c ∈ dom} and head(r1) = head(r2), it follows
that the values assigned to the variables associated to
the indexes in K are the same in r1 and r2. From
this, UNQ(a,K) ∈ U , p complies with U , {a(c1),
a(c2)} ⊆ ground(p), and Proposition B.3, it follows
c1 = c2 and ground(r, r1, J, 0) = ground(r, r2, J, 0).
2) If body(r, j) is a negative literal of the form ¬a(x),
then body(r1, j) = ¬a(c1) and body(r2, j) = ¬a(c2).
From the fact that J is strongly connected for U , it
follows that vars(¬a(x)) ⊆ support(¬a(x)). From this,
support(¬a(x)) = vars(head(r)) ∪ {x | (x = c) ∈
cstr(r)∧c ∈ dom}, and head(r1) = head(r2), it follows
that the values of the variables in support(¬a(x)) are the
same in r1 and r2. From this, it follows that c1 = c2 and
ground(r, r1, J, 0) = ground(r, r2, J, 0).
Induction Step. Assume that for all j < i and all ground
rules r1, r2 ∈ ground(p, r), if head(r1) = head(r2), then
ground(r, r1, J, j) = ground(r, r2, J, j). We now show that
ground(r, r1, J, i) = ground(r, r2, J, i). Assume, for contra-
diction’s sake, that this is not the case, namely ground(r, r1,
J, i) 6= ground(r, r2, J, i). From the definition of ground(r,
r′, J, i), it follows that ground(r, r1, J, i) = ground(r, r1, J,
i − 1) ∪ {body(r1, j) | body(r, j) ∈ V (J, i) \ V (J, i − 1)}
and ground(r, r2, J, i) = ground(r, r2, J, i − 1) ∪ {body(r2,
j) | body(r, j) ∈ V (J, i) \ V (J, i − 1)}. From this, the
induction’s hypothesis, and ground(r, r1, J, i) 6= ground(r,
r2, J, i), it follows that {body(r1, j) | body(r, j) ∈ V (J,
i) \ V (J, i− 1)} 6= {body(r2, j) | body(r, j) ∈ V (J, i) \ V (J,
i − 1)}. Therefore, there is a j such that body(r, j) ∈ V (J,
i) \ V (J, i− 1) and body(r1, j) 6= body(r2, j). There are two
cases, depending on whether body(r, j) is a positive literal:
1) If body(r, j) = a(x), then body(r1, j) = a(c1), body(r2,
j) = a(c2), and c1 6= c2. From the fact that J is strongly
connected for U , it follows that there is a set of variables
K ⊆ {i | x(i) ∈ support(a(x))} such that UNQ(a,
K) ∈ U . From support(a(x)) = vars(head(r)) ∪ {x |
(x = c) ∈ cstr(r) ∧ c ∈ dom} ∪ ⋃l∈V (J,i−1) vars(l),
ground(r, r1, J, i − 1) = ground(r, r2, J, i − 1) (from
the induction’s hypothesis), and head(r1) = head(r2),
it follows that the values assigned to the variables asso-
ciated to the indexes in K are the same in r1 and r2.
From this, UNQ(a,K) ∈ U , p complies with U , {a(c1),
a(c2)} ⊆ ground(p), and Proposition B.3, it follows that
c1 = c2 leading to a contradiction.
2) If body(r, j) = ¬a(x), then body(r1, j) = ¬a(c1),
body(r2, j) = ¬a(c2), and c1 6= c2. From the fact
that J is strongly connected for U , it follows that
vars(¬a(x)) ⊆ support(a(x)). From support(a(x)) =
vars(head(r)) ∪ {x | (x = c) ∈ cstr(r) ∧ c ∈ dom} ∪⋃
l∈V (J,i−1) vars(l), ground(r, r1, J, i− 1) = ground(r,
r2, J, i− 1) (from the induction’s hypothesis), it follows
that the values assigned to the variables in support(a(x))
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are the same in r1 and r2. From this, it follows that
c1 = c2 leading to a contradiction.
Since both cases lead to a contradiction, ground(r, r1, J, i) =
ground(r, r2, J, i).
Proposition B.9. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a
finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, r be a
rule in p, and U be a Σ-uniqueness template. If p complies
with U and r is weakly connected for U , then for all r1,
r2 ∈ ground(p, r), if there is an 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)| such
that body(r1, i) = body(r2, i), then r1 = r2.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program, r be a rule in p,
and U be a Σ-uniqueness template. Furthermore, we assume
that p complies with U and that r is weakly connected for
U , namely there is a join tree J = (N,E, root , λ) such that
(a) J is weakly connected for U , (b) N ⊆ body+(r), and (c)
all literals in body(r) \ N are (r,U , N)-strictly guarded. Let
r1, r2 ∈ ground(p, r) be two ground rules such that there is
an 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)| such that body(r1, i) = body(r2, i), and
let l be the literal body(r, i). There are two cases:
1) body(r, i) ∈ N . Given a node n in a join tree J , we
denote by adjacent(n, i), where i ∈ N, the sub-tree
obtained by considering only the nodes reachable from
n using at most i edges. We claim that for all nodes
in adjacent(l, j), the corresponding ground atoms in r1
and r2 are the same. From this and the fact that there
is a j such that adjacent(l, j) = J , it follows that for
all i ∈ {j | body(r, j) ∈ N}, body(r1, i) = body(r2, i).
From this and the fact that the literals in body(r) \ N
are (r,U , N)-strictly guarded, it follows that for all i ∈
{j | body(r, j) ∈ body(r) \ N}, body(r1, i) = body(r2,
i) (since vars(l) ⊆ ⋃l′∈N∩body+(r) vars(l′) ∪ {x | (x =
c) ∈ cstr(r)∧c ∈ dom} for any literal l in body(r)\N ).
Therefore, body(r1) = body(r2).
2) body(r, i) 6∈ N . From this and the fact that r is weakly
connected, it follows that there a j such that body(r, j) =
a(x), body(r, j) ∈ N , and a UNQ(a,K) ∈ U such that
{x(i) | i ∈ K} ⊆ vars(body(r, i)). From this, p complies
with U , body(r1, i) = body(r2, i), {body(r1, j), body(r2,
j)} ⊆ ground(p), and Proposition B.3, it follows that
body(r1, j) = body(r2, j). We proved above that if
body(r1, j) = body(r2, j) and body(r, j) ∈ N , then
body(r1) = body(r2). Therefore, body(r1) = body(r2).
From vars(head(r)) ⊆ ⋃l∈body+(r) vars(l) and body(r1) =
body(r2), it follows that head(r1) = head(r2). Therefore,
r1 = r2.
We now prove, by induction on j, that for all nodes in
adjacent(l, j), the corresponding ground atoms in r1 and r2
are the same.
Base Case. The sub-tree adjacent(l, 0) contains only the node
l = body(r, i). Since body(r1, i) = body(r2, i), the claim
holds for the base case.
Induction step. Assume now that the claim holds for all j′ <
j. We now prove that the claim holds also for j. The sub-tree
adjacent(l, j) is obtained by extending adjacent(l, j−1) with
either edges of the form n1
L1−−→ n′1, where n′1 ∈ adjacent(l,
j − 1), or n′2 L2−−→ n2, where n′2 ∈ adjacent(l, j − 1). In
both cases, from the induction hypothesis, the ground literals
corresponding to n′1 and n
′
2 are l
′
1 and l
′
2 and they are the
same in r1 and r2. From the definition of weakly connected
join tree, there are variables K1 ⊆ L1 and K2 ⊆ L2 such
that UNQ(pred(n1),K1) ∈ U and UNQ(pred(n2),K2) ∈ U .
From this, p complies with U , the fact that the value of K1 and
K2 are fixed by l′1 and l
′
2, and Proposition B.3, it follows that
the ground atoms corresponding to n1 and n2 are the same in
r1 and r2 (because the values in K1 and K2 determines all
values in n1 and n2).
8) Acyclicity Proof: We are now ready to prove our first
key result, namely that the ground graph associated to an
acyclic PROBLOG program is a forest of poly-trees, i.e., its
undirected version does not contain simple cycles (which are
cycles without repetitions of edges and vertices other than the
starting and ending vertices).
Proposition B.10. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom
be a finite domain, and p be a (Σ,dom)-acyclic PROBLOG
program. The graph gg(p) is a forest of poly-trees, i.e., its
undirected version does not contain simple cycles.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, and p be a (Σ,dom)-acyclic PROBLOG program. We
prove that the undirected version of gg(p) is acyclic. Assume,
for contradiction’s sake, that this is not the case, namely there
is a simple cycle C := n1 → n2 → . . . → nk → n1 in the
undirected version of gg(p). There are two cases: (1) there is
a directed simple cycle in gg(p) that directly corresponds to
C, or (2) there are n directed paths P1, . . . , Pn in gg(p) that
induce a simple cycle C in the undirected version of gg(p)
(and P1, . . . , Pn does not correspond to any directed simple
cycle in ggp). From the first case, it follows that there is a
directed cycle in graph(p), whereas from the second case, it
follows that there is an undirected cycle in graph(p).
Directed Cycle. Assume that C := n1 → n2 → . . . →
nk → n1 directly corresponds to a directed cycle in gg(p).
Without loss of generality, we assume that n1 is a node of
the form a(c). Therefore, the cycle has form a1(c1) → (r1,
s1, i1) → a2(c2) → . . . → an(cn) → (rn, sn, in) →
an+1(cn+1), where n = k/2 and an+1(cn+1) = a1(c1). From
this, it follows that there are rules r1, . . . , rn and ground rules
s1, . . . , sn such that: (1) there is a directed cycle a1
r1,i1−−−→
a2
r2,i2−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ an rn,in−−−→ a1 in p’s dependency
graph graph(p), and (2) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, si ∈ ground(p,
ri) and head(si) = ai+1(ci+1). From this, it follows that
p’s dependency graph graph(p) contains a directed cycle
C ′ = a1
r1,i1−−−→ a2 r2,i2−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ an rn,in−−−→ a1. Note
that C ′ may contain loops (i.e., it is not simple). Since p is
acyclic and C ′ is a directed cycle in graph(p), it follows that
there is an ordering template O, a disjointness template D, and
a uniqueness template U such that (1) p complies with O, D,
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and U and (2) there is a directed unsafe structure S that covers
C ′ and is (O,D,U)-guarded. Without loss of generality, we
assume that S = C ′. From S covers C ′ and S is (O,D,
U)-guarded, it follows that there is an ordering annotation
ORD(O) ∈ O such that there are integers 1 ≤ y1 < y2 <
. . . < ye = n, literals o1(x1), . . . , oe(xe) (where oj ∈ O and
|xj | = |oj |), a non-empty set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |pr1|}, and a bi-
jection ν : K → {1, . . . , |o1|/2} such that for each 0 ≤ k < e,
(1) pryk
ryk ,iyk−−−−−→ . . . ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→ pryk+1 ν-downward
connects to ok+1(xk+1), and (2) pryk+1−1
ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→
pryk+1 ν
′-upward connects to ok+1(xk+1), where ν′(i) =
ν(x) + |o1|/2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |o1|/2, and y0 = 1.
By applying Proposition B.6 and Proposition B.7 to the
paths pryk
ryk ,iyk−−−−−→ . . . ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→ pryk+1 ν-downward
connects to ok+1(xk+1) for each 0 ≤ k < e, it fol-
lows that (1) ground atoms o1(b1, b2), . . . , oe(b|K|, b|K|+1)
are in ground(p), and (2) for all 1 ≤ w ≤ |pr |/2,
both b1(w) = args(body(s1, i1))(ν(w)) and b|K|+1(w) =
args(head(sn))(ν
′(w)) hold. From this, ORD(O) ∈ O, p
complies with O, and Proposition B.1, it follows that b1 6=
b|K|+1. From this b1(w) = args(body(s1, i1))(ν(w)) and
b|K|+1(w) = args(head(sn))(ν′(w)) for all 1 ≤ w ≤ |pr |/2,
it follows that body(s1, i1) 6= head(sn). This contradicts
head(sn) = a(c1) and body(s1, i1) = a(c1) (which directly
follows from the existence of the cycle C).
Undirected Cycle. Assume that C does not directly corre-
spond to any directed simple cycle in gg(p). From this, it
follows that there are n directed paths P1, . . . , Pn in gg(p)
such that P1, . . . , Pn correspond to the simple cycle C in the
undirected version of gg(p). From this, it follows that P1, . . . ,
Pn form an undirected cycle in gg(p). Therefore:
1) For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, there is a directed path Dj :=
a1
r1,i1−−−→ a2 r2,i2−−−→ . . .
rnj−1,inj−1−−−−−−−−→ anj in p’s depen-
dency graph graph(p), where Pj is a1(c1) → (r1, s1,
i1) → a2(c2) → . . . → anj−1(cnj−1) → (rnj−1, snj−1,
inj−1)→ anj (cnj ).
2) For all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ h < nj , sh ∈ ground(p, rh) and
head(sh) = ah+1(ch+1), where Pj := a1(c1)→ (r1, s1,
i1) → a2(c2) → . . . → anj−1(cnj−1) → (rnj−1, snj−1,
inj−1)→ anj (cnj ).
3) D1, . . . , Dn form an undirected cycle in graph(p).
4) D1, . . . , Dn is not a directed simple cycle. Indeed, if D1,
. . . , Dn is a directed simple cycle, then C would contain
loops (contradicting our assumption that C is a simple
cycle).
Since p is acyclic and D1, . . . , Dn form an undirected cycle
in graph(p) that is not a directed simple cycle, it follows that
there is an ordering template O, a disjointness template D,
and a uniqueness template U such that (1) p complies with O,
D, and U and (2) there is an unsafe structure S that covers
D1, . . . , Dn and is (O,D,U)-guarded. We assume that there
are values i, a, b, c such that
1) S = 〈Da, Db, Dc, U〉,
2) a = i, b = (i + 1)%n, and c = (i + 2)%n (i.e., Pa, Pb,
and Pc are adjacent in the cycle), and
3) U is the undirected path containing all Di’s that are
different from Da, Db, and Dc.
Note that the previous assumption is without loss of generality:
we can always pick the directed paths in gg(p) inducing C in
such a way that they match the guarded structure S.
Let Pa be a1(a1) → (r1, s1, i1) → a2(a2) → (r2, s2,
i2) → . . . → (rna−1, sna−1, ina−1) → ana(ana), Pb be
b1(b1) → (r′1, s′1, i′1) → b2(b2) → (r′2, s′2, i′2) → . . . →
(r′nb−1, s
′
nb−1, i
′
nb−1) → bnb(bnb), and Pc be c1(c1) → (r′′1 ,
s′′1 , i
′′
1) → c2(c2) → (r′′2 , s′′2 , i′′2) → . . . → (r′′nc−1, s′′nc−1,
i′′nc−1) → cnc(cnc). From S = 〈Da, Db, Dc, U〉, it follows
that a1(a1) = b1(b1) and bnb(bnb) = cnc(cnc). From S =
〈Da, Db, Dc, U〉, S covers D1, . . . , Dn, and S is (O,D,U)-
guarded, there are two cases:
1) (Da, Db) is (D,U)-head guarded. Therefore, Da and Db
are non-empty. There are two cases:
a) Da = Db. From this, it follows that (1) Pa and Pb
are directed paths in gg(p), (2) a1(a1) = b1(b1), (3)
na = nb, and (4) Da and Db are head-connected. From
this and (Da, Db) is head-guarded, it follows that the
rules in Da and Db are weakly connected for U . We
claim that sh = s′h for any 1 ≤ h ≤ na. From this,
it follows that Pa = Pb. This contradicts the fact that
P1, . . . , Pn induces a simple cycle in the undirected
version of gg(p) (because the cycle is not simple).
We now prove, by induction on d, that sd = s′d and
ad(ad) = bd(bd).
Base Case. Assume that d = 1. From r1 = r′1, r1
is weakly connected for U , body(s1, i1) = body(s′1,
i′1) = a1(c1), sd ∈ ground(p, rd), s′d ∈ ground(p, r′d)
, and Proposition B.9, it follows that s1 = s′1. From
this, a1(a1) = head(s1), and b1(b1) = head(s′1), it
follows that a1(a1) = b1(b1).
Induction Step. Assume that the claim holds for all
d′ < d. We now prove that sd = s′d and ad(ad) =
bd(bd) hold as well. From the induction’s hypothesis, it
follows that head(sd−1) = head(s′d−1). From this and
gg’s definition, it follows that body(sd, id) = body(s′d,
i′d). From this, rd = r
′
d, id = i
′
d, rd is weakly
connected for U , sd ∈ ground(p, rd), s′d ∈ ground(p,
sd), and Proposition B.9, it follows that sd = s′d. From
this, ad(ad) = head(sd), and bd(bd) = head(s′d), it
follows that ad(ad) = bd(bd).
b) Da 6= Db. From this and (Da, Db) are head-guarded,
it follows that there is an annotation DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D
a set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |a|}, and a bijection ν : K → {1,
. . . , |pr |} such that Da ν-downward links to pr and
Da ν-downward links to pr ′. From Da ν-downward
links to pr , Pa is a ground instance of Da, and
Proposition B.6, it follows that there is a positive literal
pr(v) in the body of one of the ground rules such
that a1(a1)(k) = v(ν(K)) for any k ∈ K. From this
and the definition of ground , it follows that pr(v) ∈
ground(p). From Db ν-downward links to pr ′, Pb is a
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ground instance of Db, and Proposition B.6, it follows
that there is a positive literal pr ′(v′) in the body of one
of the ground rules such that b1(b1)(k) = v′(ν(K)) for
any k ∈ K. From this and the definition of ground ,
it follows that pr ′(v′) ∈ ground(p). Finally, from the
fact that Pa and Pb are head-connected, it follows that
a1(a1) = b1(b1). From this, a1(a1)(k) = v(ν(K))
for any k ∈ K, and b1(b1)(k) = v′(ν(K)) for
any k ∈ K, it follows that v = v′. From this,
pr(v) ∈ ground(p) and pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p). This
contradicts Proposition B.2, DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D, and
p complies with D.
2) (Db, Dc) is (D,U)-tail guarded. Therefore, Db and Dc
are non-empty. There are two cases:
a) Db = Dc. From this, it follows that (1) Pc and Pb
are directed paths in gg(p), (2) cnc(cnc) = bnb(bnb),
(3) nb = nc, and (4) Db and Dc are tail-connected.
From this and (Db, Dc) is tail-guarded, it follows that
(1) Dc and Db are tail-connected, and (2) the rules in
Dc and Db are strongly connected for U . We claim
that s′′h = s
′
h for any 1 ≤ h ≤ nc. From this, it follows
that Pc = Pb. This contradicts the fact that P1, . . . ,
Pn induces a simple cycle in the undirected version of
gg(p) (because the cycle is not simple).
We now prove, by induction on d, that s′′nb−d = s
′
nb−d
and head(s′′nb−d) = head(s
′
nb−d).
Base Case. Assume d = 0. From r′′nb = r
′
nb
, r′nb is
strongly connected for U , head(s′′nb) = head(s′nb) =
bnb(bnb), s
′′
nb
∈ ground(p, r′′d ), s′d ∈ ground(p, r′d) ,
and Proposition B.8, it follows that s1 = s′1. From this,
a1(a1) = head(s1), and b1(b1) = head(s′1), it follows
that bnb(bnb) = cnb(cnb).
Induction Step. Assume that the claim holds for all
d′ < d. We now prove that s′′nb−d = s
′
nb−d and
cnb−d(cnb−d) = bnb−d(bnb−d) hold as well. From
the induction’s hypothesis, it follows that s′′nb−d+1 =
s′nb−d+1. From this and gg’s definition, it follows that
head(s′′nb−d, i
′′
nb−d) = head(s
′
nb−d, i
′
nb−d). From this,
r′′nb−d = r
′
nb−d, i
′′
nb−d = i
′
nb−d, r
′′
nb−d is strongly
connected for U , s′′nb−d ∈ ground(p, r′′nb−d), s′nb−d ∈
ground(p, snb−d), and Proposition B.8, it follows
that snb−dd
′′ = s′nb−d. From this, cnb−d(cnb−d) =
head(s′′nb−d), and bnb−d(bnb−d) = head(s
′
nb−d), it
follows that cnb−d(cnb−d) = bnb−d(bnb−d).
b) Db 6= Dc. From this and (Db, Dc) is tail-guarded, it
follows that there is an annotation DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D,
a set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |a|}, and a bijection ν : K → {1,
. . . , |pr |}, such that Db ν-upward links to pr and Dc
ν-upward links to pr ′. From Db ν-upward links to
pr , Pb is a path in the ground graph corresponding
to Db, and Proposition B.7, it follows that a positive
literal pr(v) in the body of one of the ground rules
such that bnb(bnb)(k) = v(ν(K)) for any k ∈ K.
From this and the definition of ground , it follows
that pr(v) ∈ ground(p). From Dc ν-upward links to
pr ′, Pc is a path in the ground graph corresponding
to Dc, and Proposition B.7, it follows that a positive
literal pr ′(v′) in the body of one of the ground rules
such that cnc(cnc)(k) = v
′(ν(K)) for any k ∈ K.
From this and the definition of ground , it follows that
pr ′(v′) ∈ ground(p). Finally, from the fact that Pb
and Pc are tail-connected, it follows that bnb(bnb) =
cnc(cnc). From this, bnb(bnb)(k) = v(ν(K)) for any
k ∈ K, and cnc(cnc)(k) = v′(ν(K)) for any k ∈ K, it
follows that v = v′. Therefore, pr(v) ∈ ground(p) and
pr ′(v) ∈ ground(p). This contradicts Proposition B.2,
DIS (pr , pr ′) ∈ D, and p complies with D.
This completes the proof of our claim.
9) Auxiliary Results: Here we prove two auxiliary results
that help in establishing that programs are acyclic. In particu-
lar, Proposition B.11 states pre-conditions that allows reducing
the guardedness of a complex undirected structure to the
guardedness of simpler structures. Similarly, Proposition B.12
states pre-conditions that allows reducing the guardedness of
a complex directed structure to the guardedness of a sequence
of simpler structures. Note that Proposition B.12 can be easily
extended to support (1) different forms of cycle combination,
and (2) combinations of non-self-loop cycles.
Proposition B.11. Let p be a PROBLOG program, O be
an ordering template, D be a disjointness template, U be a
uniqueness template, C be an undirected cycle in graph(p),
and S = 〈D1, D2, D3, U〉 be an undirected unsafe structure.
If (1) p complies with O, D, and U , (2) C is equivalent to
D1, U
′
1, U, U
′
2, D3, D2, (3) S is (O,D,U)-guarded, then there
is an undirected unsafe structure that covers C and is (O,D,
U)-guarded.
Proof. Let p be a PROBLOG program, O be an ordering
template, D be a disjointness template, U be a uniqueness
template, C be an undirected cycle in graph(p), and S = 〈D1,
D2, D3, U〉 be an undirected structure. We assume that (1)
p complies with O, D, and U , (2) C is equivalent to D1,
U ′1, U, U
′
2, D3, D2, (3) S is (O,D,U)-guarded. We define the
undirected unsafe structure S′ = 〈D1, D2, D3, U ′1, U, U ′2〉.
From our assumption C is equivalent to D1, U ′1, U, U
′
2, D3,
D2. Thus, S′ covers C. Furthermore, since S and S′ agree
on all directed paths, which are the only ones that determine
whether an undirected structure is guarded, it follows that S′
is (O,D,U)-guarded
In the following, we say that a directed cycle is guarded by
a set of predicates O and a bijection ν iff the definition of
guarded cycle is satisfied for the specific bijection ν.
Proposition B.12. Let p be a PROBLOG program, C1 =
pr1
r1,i1−−−→ . . . rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn rn,in−−−→ pr1 be a directed cycle in
graph(p), O be a set of predicate symbols, pr1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1,
and o be a predicate symbol such that for all o′ ∈ O, |o| = |o′|,
K be a non-empty set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |pr1|}, and a bijection
ν : K → {1, . . . , |o|/2}. If (1) C1 is guarded for O1 and
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ν, and (2) pr1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1 is guarded for o and ν, then
C1, pr1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1 is guarded for O1 ∪ {o}.
Proof. Let p be a PROBLOG program, C1 = pr1
r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn rn,in−−−→ pr1 be a directed cycle in graph(p),
O be a set of predicate symbols, pr1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1, and o
be a predicate symbol such that for all o′ ∈ O, |o| = |o′|, K
be a non-empty set K ⊆ {1, . . . , |pr1|}, ν be a bijection ν :
K → {1, . . . , |o|/2} and ν′ be the bijection ν′(i) = ν(x)+|o|/2
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |o|/2. Furthermore, we assume that (1) C1 is
guarded for O1 and ν, and (2) pr1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1 is guarded
for o and ν.
First, we rewrite C1, pr1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1 as pr1 r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn rn,in−−−→ prn+1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1. From
C1 is guarded for O1, it follows that there are inte-
gers 1 ≤ y1 < y2 < . . . < ye ≤ n such that
ye = n and literals o1(x1), . . . , oe(xe) (where oj ∈ O
and |xj | = |oj |), such that for each 0 ≤ k < e, (1)
pryk
ryk ,iyk−−−−−→ . . . ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→ pryk+1 ν-downward con-
nects to ok+1(xk+1), and (2) pryk+1−1
ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→
pryk+1 ν
′-upward connects to ok+1(xk+1), where y0 = 1.
Furthermore, from pr1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1 is guarded for o
and ν, it follows that there is a literal o(x) such that
(3) prn+1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1 ν-downward connects to o(x),
and (4) pryn+1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pry1 ν′-upward connects to
ok+1(xk+1). From (1)–(4), it therefore follows that pr1
r1,i1−−−→
. . .
rn−1,in−1−−−−−−→ prn rn,in−−−→ prn+1
rn+1,in+1−−−−−−→ pr1 is guarded
for ν and O ∪ {o}. Indeed, there are integers 1 ≤ y1 < y2 <
. . . < ye < ye+1 ≤ n + 1 such that ye+1 = n + 1 and
literals o1(x1), . . . , oe(xe), oe+1(xe+1) (where oj ∈ O ∪ {o}
and |xj | = |oj |) such that for each 0 ≤ k < e + 1,
(1) pryk
ryk ,iyk−−−−−→ . . . ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→ pryk+1 ν-downward
connects to ok+1(xk+1), and (2) pryk+1−1
ryk+1−1,iyk+1−1−−−−−−−−−−−→
pryk+1 ν
′-upward connects to ok+1(xk+1).
B. Relaxed Acyclic Programs
Acyclic PROBLOG programs as defined above are very
restrictive. For instance, they cannot encode rules like those in
Section V. We now design relaxed acyclic programs, a larger
fragment of PROBLOG where these examples can be encoded.
The key components of this new fragment are two syntactic
transformations over PROBLOG programs that, while not pre-
serving the program’s semantics, preserve certain key aspects
of the program’s structure. Intuitively, a PROBLOG program p
is a relaxed acyclic program if the program obtained from p by
applying the transformations is an acyclic PROBLOG program.
Finally, we develop a procedure for compiling any relaxed
acyclic PROBLOG program into a poly-tree Bayesian Network.
Since any acyclic program is a relaxed acyclic program as
well, this procedure can be applied also to acyclic programs.
1) Rule Domination: Rule r1 is dominated by rule r2,
written r1 v r2, iff:
• head(r1) = head(r2),
• cstr(r1) = cstr(r2),
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r1)|, then pred(body(r1, i)) =
pred(body(r2, i)) and args(body(r1, i)) = args(body(r2,
i)).
We extend the domination relation also to atoms and proba-
bilistic atoms as follows: a1(c1) v a2(c1) iff a1 = a2 and
c1 = c2, and v1::a1(c1) v v2::a2(c1) iff v1 = v2, a1 = a2,
and c1 = c2.
Given a program p and a rule r ∈ p, [r]vp denotes the
set {r′ ∈ p | r′ v r}. We say that a rule r is maximal in
a program p iff there is no rule r′ ∈ p such that r v r′.
The kernel of [r]vp, denoted k([r]vp), is the rule r′ defined
as follows: head(r′) = head(r), |body(r′)| = |body(r)|,
cstr(r′) = cstr(r), and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r′)|,
then body(r′, i) = ai(ci) if for all rules r′′ ∈ [r]vp (1)
|body(r′′)| ≥ i and (2) body(r′′, i) is a positive literal and
body(r′, i) = ¬ai(ci) otherwise, where ai = pred(body(r, i))
and ci = args(body(r, i)).
The maximal projection of p, denoted p ⇓v, is {k([r]vp) |
¬∃r′ ∈ p. r v r′}. A maximal partition PP of p is a subset
of P(p) such that: (1) for each R ∈ PP , R = [r]vp for some
maximal rule r ∈ p, and (2) for each R1, R2 ∈ PP , R1∩R2 =
∅. A maximal partition PP induces a maximal assignment
νPP : p → PP such that νPP (r) = R, where R ∈ PP and
r ∈ R if r is maximal, and νPP (r) = ∅ otherwise.
The syntactic transformation α, which removes all non-
maximal rules, takes as input a PROBLOG program p and
returns as its maximal projection p ⇓v.
2) CPT-like predicates: We now present CPT-like predi-
cates, a special kind of probabilistic structure that can be
formalized using annotated disjunctions. While general an-
notated disjunctions cannot be used in our encoding, since
they introduce, in general, cycles in the underlying Bayesian
Network, CPT-like predicates can be still encoded as poly-
trees.
Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite domain,
pr be a predicate symbol in Σ of arity |pr |, p be a (Σ,dom)-
PROBLOG program, and K be a set of distinct integer values
such that for all i ∈ K, 1 ≤ i ≤ |pr |. Given a tuple t, we
denote by t ↓{i1,...,in} the tuple (t(i1), . . . , t(in)).
We say that pr is K-fixed domain with respect to p iff for
all rules r ∈ p, the following conditions hold:
• if pred(head(r)) = pr , then args(head(r)) ↓K is a tuple
in dom|K|, and
• if pred(body(r, j)) = pr , for some 1 ≤ j ≤ |body(r)|,
then args(body(r, j)) ↓K is a tuple in dom|K|.
We denote by pdom(pr , p,K) the set of |K|-tuples repre-
senting all constant values associated with the positions in
K. Namely, pdom(pr , p,K) = {args(head(r)) ↓K | r ∈
p} ∪ {args(body(r, j)) ↓K | r ∈ p ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r)|}.
Finally, given an atom a(x) and a K, we denote by β(a(x),
K) the atom a(x ↓K).
A set of rules r1, . . . , rn in p is an annotated disjunction-
set iff they are the translation of an annotated disjunction
to plain PROBLOG. Formally, a set of rules r1, . . . , rn in p
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is an annotated disjunction-set iff there are a set of pred-
icate symbols sw1, . . . , swn and a sequence of literals L
such that (1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, body(ri) = L,¬sw1(x1),
. . . ,¬sw i−1(xi−1), sw i(xi), where xj = args(head(rj)) for
1 ≤ j ≤ n, and (2) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sw i is used only to
define probabilistic ground atoms such that if v1::sw i(c1) ∈ p
and v2::sw i(c2) ∈ p, then v1 = v2, and (3) Σ1≤i≤np(i) ≤ 1,
where p(i) = vi ·(1−Σ1≤j<ip(j)), where vi is the probability
associated to the predicate symbol sw i in the program p.
We denote by (1) common(R), where R is an annotated
disjunction-set, the list of literals that are common to all the
rules in R, namely common(R) =
⋂
r∈R body(R) (with a
slight abuse of notation, we use intersection for lists), by
(2) heads(R) the set containing the various heads of the
rules in R, namely heads(R) =
⋃
r∈R{head(r)}, and by (3)
common(R, pr) the list of all literals in common(R) whose
predicate symbol is pr .
We say that an annotated disjunction set R is an
pr -annotated disjunction-set iff for all rules r ∈ R,
pred(head(r)) = pr . Let R1 and R2 be two pr -annotated
disjunction-sets. We say that R1 and R2 are (pr1, pr2)-
disjoint iff pr1(x1 ↓{1,...,|pr |}\K) ∈ common(R1) and
pr2(x2 ↓{1,...,|pr |}\K) ∈ common(R2), pr(x1) ∈ heads(R1),
and pr(x2) ∈ heads(R2). We say that R1 and R2 are (pr ,
K)-row-distinct iff (1) all literals in common(R1, pr) are
positive, (2) all literals in common(R2, pr) are positive, (3)
|common(R1, pr)| = |common(R2, pr)|, and (4) {x1 ↓K |
∃l ∈ common(R1, pr). x1 = args(l)} 6= {x2 ↓K | ∃l ∈
common(R2, pr). x2 = args(l)}.
We say that pr is (K,D,U)-CPT-like in a program p iff
• for all rules r ∈ p such that pred(head(r)) = pr , (1) r
is strongly connected for U , and (2) body(r) 6= ∅,
• pr is K-fixed domain with respect to p,
• for all maximal pr -annotated disjunction-sets R ⊆ p, for
all pr(x) ∈ heads(R), x ↓K∈ pdom(pr , p,K) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n,
• for all maximal pr -annotated disjunction-sets R ⊆ p,
|heads(R)| = |pdom(pr , p,K)|,
• for all maximal pr -annotated disjunction-sets R ⊆ p, for
all distinct pr(x1), pr(x2) ∈ heads(R), x1 ↓K 6= x2 ↓K
and x1 ↓{1,...,|pr |}\K= x2 ↓{1,...,|pr |}\K ,
• for any two distinct and maximal pr -annotated
disjunction-sets R1, R2 ⊆ p, one of the following con-
ditions hold:
– there is pair of predicate symbols (pr1, pr2) ∈ D such
that R1 and R2 are (pr1, pr2)-disjoint, or
– R1 and R2 are (pr ,K)-row-distinct.
• There is no rule r ∈ p such that (1) pred(head(r)) = pr ,
and (2) r is not in a maximal pr -annotated disjunction
set.
Let pr be a predicate symbol and K be a set of natural
numbers. The syntactic transformation ⇓pr ,K is defined as
follows:
• (pr(x)) ⇓pr ,K is pr(x ↓{1,...,|x|}\K),
• (pr ′(x)) ⇓pr ,K is pr ′(x), where pr 6= pr ′,
• (v::a(x)) ⇓pr ,K is v::(a(x) ⇓pr ,K),
• (¬a(x)) ⇓pr ,K is ¬(a(x) ⇓pr ,K), and
• (h ← l1, . . . , ln, c1, . . . , cn) ⇓pr ,K is h ⇓pr ,K←
l1 ⇓pr ,K , . . . , ln ⇓pr ,K , c1, . . . , cn, and
• p ⇓pr ,K , where p is a program, is {r ⇓pr ,K | r ∈ p}.
Finally, we define the transformation ⇓(pr1,K1),...,(prn,Kn) that
is just ⇓pr1,K1 ◦ . . . ◦ ⇓prn,Kn .
Given a program p, the function µp,D,U associates
to each predicate symbol pr in Σ the maximal set
K such that pr is (K,D,U)-CPT-like with respect to
p. The syntactic transformation βp,D,U takes as input a
PROBLOG program p′ and it returns as output the program
p′ ⇓(pr1,µp,D,U (pr1)),...,(prn,µp,D,U (prn)), where pr1, . . . , prn
are all predicate symbols in Σ.
Note that p′ is defined on a different vocabulary than p. The
program p′ is defined over the “reduced vocabulary” obtained
by applying β to the atoms in p.
3) Relaxed Acyclic PROBLOG programs: A relaxed acyclic
(Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program is a (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG pro-
gram p such that there are a Σ-ordering template O, a Σ-
disjointness template D, and a Σ-uniqueness template U such
that α(βp,D,U (p)) is (O,D,U)-acyclic. An aciclicity witness
for a program p is a tuple (O,D,U) such that α(βp,D,U (p))
is a (O,D,U)-acyclic PROBLOG program.
Given a relaxed acyclic (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program p,
we associate to each rule r in α(βp,D,U (p)), the set [r]p of
rules in p defined as follows:
[r]p :=
⋃
r′∈[r]vβp,D,U (p)
{r′′ ∈ p | βp,D,U (r′′) = r′}
The set [r]p contains all rules in p that are represented by the
rule r in α(βp,D,U (p)).
4) Compilation to Bayesian Networks: Given a relaxed
acyclic PROBLOG program p, its encoding as a Bayesian
Network BN = (N,E, cpt), denoted bn(p), is defined by
Algorithm 2.
5) Encoding’s acyclicity: Here, we prove that Algorithm 2
produces a Bayesian Network that is a forest of poly-trees.
Note that Algorithm 2 produces a forest of poly-trees and not
just a single poly-tree because some predicates symbols may
be independent. For instance, the program consisting of the
rules a(x)← b(x) and c(x)← d(x) corresponds to two poly-
trees (one per rule).
Proposition B.13. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be
a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG
program, and (O,D,U) be a witness for p’s acyclicity. The
Bayesian Network (N,E, cpt) produced by Algorithm 2 on
input p is a forest of poly-trees.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program,
and (O,D,U) be a witness for p’s acyclicity. Furthermore,
let BN = (N,E, cpt) be the Bayesian Network produced
by Algorithm 2 on input p. There is a one-to-one mapping
from paths in the ground graph gg(α(βp,D,U (p)))) and paths
in the Bayesian Network produced by Algorithm 2. Namely,
there is a path from a(c) to a′(c′) in gg(α(βp,D,U (p)))) iff
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Algorithm 2: Constructing the Bayesian Network. The sub-routines tree, CPT , and CPT⊕ are shown in Algorithm 3.
Input: A relaxed acyclic (Σ,dom)-PROBLOG program p0 and a
witness (O,D,U) for p.
Output: A Bayesian Network (N,E, cpt).
.Transform the original program.
p = α(βp0,D,U (p0))
.Initialize the domain of each predicate symbol.
D = ∅
for pr ∈ Σ do
if |µp0,D,U (pr)| > 0 then
D(pr) = pdom(pr , p0, µp0,D,U (pr)) ∪ {⊥}
else
D(pr) = {>,⊥}
.Initialize the BN.
N = ∅
E = ∅
cpt = ∅
.Creates the nodes.
for r ∈ p do
for r′ ∈ ground(p, r) do
N = N ∪ {X[head(r′)]}
for a(c) ∈ body+(r′) do
N = N ∪ {X[a(c)]}
for ¬a(c) ∈ body−(r′) do
N = N ∪ {X[a(c)]}
for r ∈ p do
µ = ∅
for s ∈ ground(p, r) do
µ(head(s)) = µ(head(s)) ∪ {pos(s)}
for a(c) ∈ domain(µ) do
N = N ∪ {X[r, a(c)]}
E = E ∪ {X[r, a(c)]→ X[a(c)]}
K = ∅
for I ∈ µ(a(c)) do
K = K ∪ {X[r, I, a(c)]}
if I = ∅ then
.Here, [r]p0 = {r} and D(a) = {>,⊥}.
if ∃v. head(r) = v::a(c) then
p = v
else
p = 1
cpt(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = (> 7→ p,
⊥ 7→ (1− p))
else
for b(v) ∈ I do
E = E ∪ {X[b(v)]→ X[r, I, a(c)]}
for ¬b(v) ∈ I do
E = E ∪ {X[b(v)]→ X[r, I, a(c)]}
cpt(X[r, I, a(c)]) = CPT (I, r,D, µp0,D,U , p0)
(N ′, E′, cpt ′) = tree(K,X[r, a(c)], D(a))
N = N ∪N ′
E = E ∪ E′
cpt = cpt ∪ cpt ′
.Set the CPT for the variables associated to the atoms.
for X[a(c)] ∈ N do
cpt(X[a(c)]) = CPT⊕(|{X[r, a(c)] ∈ N}|+ 1, D(a))
return (N,E, cpt)
there is a path from X[a(c)] to X[a′(c′)] in BN . Assume that
there is a cycle in the undirected version of BN . From this, it
follows that there is an undirected cycle in gg(α(βp,D,U (p)))).
This, however, contradicts Proposition B.10 (since p is relaxed
acyclic, then α(βp,D,U (p))) is acyclic and there are no undi-
rected cycles in gg(α(βp,D,U (p))))).
6) Bayesian Networks: A Bayesian Network BN is a tuple
(N,E, cpt), where N is the set of nodes, E is the set of
edges, cpt is a function associating to each node n ∈ N
its Conditional Probability Table. For each node n ∈ N ,
we denote by D(n) its domain, i.e., the possible values
it can have. Note that D(n) can be immediately derived
from cpt(n). We denote by p(n) the set of n’s parents, i.e.,
p(n) = {n′ | n′ → n ∈ E}. Furthermore, we denote by
ancestors(n) the set of n’s ancestors, i.e., ancestors(n) =
p(n) ∪⋃n′∈p(n) ancestors(n′).
A BN -total assignment is a total function ν that associates
to each n ∈ N a value in n ∈ D(n), whereas a BN -
partial assignment is a partial function ν that associates to
each n ∈ N ′, where N ′ ⊆ N , a value in n ∈ D(n).
The probability defined by BN given ν, written JBN K(ν) is
[Σy1 . . .Σym (Πn∈Ncpt(n)) (Y1 = y1, . . . , Ym = ym)] (X1
= v1, . . . , Xn = vn), where dom(ν) = {X1, . . . , Xn},
N \ dom(ν) = {Y1, . . . , Ym}, and vi = ν(Xi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
7) Correctness Proof: Before presenting our correctness
proof, we introduce some machinery. Let p be a relaxed
acyclic PROBLOG program, (O,D,U) be a witness for p,
and BN = (N,E, cpt) be the Bayesian Network produced
by Algorithm 2 having p and (O,D,U) as inputs. For each
rule atom a(c) ∈ ground(p), we denote by a(c)↓p the atom
obtained by applying the transformations α and β, whereas
we denote by a(c)↑p the constants not used in the transformed
program, namely a(c)↑p is c ↓{1,...,|c|}\µp,D,U (a). Furthermore,
given a rule r ∈ p (respectively a ground rule s ∈ ground(p,
r)), we denote by r↓p (respectively s↓p) the rule obtained by
applying the transformations α and β. If µp,D,U (a) = ∅, then
a(c)↑p= >. We say that the kernel of BN , denoted K(BN ),
is the set of variables {X[r, ∅, a(c)] ∈ N | ∃v. r = v::a(c)}.
Note that all nodes n ∈ K(BN ) are boolean random variables
by construction, namely D(n) = {>,⊥}. Given a BN -total
assignment ν, we say that ν is consistent iff for all variables
n ∈ N\K(BN ), cpt(n)(ν(P1), . . . , ν(Pm), ν(n)) = 1, where
p(n) = {P1, . . . , Pm}. Furthermore, we say that ν is a model
for a state s, written ν |= s, iff a(c) ∈ s ⇔ ν(X[a(c)↓p]) =
a(c)↑p.
We first prove a simple results that connect the original
program p and its transformed version α(β(p)).
Proposition B.14. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be
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Algorithm 3: Auxiliary functions used in Algorithm 2.
function CPT ((a1(c1), . . . , an(cn)), r,D, µ, p0)
A = D(a1)× . . .×D(an)×D(pred(head(r)))
cpt = ∅
for a ∈ A do
a′ = removeDuplicates((a1(c1), . . . , an(cn)), a)
if satisfiable(r, a,D, µ, p0) ∧ ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.∀1 ≤ j ≤
n. (i 6= j ∧ ai(ci) = aj(cj)⇒ a(i) = a(j)) then
cpt = cpt ∪ {a′ 7→ 1}
else
cpt = cpt ∪ {a′ 7→ 0}
return cpt
function satisfiable(r, (v1, . . . , vn), D, µ, p0)
if vn 6= ⊥ then
.At least one satisfiable assignment.
res = ⊥
for r′ ∈ [r]p0 do
if filter(head(r′), D, µ) = vn then
sat = >
for 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r′)| do
if vi 6∈ filter(body(r′, i), D, µ) then
sat = ⊥
res = res ∨ sat
return res
if vn = ⊥ then
.All assignments must be unsatisfiable.
res = ⊥
for r′ ∈ [r]p0 do
sat = >
for 1 ≤ i ≤ |body(r′)| do
if vi 6∈ filter(body(r′, i), D, µ) then
sat = ⊥
res = res ∨ sat
return ¬res
function filter(l,D, µ)
if ∃a ∈ Σ, x ∈ (Var ∪ dom)|a|. l = a(c) then
if µ(a) 6= ∅ then
return {x ↓µ(a)}
else
return {>}
if ∃a ∈ Σ, x ∈ (Var ∪ dom)|a|. l = ¬a(c) then
if µ(a) 6= ∅ then
return (D(a) \ {µ(a)}) ∪ {⊥}
else
return {⊥}
function CPT⊕(n,D)
.If D 6= {>,⊥}, then n = 2 (since the program is
relaxed-acyclic).
if D 6= {>,⊥} ∧ n = 2 then
cpt = ∅
for (v1, v2) ∈ D2 do
if v1 = v2 then
cpt = cpt ∪ {(v1, v2) 7→ 1}
else
cpt = cpt ∪ {(v1, v2) 7→ 0}
return cpt
if D = {>,⊥} then
E = {>,⊥}n
cpt = ∅
for (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ E do
K = {vi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 ∧ vi = >}
if (vn = > ∧K 6= ∅) ∨ (vn = ⊥ ∧K = ∅) then
cpt = cpt ∪ {v 7→ 1}
else
cpt = cpt ∪ {v 7→ 0}
return cpt
function tree(X, root , D)
p = nil
N = X
E = ∅
cpt = ∅
X′ = ∅
if X = {x} then
N = N ∪ {root}
E = E ∪ {x→ root}
cpt(root) = CPT⊕(2, D)
else
for v ∈ X do
if p = nil then
p = v
else
X′ = X′ ∪X[p, v]
N = N ∪X[p, v]
E = E ∪ {p→ X[p, v], v → X[p, v]}
cpt(X[p, v]) = CPT⊕(3, D)
p = nil
if p 6= nil then
X′ = X′ ∪ p
(N ′, E′, cpt ′) = tree(X′, root , D)
return (N ∪N ′, E ∪ E′, cpt ∪ cpt ′)
a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG
program, (O,D,U) be a witness for p, s be a (Σ,dom)-
structure, and p′ be the program α(βp0,D,U (p0)). Then, (1) a ∈
ground(p) implies a↓p∈ ground(p′), and (2) s ∈ ground(p,
r) implies s↓p∈ ground(p, r↓p).
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program,
(O,D,U) be a witness for p, s be a (Σ,dom)-structure, and
p′ be the program α(βp0,D,U (p0)).
We first prove our first claim. Let a ∈ ground(p). From
this, it follows that there is an i such that a ∈ ground(p, i).
We now prove our claim by induction on i. The base case
is a ∈ ground(p, 0). From this, it follows that a is either a
ground atom or a probabilistic ground atom. From this and
the definition of α and β, a↓p= a. From this, it follows that
a ∈ p′ and, therefore, a ∈ ground(p′). For the induction step,
assume that our claim holds for all j < i, we now show that
it holds also for i. The only interesting case is a ∈ ground(p,
i)\ground(p, i−1). From this, it follows that there is a rule r
and a ground rule s such that all body+(s) ⊆ ground(p, i−1).
From this, r↓p∈ p′, the fact that the transformation does not
introduce new positive literals, and the induction hypothesis,
it follows that {b↓p| b ∈ body+(s)} ⊆ ground(p′). From this
and ground ’s definition, it follows that a↓p∈ ground(p′).
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The proof of our second claim is similar to the first one.
Here are now ready to prove the two key lemmas for the
encoding’s correctness.
Proposition B.15. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be
a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG
program, (O,D,U) be a witness for p, s be a (Σ,dom)-
structure, and BN = (N,E, cpt) be the Bayesian Network
generated by Algorithm 2 having p and (O,D,U) as input.
There is a p-probabilistic assignment f such that prob(f) = k
and gf (p) = s iff there is a BN -total assignment ν such thatJBN K(ν) = k, ν is consistent, and ν |= s.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program,
(O,D,U) be a witness for p, s be a (Σ,dom)-structure, and
BN = (N,E, cpt) be the Bayesian Network generated by
Algorithm 2 having p and (O,D,U) as input. We now prove
both directions of our claim.
(⇒). Let f be a p-probabilistic assignment f such that
prob(f) = k and gf (p) = s. Furthermore, let ν be the
following BN -total assignment:
ν(n) =

f(v::a(c)) if n = X[v::a(c), ∅, a(c)]
> if n = X[a(c), ∅, a(c)]
k if k ∈ D(n) ∧ p(n) = {P1, . . . , Pm}
∧ν(P1) = v1 ∧ . . . ∧ ν(Pm) = vm
∧cpt(n)(v1, . . . , vm, k) = 1
The assignment ν is well-defined since (1) BN is a forest of
poly-trees (see Proposition B.13), and (2) for all nodes of the
form X[v::a(c), ∅, a(c)] and X[a(c), ∅, a(c)], D(n) = {>,⊥}
by construction (cf. Algorithm 2). Furthermore, the assignment
ν is consistent by construction. Indeed, for all variables n ∈
N \K(BN ), the corresponding entry in the CPT is 1.
We now prove that ν |= s. From Proposition B.16, ν’s
consistency, and f(v::a(c)) = ν(X[{v::a(c)}, ∅, a(c)]) for all
v::a(c) ∈ p, it follows that a(c) ∈ gf (p) iff ν(X[a(c)↓p]) =
a(c)↑p. From this and gf (p) = s, it follows ν |= s.
Finally, we show that JBN K(ν) = prob(f). In
more detail, JBN K(ν) = [(Πn∈Ncpt(n))] (ν). This
can be equivalently rewritten as follows: JBN K(ν) =[(
Πn∈K(BN )cpt(n)
) · (Πn∈N\K(BN )cpt(n))] (ν).
Furthermore, since ν is consistent and the CPTs associated
with the variables in N \K(BN ) are deterministic, JBN K(ν)
can be simplified as JBN K(ν) = [(Πn∈K(BN )cpt(n))] (ν).
From this and BN ’s definition, it follows that JBN K(ν) =
Πν(X[v::a(c),∅,a(c)])=>v · Πν(X[v::a(c),∅,a(c)])=⊥(1 − v).
From this and ν’s definition, it follows JBN K(ν) =
Πf(v::a(c))=>v · Πf(v::a(c))=⊥(1 − v), which is equivalent to
prob(f).
(⇐). Let ν be a BN -total assignment such that JBN K(ν) =
k, ν is consistent, and ν |= s, and f be the following
p-probabilistic assignment: f(v::a(c)) = ν(X[{v::a(c)}, ∅,
a(c)]).
We now show that JBN K(ν) = prob(f). In more detail,JBN K(ν) = [(Πn∈Ncpt(n))] (ν). Furthermore, since ν is
consistent and the CPTs associated with the variables in
N \K(BN ) are deterministic, JBN K(ν) can be simplified asJBN K(ν) = [(Πn∈K(BN )cpt(n))] (ν). From this and BN ’s
definition, it follows that JBN K(ν) = Πν(X[v::a(c),∅,a(c)])=>v ·
Πν(X[v::a(c),∅,a(c)])=⊥(1− v). From this and ν’s definition, it
follows that JBN K(ν) = Πf(v::a(c))=>v ·Πf(v::a(c))=⊥(1−v),
which is equivalent to prob(f).
We still have to prove that gf (p) = s. From Proposi-
tion B.16, ν’s consistency, f(v::a(c)) = ν(X[{v::a(c)}, ∅,
a(c)]), it follows that a(c) ∈ gf (p) iff ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p.
From this and ν |= s, it follows gf (p) = s.
Proposition B.16. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be
a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG
program, (O,D,U) be a witness for p, BN = (N,E, cpt)
be the Bayesian Network generated by Algorithm 2 having p
and (O,D,U) as input, f be a p-probabilistic assignment,
and ν be a consistent BN -variable assignment such that
ν(X[v::a(c), ∅, a(c)]) = f(v::a(c)) for all v::a(c) ∈ p. Then,
a(c) ∈ gf (p, j, i), for some j and i, iff ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program,
(O,D,U) be a witness for p, BN = (N,E, cpt) be the
Bayesian Network generated by Algorithm 2 having p and (O,
D,U) as input, f be a p-probabilistic assignment, and ν be
a consistent BN -variable assignment such that ν(X[v::a(c),
∅, a(c)]) = f(v::a(c)) for all v::a(c) ∈ p. Furthermore, let
p′ be the acyclic PROBLOG program obtained after applying
the α and β transformations. We claim that a(c) ∈ gf (p,
µ(a)) iff ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p. From this, a(c) ∈ gf (p)
iff a(c) ∈ gf (p, j, i) for some j and i, and a(c) ∈ gf (p) iff
a(c) ∈ gf (p, µ(a)), it follows that a(c) ∈ gf (p, j, i), for some
j and i, iff ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p. However, there may be
some nodes in BN that do not correspond to any ground rule
or atom in gf (p, r) or gf (p).
We now prove, by induction on µ(a) (define in §B-A2), our
claim that a(c) ∈ gf (p, µ(a)) iff ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p (we
denote the corresponding induction hypothesis as (?)).
Base Case. For the base case, we assume that µ(a) = 0. We
prove separately the two directions, namely (1) if a(c) ∈ gf (p,
0, i) and µ(a) = 0, then ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p, and (2) if
ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p and µ(a) = 0, then a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0, i).
From this, it follows that if µ(a) = 0, then a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0) iff
ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p.
(⇒). We prove, by induction on i, that if a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0,
i), then ν(X[a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p (we denote this induction
hypothesis as (†)). From a(c) ∈ gf (p), gf (p) ⊆ ground(p),
and Proposition B.14, then X[a(c)↓p] ∈ N . The base case
is as follows. If a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0, 0), then there is a rule r
such that either r = a(c) or r = v::a(c) and a(c) ∈ gf (p,
r, 0, 0). If r = a(c), then ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = > due to ν’s
consistency, gf (p) ⊆ ground(p), Proposition B.14, r↓p= r,
and a(c)↓p= a(c). If r = v::a(c), then f(v::a(c)) = > follows
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from a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0, 0). From this, gf (p) ⊆ ground(p),
Proposition B.14, r↓p= r, a(c)↓p= a(c), and ν(X[v::a(c),
∅, a(c)]) = f(v::a(c)), it follows that there is a variable
X[r, ∅, a(c)] ∈ N such that ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = >. From
ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = >, BN ’s definition, and nu’s definition,
it follows that there are nodes X[r, a(c)], X[a(c)] ∈ N such
that ν(X[r, a(c)]) = > and ν(X[a(c)]) = > as well (note that
r↓p= r, and a(c)↓p= a(c) in this case). For the induction
step, we assume that our claim holds for all i′ < i. The
only interesting case is when a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0, i) \ gf (p, 0,
i − 1). From this, it follows that there is rule r ∈ p such
that a(c) ← b1, . . . , bm ∈ gf (p, r, 0, i). From this, it follows
that b1, . . . , bm ∈ gf (p, 0, i − 1) and body−(r) = ∅. From
this, gf (p, 0, i − 1) ⊆ ground(p), Proposition B.14, and the
induction’s hypothesis (†), it follows that there are nodes
X[b1 ↓p], . . . , X[bm ↓p] ∈ N and ν(X[b1 ↓p]) = b1 ↑p, . . . ,
ν(X[bm ↓p]) = bm ↑p. From this, body−(r) = ∅, gf (p,
r, 0, i) ⊆ gf (p, r) ⊆ ground(p, r), Proposition B.14, and
BN ’s construction, it follows that there is a variable X[r↓p,
{b1↓p, . . . , bm↓p}, a(c)↓p] ∈ N such that cpt(X[r↓p, {b1↓p,
. . . , bm ↓p}, a(c) ↓p])(ν(X[b1 ↓p]), . . . , ν(X[bm ↓p]), k) = 1
iff k = a(c) ↑p. As a result, ν(X[r ↓p, {b1 ↓p, . . . , bm ↓p},
a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p since ν is consistent. From this and BN ’s
construction, it follows that there are nodes X[r↓p, a(c)↓p],
X[a(c) ↓p] ∈ N such that ν(X[r ↓p, a(c) ↓p]) = > and
ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p. This completes the proof of the if
direction.
(⇐). To prove that if ν(X[a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p, then
a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0, i), for some i, we prove a stronger claim.
Namely, if ν(X[a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p, then a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0,
depth(X[a(c) ↓p])), where depth(n) = 0 if ancestors(n)
does not contain any variable of the form X[b(v)] and
depth(n) = 1 + maxn′∈ancestors(n)depth(n′) otherwise. We
prove our claim by induction on depth(X[a(c)↓p]) (we denote
the induction hypothesis as (4)). The base case is as follows.
If depth(X[a(c) ↓p]) = 0, then from ν(X[a(c) ↓p]) = >
and ν’s consistency, it follows that there must be a rule
r, of the form r = v::a(c) or r = a(c), such that X[r,
a(c)] ∈ N and ν(X[r, a(c)]) = > (note that, in this case,
r↓p= r and a(c)↓p= a(c)). From this and ν’s consistency,
there is a variable X[r, ∅, a(c)] ∈ N such that ν(X[r, ∅,
a(c)]) = >. If r = a(c), then a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0, 0) by definition.
If r = v::a(c), then from ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = > and ν(X[r,
∅, a(c)]) = f(v::a(c)), it follows that f(v::a(c)) = >. From
this, it follows that a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0, 0). For the induction step,
we assume that our claim holds for all random variables of
depth less than k. From ν(X[a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p and ν’s
consistency, it follows that there is a rule r ∈ p′ such that
ν(X[r, a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p. From this and ν’s consistency,
there is a set of positive ground literals I = (b1, . . . , bm)
such that X[r, (b1 ↓p, . . . , bm ↓p), a(c) ↓p] ∈ N and ν(X[r,
(b1 ↓p, . . . , bm ↓p), a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p. From this and BN ’s
construction (cf. the cpt and satisfiable procedures), it follows
that there is a rule r′ ∈ p such that (1) r ∈ [r′]p, and (2) the
values assigned by ν to the random variables associated to
the atoms in I produce a grounding s of r that satisfies all
constraints and is consistent (namely, the body of s does not
contain both an atom and its negation and multiple copies
of the same CPT-like atom in r′ are assigned to the same
value in r). From this, BN ’s definition, and µ(a) = 0, it
follows that ν(X[b↓p]) = b↑p for all b ∈ I . From this and
the induction’s hypothesis (4), it follows that b ∈ gf (p, 0,
depth(X[a(c)])− 1) for all b ∈ I . From this, ν(X[r↓p, {b1↓p,
. . . , bm↓p}, a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p, and BN ’s construction (cf. the
cpt and satisfiable procedures), it follows that there is a rule
r′ ∈ p such that (1) r↓p= r′↓p, and (2) r′ is satisfied by {b1,
. . . , bm}, i.e., there is a grounding s′ of r′ obtained by using
a subset of the literals in {b1, . . . , bm} and adding repeated
occurrences of the literals if needed. From this, it follows that
s is in gf (p, r, 0, depth(X[a(c)↓p])). From this, it follows that
a(c) ∈ gf (p, 0, depth(X[a(c)↓p])). This completes the proof
the only if direction.
Induction Step. For the induction’s step, we assume that
b(d) ∈ gf (p, µ(b)) iff ν(X[b(d)↓p]) = b(d)↑p holds for all b
such that µ(b) < µ(a). We now prove that a(c) ∈ gf (p, µ(a))
iff ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p as well. In the following, let k be
µ(a). We prove separately the two directions, namely (1) if
a(c) ∈ gf (p, µ(a), i), for some i, then ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p,
and (2) if ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p, then a(c) ∈ gf (p, µ(a), i),
for some i. From this, it follows that a(c) ∈ gf (p, µ(a)) iff
ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p.
(⇒). We prove, by induction on i, that if a(c) ∈ gf (p, k,
i), for some i, then ν(X[a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p (we denote
the induction hypothesis associated to this proof as (♣)).
From a(c) ∈ gf (p) ⊆ ground(p) and Proposition B.14, then
X[a(c)↓p] ∈ N . The base case is as follows. Assume that
a(c) ∈ gf (p, k, 0). From this and a(c) 6∈ gf (p, k − 1) (since
µ(a) > k− 1), it follows that there is a rule r such that either
r = a(c) or r = v::a(c). If r = a(c), then there is a node X[r,
∅, a(c)] ∈ N such that ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = > due to ν’s con-
sistency, gf (p, r) ⊆ ground(p, r), r↓p= r, a(c)↓p= a(c), and
Proposition B.14. If r = v::a(c), then f(v::a(c)) = > follows
from a(c) ∈ gf (p, k, 0). From this, gf (p, r) ⊆ ground(p, r),
Proposition B.14, and ν(X[{v::a(c)}, ∅, a(c)]) = f(v::a(c)),
it follows that there is a node X[r, ∅, a(c)] ∈ N such that
ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = >. From ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = >, BN ’s
definition, and nu’s definition, it follows that there are nodes
X[r, a(c)], X[a(c)] ∈ N such that ν(X[r, a(c)]) = > and
ν(X[a(c)]) = > as well (note that r↓p= r and a(c)↓p= a(c)).
For the induction step, we assume that our claim holds for all
i′ < i. Assume that a(c) ∈ gf (p, k, i). The only interesting
case is when a(c) ∈ gf (p, k, i) \ gf (p, k, i − 1). From this,
it follows that there is rule r such that r′ = a(c) ← b1, . . . ,
bm and r′ ∈ gf (p, r, k, i). Furthermore, we denote by b′1, . . . ,
b′m the atoms pos(b1), . . . , pos(bm). From this, it follows that
be ∈ gf (p, k, i − 1) for all be ∈ body+(r′) and b′d 6∈ gf (p,
k−1) for all bd ∈ body−(r′). From be ∈ gf (p, k, i−1) for all
be ∈ body+(r′), gf (p, r) ⊆ ground(p, r), Proposition B.14,
and the induction’s hypothesis (♣), it follows that there is
a node X[be ↓p] ∈ N such that ν(X[be ↓p]) = be ↑p for all
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be ∈ body+(r′). From b′d 6∈ gf (p, k−1) for all bd ∈ body−(r′),
it follows that b′d 6∈ gf (p, µ(pred(bd))) for all bd ∈ body−(r′).
From this, r′ ∈ gf (p, r, k, i), gf (p, r, k, i) ⊆ ground(p, r),
Proposition B.14, µ(pred(bd)) < µ(a) for all bd ∈ body−(r′),
and the induction’s hypothesis (?), it follows that there is
a node X[b′d ↓p] ∈ N such that ν(X[b′d ↓p]) 6= b′d ↑p
for all bd ∈ body−(r′). From r′ ∈ gf (p, r, k, i), gf (p, r, k,
i) ⊆ ground(p, r), Proposition B.14, ν(X[be↓p]) = be↑p for
all be ∈ body+(r′), ν(X[b′d↓p]) 6= b′d↑p for all bd ∈ body−(r′),
and BN ’s construction, there is X[r ↓p, {b′1 ↓p, . . . , b′m ↓p},
a(c) ↓p] ∈ N such that cpt(X[r ↓p, {b′1 ↓p, . . . , b′m ↓p},
a(c)↓p])(ν(X[b′1↓p]), . . . , ν(X[b′m↓p]), k) = 1 iff k = a(c)↑p.
As a result, ν(X[r↓p, {b′1↓p, . . . , b′m↓p}, a(c)↓p]) = > since ν
is consistent. From this and BN ’s construction, it follows that
there are variables X[r↓p, a(c)↓p], X[a(c)↓p] ∈ N such that
ν(X[r↓p, a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p and ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p. This
completes the proof of the if direction.
(⇐). To prove that if ν(X[a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p, then
a(c) ∈ gf (p, k, i), for some i, we prove a stronger claim.
Namely, if ν(X[a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p, then a(c) ∈ gf (p,
k, depth(X[a(c)])), where depth(n) is as above. We prove
our claim by induction on depth(X[a(c)↓p]) (we denote the
induction hypothesis associated to this proof as (♠)). The
base case is as follows. If depth(X[a(c)↓p]) = 0, then from
ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = > and ν’s consistency, it follows that there
must be a rule r, of the form r = v::a(c) or r = a(c), such that
X[r, a(c)] ∈ N and ν(X[r, a(c)]) = > (note that r↓p= r and
a(c)↓p= a(c). From this and ν’s consistency, there is a variable
X[r, ∅, a(c)] ∈ N such that ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = >. If r = a(c),
then a(c) ∈ gf (p, k, 0) by definition. If r = v::a(c), then
from ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = > and ν(X[r, ∅, a(c)]) = f(v::a(c)),
it follows that f(v::a(c)) = >. From this, it follows that
a(c) ∈ gf (p, k, 0). For the induction step, we assume that
our claim holds for all random variables of depth less than k.
We now show that it holds also for a variable X[a(c)↓p] such
that depth(X[a(c)↓p]) = i. From ν(X[a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p and
ν’s consistency, it follows that there is a rule r′ ∈ p′ such that
X[r′, a(c)↓p] ∈ N and ν(X[r′, a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p. From this
and ν’s consistency, there is a set of ground atoms I = (b1,
. . . , bm) such that X[r′, (b1 ↓p, . . . , bm ↓p), a(c) ↓p] ∈ N ,
ν(X[r′, (b1↓p, . . . , bm↓p), a(c)↓p]) = a(c)↑p, and X[b↓p] ∈ N
for all b ∈ I . From this and BN ’s construction (cf. the cpt
and satisfiable procedures), it follows that there is a rule
r′ ∈ p such that (1) r ∈ [r′]p, and (2) the values assigned
by ν to the random variables associated to the atoms in I
produce a grounding s of r that satisfies all constraints and
is consistent (namely, the body of s does not contain both
an atom and its negation and multiple copies of the same
CPT-like atom in r′ are assigned to the same value in r).
Let I+ be the atoms in I that are assigned to positive literals
in s and I− be the atoms in I that are assigned to negative
literals (note that these two sets are disjoint). From ν(X[r′,
(b1 ↓p, . . . , bm ↓p), a(c) ↓p]) = a(c) ↑p, and ν’s consistency,
it follows that ν(X[be ↓p]) = be ↑p for all be ∈ I+ and
ν(X[bd↓p]) 6= bd↑p for all bd ∈ I−. From ν(X[be↓p]) = be↑p
and depth(X[be↓p]) < depth(X[a(c)↓p]) for all be ∈ I+ and
the induction’s hypothesis (♠), it follows that be ∈ gf (p, k,
depth(X[be↓p])) for all be ∈ I+. From this, the induction’s
hypothesis, and depth(X[be ↓p]) < depth(X[a(c) ↓p]), it
follows that be ∈ gf (p, k, i − 1) for all be ∈ body+(r′).
From ν(X[bd ↓p]) 6= bd ↑p and µ(pred(bd)) < µ(a) for all
bd ∈ I− and the induction’s hypothesis (?), it follows that
bd 6∈ gf (p, µ(pred(bd))) for all bd ∈ I−. From this and
µ(pred(bd)) < µ(a), it follows that bd 6∈ gf (p, k − 1) for
all bd ∈ I−. From r′ definition, be ∈ gf (p, k, i − 1) for all
be ∈ I+, and bd 6∈ gf (p, k− 1) for all bd ∈ I−, it follows that
r′ ∈ gf (p, r, k, i). From this, it follows that r′ ∈ gf (p, k, i)
and a(v) ∈ gf (p, k, i). This completes the proof the only if
direction.
Proposition B.17 shows the correctness of our encoding.
Proposition B.17. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be
a finite domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG
program, (O,D,U) be a witness for p, BN be the Bayesian
Network generated by Algorithm 2 having p and (O,D,U) as
input, and s be a (Σ,dom)-structure. Furthermore, let µ be
the BN -partial assignment such that (1) for any ground atom
a(c), µ(X[a(c↓p)]) = a(c)↑p iff a(c) ∈ s, and (2) µ(v) is
undefined otherwise. Then, JpK(s) = JBN K(µ).
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature, dom be a finite
domain, p be a (Σ,dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program,
(O,D,U) be a witness for p, BN be the Bayesian Network
generated by Algorithm 2 having p and (O,D,U) as input, and
s be a (Σ,dom)-structure. Furthermore, let µ be the BN -
partial assignment such that (1) for any ground atom a(c),
µ(X[a(c↓p)]) = a(c)↑p iff a(c) ∈ s, and (2) µ(v) is undefined
otherwise.
The probability JpK(s) is Σf∈M(p,s)prob(f), where M(p,
s) is the set of all assignments f such that WFM (instance(p,
f)) = s. Equivalently, M(p, s) is the set of all probabilistic
assignments f such that gf (p) = s. Let K be the set of all
total assignments that agree with µ for all variables of the form
X[a(c)↓p]. The probability JBN K(µ) is Σν∈KJBN K(ν). Since
any non-consistent assignment has probability 0, JBN K(µ) =
Σν∈K′JBN K(ν), where K ′ is the set of all consistent assign-
ments in K. From this, it follows that JpK(s) = JBN K(µ) iff
Σf∈{f |gf (p)=s}prob(f) = Σν∈K′JBN K(ν). The latter follows
trivially from Proposition B.15, which establishes a one-to-
one mapping from {f | gf (p) = s} and K ′ that preserves
probabilities.
8) Size of the encoding: Given a Bayesian Network BN =
(N,E, cpt), the size of BN , denoted |BN |, is |N | + |E| +
Σn∈N |cpt(n)|, where the size of a conditional probability
table is just the number of rows in the table (i.e., the number
of all assignments). The size of an atom a(c) is |a|, whereas
the size of a rule h ← l1, . . . , ln is |h| + Σ1≤i≤nli. Finally,
the size of a program p is Σr∈p|r|. The ground version of
p, denoted gv(p), is
⋃
r∈p ground(p, r), namely the relaxed
grounding of all the rules in p. Note that ground(p) ⊆ gv(p).
Given a PROBLOG program p, we denote by edb(p) the ground
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(possibly probabilistic) atoms in p, whereas we denote by
rules(p) the rules, i.e., edb(p) = {a(c) ∈ p} ∪ {v::a(c) ∈
p | 0 ≤ v ≤ 1} and rules(p) = {r ∈ p | body(r) 6= ∅}.
Let p be a relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program, (O,D,U)
be a witness for p, p′ = α(βp,D,U (p)) be the transformed
program, g = gv(p′) be its ground version, and bn(p, (O,D,
U)) = (N , E , cpt) be the corresponding Bayesian Network
derived by Algorithm 4. The number of nodes in N is
O(|rules(p′)| · |g|). Indeed, there is a node X[a(c)] for each
ground atom in g. Moreover, for each rule r ∈ p′ and ground
rule r′ ∈ g, there are nodes X[r, body(r′), head(r′)] and X[r,
head(r′)]. Finally, the number of intermediate nodes generated
by the tree procedure is twice the number of nodes of the form
X[r, body(r′), head(r′)].
The number of edges in E is O(|rules(p′)|2 · |g|). Indeed,
there is an edge X[r, a(c)] → X[a(c)] for each rule r and
ground atom a(c). Furthermore, there is an edge X[b(v)] →
X[r, I, a(c)] for each rule r, ground rule a(c)← I , and atom
b(v) ∈ I . Finally, the number of edges introduced by the tree
procedure is O(|g|).
The size of cpt is O(|rules(p′)| · |g| · max (2,
|rules(p)|)2+|rules(p)|). Indeed, we have a CPT for each
node n ∈ N . The size of each CPT depends on (1) the
number of parents for each node, and (2) the size of the
domain associated to each variable. In the worst case, the
size of the domain of each node is max (2, |rules(p)|) (since
the size of the domain of a CPT-like predicate depends only
on the rules — there are no CPT-like predicates defined by
ground atoms). The number of parents for intermediate nodes
is 2, and the size of each CPT is O(max (2, |rules(p)|)3).
The maximum number of parents for nodes of the form
X[r, a(c)] is 1, and the size of each CPT is O(max (2,
|rules(p)|)2). The maximum number of parents for nodes
of the form X[r, I, a(c)] is |rules(p′)|, and the size of
each CPT is O(max (2, |rules(p)|)|rules(p′)+1|). Similarly,
the maximum number of parents for nodes of the form
X[a(c)] is 1 + |rules(p)|, and the size of each CPT is
O(max (2, |rules(p)|)|rules(p′)+2|).
As a result, |bn(p, (O,D,U))| is O(|rules(p′)|2 ·|g|·max (2,
|rules(p)|)2+|rules(p)|). Furthermore, since |g| ∈
O(|edb(p′)||rules(p′)|), it follows that |bn(p, (O,D,
U))| is O(|rules(p′)|2 · |edb(p′)||rules(p′)| · max (2,
|rules(p)|)2+|rules(p)|). Finally, since |edb(p′)| ∈
O(|edb(p)|) and |rules(p′) ∈ O(|rules(p)|), we
can simplify the result as follows: |bn(p, (O,D,
U))| is O(|rules(p)|2 · |edb(p)||rules(p)| · max (2,
|rules(p)|)2+|rules(p)|).
9) Complexity Proofs: We first define the inference problem
INF. Afterwards, we analyse its complexity.
Problem 1. INF denotes the following decision problem:
Input: A first-order signature Σ, a finite domain dom, a (Σ,
dom)-relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program p, a set of ground
literals E, and a ground atom a(c).
Output: The probability of a(c) given evidence in E. 
The data complexity of INF(Σ,dom, p, E, a) for relaxed
acyclic programs can be obtained by (1) fixing rules(p) and
varying only edb(p) (and indirectly dom), and (2) requiring
the program to be relaxed acyclic.
The data complexity of the INF problem for relaxed-acyclic
programs p is the complexity of the following decision prob-
lem:
Problem 2. Let Σ be a first-order signature Σ, R be a
fixed set of PROBLOG rules over Σ, E be a set of ground
literals, a(c) be a ground atom, and (O,D,U) be an ordering
template, a disjointness template, and a uniqueness template.
INFraΣ,R,E,a(c),(O,D,U) denotes the following problem:
Input: A set of probabilistic atoms E′ such that (1) atoms in
E and ac refer only to constant values in E′ and R, and (2)
R∪E′ is a relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program and (O,D,U)
is a witness for the acyclicity of R ∪ E′.
Output: The probability of a(c) given evidence in E. 
Proposition B.18. INFraΣ,R,E,a(c),(O,D,U) is in PTIME.
Proof. Let Σ be a first-order signature Σ, R be a fixed set of
PROBLOG rules over Σ, E be a set of ground literals, a(c)
be a ground atom, and (O,D,U) be an ordering template, a
disjointness template, and a uniqueness template. We consider
only inputs E′ such that E′∪R is a relaxed acyclic PROBLOG
program and (O,D,U) is a witness for the acyclicity of R∪E′.
The size of E′ is the sum of the sizes of all atoms, where the
size of an atom is its cardinality.
Let e be the number of distinct constants occurring in E′∪R
and r be |R|. Computing INF(Σ, E′, p, E, a) can be done in
the following steps:
1) Transform the original program p into the program p′ (by
applying the α and β transformations).
2) Construct the ground version g of the program p′.
3) Construct the Bayesian Network bn(p, (O,D,U)) from
g.
4) Perform the inference on bn(p, (O,D,U)).
The first step can be performed in linear time in the size
of O(e + r). The second step can be performed in O(er)
(because the grounding of p′ can be done in O(e|rules(p
′)|)
and |rules(p′)| ≤ r). The third step can be performed in
O(r4 · e2·r · max (2, r)2+r) (constructing N and E can be
done in O(r2 · e2·r), whereas the cpt can be constructed in
O(r4 · er ·max (2, r)2+r)). The fourth step can be performed
in O(|bn(p)|) since bn(p) is a forest of poly-trees (see
Proposition B.13). In particular, inference can be performed
by (1) identifying the poly-tree that contains the atom a(x) (in
O(|bn(p)|)), (2) identifying the subset E′′ ⊆ E of all atoms in
the poly-tree of a(x) (again in O(|bn(p)|)), and (3) performing
inference using belief-propagation (in O(|bn(p)|) [47]). There-
fore, the fourth step can be performed in O(r2 · er · max (2,
r)2+r). As a result, the answer to INF can be computed in
O(r2 · e2·r ·max (2, r)2+r). Furthermore, since r is fixed and
the number of constants in E′ is O(|E′|), there is a k ∈ N
such that e ∈ O(|E′|+k). From this, it follows that there is a
k ∈ N such that INF can be computed in O(|E′|k). Hence, the
complexity of INFraΣ,R,E,a(c),(O,D,U) (and the data complexity
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of INF) is PTIME.
INF for PROBLOG is #P -hard. This follows from the
#P -hardness of inference on arbitrary Bayesian networks
(BNs) [47], which can be encoded in PROBLOG. We now
show that inference for PROBLOG programs is #P -hard even
in terms of data complexity. We do this using a reduction
from the #SAT problem (counting the number of satisfying
assignments of a propositional formula φ), which is #P -
hard [56].
Proposition B.19. INF is #P -hard in terms of data complexity
for PROBLOG programs.
Proof. We show this by reducing the #SAT problem to
inference for a PROBLOG program p where (1) the formula
can be encoded in edb(p), and (2) the rules are fixed. Let φ
be a propositional formula.
First-order Signature. Let Σ be the signature containing the
following predicate symbols:
• e of arity 1, which is used to store the identifiers
associated to all sub-expressions of φ,
• state of arity 1, which is used to store the propositions
in the model,
• sat of arity 1, which is used to denote whether an
expression is satisfiable or not,
• conj of arity 3 which is used to encode conjunctions,
• disj of arity 3 which is used to encode disjunctions,
• neg of arity 2 which is used to encode negations, and
• prop of arity 2 used to encode propositions.
Rules. We now define a fixed set of rules encoding the
semantics of propositional logic.
sat(x)← e(x), prop(x, y), state(y)
sat(x)← e(x),neg(x, y),¬sat(y)
sat(x)← e(x), conj (x, y, z), sat(y), sat(z)
sat(x)← e(x), disj (x, y, z), sat(y)
sat(x)← e(x), disj (x, y, z), sat(z)
Encoding a formula φ. Given a formula φ, we define the
following encoding using probabilistic ground atoms. We first
associate to each sub-formula ψ of φ a unique identifier idψ .
We also associate a unique identifier idp to each propositional
symbol p. For each sub-formula ψ ∧ γ, the ground atoms
e(idψ∧γ) and conj (idψ∧γ , idψ, idγ) are in E′. For each sub-
formula ψ ∨ γ, the ground atoms e(idψ∨γ) and disj (idψ∨γ ,
idψ, idγ) are in E′. For each sub-formula ¬ψ, the ground
atoms e(id¬ψ) and neg(id¬ψ, idψ) are in E′. For each sub-
formula ψ such that ψ is a propositional symbol p, the
ground atoms e(idψ) and prop(idψ, idp) are in E′. Finally,
for each propositional symbol p, there is a propositional atom
1/2::state(idp) in E′.
Reduction. There are 2n(φ) grounded instances of R ∪ E′,
where n(φ) is the number of predicate symbols in φ, each one
with probability 1/2n(φ). The grounded instances represent all
possible assignments of > and ⊥ to the proposition symbols
in φ. It is easy to see that sat(idφ) can be derived in a
grounded instance iff it represents a model for φ. Therefore,
the probability JR∪E′K(idφ) is k/2n(φ), where k is the number
of models that satisfy φ.
Note that the encoding shown in the previous proof can
be tweaked to work for acyclic PROBLOG programs but only
for propositional formulae without repetitions of propositional
symbols. We remark that the #SAT problem restricted to
formulae without repetitions is no longer #P -hard. Indeed,
it can be solved in PTIME as follows: given a formula φ
without repetitions, we can construct a poly-tree boolean
Bayesian Network BN encoding φ in O(|φ|), where the nodes
associated to sub-formulae of the from p have a uniform
probability distribution (i.e., p is > with probability 1/2 and
⊥ with probability 1/2). Then, the probability associated to
the root of φ is going to be k/2n(φ), where k is the number
of satisfying assignments. Since the inference on BN can be
done in linear time in |BN | and |BN | ∈ O(|φ|), then the
whole problem is in PTIME.
10) Expressiveness: Here we show that any BN that con-
sists of a forest of poly-trees can be represented as a relaxed
acyclic program.
Proposition B.20. Any BN that is a forest of poly-trees can
be represented as a relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program.
Proof. Let bn be a BN that is a forest of poly-trees. We
now construct the corresponding relaxed acyclic PROBLOG
program. In particular, for each random variable X in bn ,
we show how to equivalently encode it as PROBLOG rules.
Without loss of generality, we assume there is a unique
mapping id from random variables in bn to predicate symbols
identifiers. With a slight abuse of notation, we use X to refer
both to the random variable and to the corresponding symbol
id(X).
Boolean Random Variables without parents. For each
boolean random variable X such that (1) p(X) = ∅, and (2)
cpt(X) = {> 7→ v,⊥ 7→ (1−v)}, we introduce a probabilistic
atom v::X .
Non-Boolean Random Variables without parents. For each
non-boolean random variable X with domain {q1, . . . , qn}
such that (1) p(X) = ∅, and (2) cpt(X) = {q1 7→
v1, . . . , qn 7→ vn}, we introduce an annotated disjunction
v1::X(q1); . . . ; vn::X(qn).
Boolean Random Variables with parents. Let X be a
boolean random variable X with parents p(X) = {Y1, . . . ,
Yn}, cpt(X) be the function associated with X , and v1, . . . ,
vm be all possible assignments to the variables in p(X). We
introduce m fresh predicate symbols swX,v1 , . . . , swX,vm . For
each vi, we introduce the probabilistic atom ci::swX,vi , where
cpt(X)(vi,>) = ci. Finally, for each vi, we also introduce
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the following rules:
X ← Y1(vi(1)), . . . , Yn(vi(n)), sw(l1), swX,vi
...
X ← Y1(vi(1)), . . . , Yn(vi(n)), sw(l2i−1), swX,vi
where Yk(>) = Yk, Yk(⊥) = ¬Yk, and Y1(v) = Y1(v)
if v 6∈ {>,⊥}, l1, . . . , l2i−1 are all possible values in {>,
⊥}i−1, and sw(l1, . . . , li−1) is the list of literals swX,v1(l1),
. . . , swX,vi−1(i− 1).
Non-Boolean Random Variables with parents. Let X be
a non-boolean random variable X with domain {q1, . . . , qm}
and parents p(X) = {Y1, . . . , Yn}, cpt(X) be the function
associated with X , and v1, . . . , vm be all possible assignments
to the variables in p(X). We introduce m fresh predicate
symbols swX,v1 , . . . , swX,vm . For each vi, we introduce the
probabilistic atom ci::swX,vi , where cpt(X)(vi,>) = ci.
Finally, for each vi, we also introduce the following rules:
pi1::X(q1); . . . ; p
i
m::X(qm)← Y1(vi(1)), . . . , Yn(vi(n)),
sw(l1), swX,vi
...
pi1::X(q1); . . . ; p
i
m::X(qm)← Y1(vi(1)), . . . , Yn(vi(n)),
sw(l2i−1), swX,vi
where Yk(>) = Yk, Yk(⊥) = ¬Yk, and Y1(v) = Y1(v)
if v 6∈ {>,⊥}, l1, . . . , l2i−1 are all possible values in {>,
⊥}i−1, sw(l1, . . . , li−1) is the list of literals swX,v1(l1), . . . ,
swX,vi−1(i− 1), and cpt(vi, qj) = pij .
Correctness of the encoding. The encoding presented above
encodes the CPTs for the random variables. The probability
that a random variable X has value v is exactly the same
as the probability associated with the ground literal X(v)
(with the notation defined above). The encoding for variables
without parents directly encodes the corresponding CPTs. For
variables with parents, the only non-standard part is the use of
sw(l2i−1), swX,vi . Note, however, that the literals in sw(l2i−1)
do not influence the derivation since there is a rule for any
possible values for them. We need them only for the encoding.
Therefore, also the encoding of random variables with parents
directly encodes the corresponding CPTs.
Relaxed Acyclicity. Let p be the program produced by
the above construction. It is easy to see that all predicates
associated with non-boolean random variables are CPT-like
(as we just encoded their CPTs). Therefore, the program β(p)
is obtained by removing all constant values associated with the
domains of non-boolean random values. Finally, the program
α(β(p)) collapses the rules for random variables with parents
into a single rule (this follows from our construction and the
use of sw(l2i−1), swX,vi in the rules’ bodies). The acyclicity
of p′ = α(β(p)) follows from (1) p′ does not contain free-
variables (i.e., both the literals and the ground atoms are only
propositional facts), (2) bn is a forest of poly-trees, and (3)
each predicate symbol swX,vi occurs only in the rule of X .
From (1), it follows that all rules are both strongly and weakly
connected. From (2) and (3), it follows that (a) there are no
directed cycles in graph(p), and (b) for all undirected cycles
U in graph(p), there are U ′, U ′′ such that U is equivalent to
U ′ ·U ′′ and U ′ is P ′ r,i←− P r,i−→ P ′ for some P, P ′, r, i. Since
all rules are both strongly and weakly connected, it directly
follows that the undirected unsafe structure 〈P r,i−→ P ′,
P
r,i−→ P ′, P ′, U ′′〉 is guarded. Therefore, p′ is acyclic and
p is a relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program.
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APPENDIX C
ANGERONA
Here, we present additional details about ANGERONA. We
also prove its security, complexity, and completeness.
A. Checking Query Security
In the following, let D = 〈Σ,dom〉 be a database schema.
Without loss of generality, we focus only on relational calculus
formulae φ where no distinct pair of quantifiers binds the same
variable.
Normal Form. We say that a formula ψ ∧ ¬γ is guarded iff
free(γ) ⊆ free(ψ). We say that a relational calculus formula
φ is in Normal Form (NF) iff (1) φ uses only existential
quantifiers, (2) negation is used only in sub-formulae of the
form ψ∧¬γ and it is always guarded, (3) for any sub-formula
ψ ∨ γ, free(ψ) = free(γ), (4) no distinct pair of quantifiers
binds the same variable, and (5) there are no equality and
inequality constraints.
Most of the time, domain-independent relational cal-
culus formulae can be easily written in NF by just
re-arranging sub-formulae. We remark that any domain-
independent relational calculus formula can be written in
NF by (1) extending the database schema with two re-
lations eq and neq encoding = and 6= among constants
in dom (this is always possible because dom is fi-
nite), (2) renaming the quantified variables in a unique
way, (3) replacing all universally quantified sub-formula
∀x.φe → ψ with the equivalent existentially quantified ver-
sion ¬∃x. φe ∧ ¬ψ, (4) replacing each negated sub-formula
¬ψ with the equivalent sub-formula (∧x∈free(ψ) adom(x)) ∧
¬ψ, where adom(x) is ∨R∈D∨1≤i≤|R| ∃x1, . . . , xi−1,
xi+1, . . . , x|R|. R(x1, . . . , xi−1, x, xi+1, . . . , x|R|), and (5)
replacing sub-formulae of the form ψ ∨ γ with the
equivalent formula (
∧
x∈free(γ)\free(ψ) adom(x) ∧ ψ) ∨
(
∧
x∈free(ψ)\free(γ) adom(x) ∧ γ). Note that the resulting NF
formula is equivalent to the original one (because the rewriting
does not modify the formula’s semantics). Therefore, in the
following we consider only NF relational calculus formulae.
From Relational Calculus to Logic Programming. Let φ
be a NF relational calculus sentence. We denote by sub(φ)
the sequence φ1, . . . , φn of all φ’s sub-formulae ordered from
the smallest to the largest, i.e., φn = φ, and by DIsub(φ)
the sequence obtained by removing from the sequence sub(φ)
(1) all formulae of the form ¬ψ , and (2) removing all sub-
formulae consisting just of equality and inequality terms. Since
φ is in NF, all negated sub-formulae in φ appear only in NF
in the sequence DIsub(φ).
The function PL(φ) encodes any NF relational calculus
sentence as a set of equivalent logic programming rules. We
associate a unique predicate symbol Hi and a set of rules
r(Hi) to each ψi in DIsub(φ) as follows:
• If ψi := R(xi), for some R ∈ Σ, then r(Hi) is
{Hi(xi)← R(xi)}, where xi are ψi’s free variables.
• If ψi := ψj ∧ ¬ψj , then r(Hi) is {Hi(xi) ← Hj(xj),
¬Hk(xk)}, where xi are ψi’s free variables, xj are ψj’s
Algorithm 4: ANGERONA Enforcement Algorithm (re-
peated from §VII).
Input: A system configuration C, a system state
s = 〈db, U, P 〉, a history h, a C-ATKLOG model
ATK , and an action 〈u, q〉.
Output: The security decision in {>,⊥}.
begin
for 〈u, ψ, l〉 ∈ secrets(P, u) do
if secure(C,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ, l〉)
if pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u, q〉,>)
h′ := h · 〈〈u, q〉,>,>〉
if ¬secure(C,ATK , h′, 〈u, ψ, l〉)
return ⊥
if pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u, q〉,⊥)
h′ := h · 〈〈u, q〉,>,⊥〉
if ¬secure(C,ATK , h′, 〈u, ψ, l〉)
return ⊥
return >
function secure(〈D,Γ〉,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ, l〉)
p := ATK (u)
for φ ∈ knowledge(h, u) do
p := p ∪ PL(φ) ∪ {evidence(head(φ), true)}
p := p ∪ PL(ψ)
return JpKD(head(ψ)) < l
function pox (〈D,Γ〉,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ〉, v)
p := ATK (u)
for φ ∈ knowledge(h, u) do
p := p ∪ PL(φ) ∪ {evidence(head(φ), true)}
if v = >
p := p ∪ PL(ψ)
return JpKD(head(ψ)) > 0
else
p := p ∪ PL(¬ψ)
return JpKD(head(¬ψ)) > 0
free variables, and xk are ψk’s free variables (note that
xi = xj and xk ⊆ xj).
• If ψi = ψj ∧ ψk, then r(Hi) is {Hi(xi) ← Hj(xj),
Hk(xk)}, where xi are ψi’s free variables, xj are ψj’s
free variables, and xk are ψk’s free variables.
• If ψi = ψj ∨ψk, then r(Hi) contains the rules Hi(xi)←
Hj(xi) and Hi(xi) ← Hk(xi) (note that free(ψi) =
free(ψj) = free(ψk)).
• If ψi = ∃x. ψj , then r(Hi) is {Hi(xi) ← Hj(xj), c1,
. . . , cn}, where xi are ψi’s free variables and xj are ψj’s
free variables (i.e., those in xi and x).
Furthermore, we denote head(φ) the predicate symbol asso-
ciated to ψm.
Checking Query Security. ANGERONA’s enforcement algo-
rithm is shown in Algorithm 4 (repeated from §VII).
B. Security Proof
Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration and h be a C-
history. The set knowledge(h, u) is {φ | ∃i. h(i) = 〈〈u, φ〉,>,
>〉} ∪ {¬φ | ∃i. h(i) = 〈〈u, φ〉,>,⊥〉}.
We first prove that ANGERONA’s result depends just on the
queries in the history, and not on the actual database’s state.
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Proposition C.1. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration,
ATK be a C-ATKLOG model, and 〈u, q〉 be a C-query.
ANGERONA(C, s, h,ATK , 〈u, q〉) = ANGERONA(C, s′, h′,
ATK , 〈u, q〉) whenever knowledge(h, u) = knowledge(h′, u).
Proof. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration, ATK be an
ATKLOG model, and 〈u, q〉 be a C-query. Furthermore, let s, s′
be C-states and h, h′ be C-histories such that knowledge(h,
u) = knowledge(h′, u). Assume, for contradiction’s sake,
that ANGERONA(C, s, h,ATK , 〈u, q〉) 6= ANGERONA(C, s′,
h′,ATK , 〈u, q〉). Without loss of generality, assume that
ANGERONA(C, s, h,ATK , 〈u, q〉) = > and ANGERONA(C,
s′, h′,ATK , 〈u, q〉) = ⊥. This happens iff either the re-
sult of pox or secure is different in the two cases. The
results of pox and secure, however, depend just on the
attacker’s initial beliefs, the query q, and the set of formulae
derive knowledge(h, u). From this and knowledge(h, u) =
knowledge(h′, u), it follows that ANGERONA(C, s, h,ATK ,
〈u, q〉) = ANGERONA(C, s′, h′,ATK , 〈u, q〉).
We now prove a key result for our security proof, namely
that considering only the sentences in knowledge(h, u) is
enough to determine secrecy-preservation.
Proposition C.2. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration,
ATK be a C-ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained by
parametrizing Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , u ∈ U be a
user, and r = 〈s, h〉 be a (C, f)-run. The following fact holds:JrK∼u = {db ∈ ΩΓD | ∧φ∈knowledge(h,u)[φ]db = >}.
Proof. (⇒). Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration,
ATK be an ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained by
parametrizing Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , u ∈ U be a
user, and r = 〈〈db, U, P 〉, h〉 be a (C, f)-run. Furthermore,
let r′ = 〈〈db′, U ′, P ′〉, h′〉 be a run in [r]∼u . From this,
it follows that h|u = h′|u. From this, it follows that all
queries in knowledge(h, u) have the same result in db and db′.
Therefore, db′ ∈ {db ∈ ΩΓD |
∧
φ∈knowledge(h,u)[φ]
db = >}.
(⇐). Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration, ATK be an
ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained by parametrizing
Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , u ∈ U be a user, and r = 〈〈db,
U, P 〉, h〉 be a (C, f)-run. Furthermore, let db′ be a database
state in {db′ ∈ ΩΓD |
∧
φ∈knowledge(h,u)[φ]
db′}. We now
construct a C-state s and an history h′ such that (1) 〈s, h′〉
is a run, (2) s.db = db′, and (3) 〈s, h′〉 ∈ [r]∼u . The C-state
s is defined as 〈db′, U, P 〉, whereas the history h′ = h|u. We
claim that 〈s, h′〉 is a run. From this and h′ = h|u, it follows
that 〈s, h′〉 ∼u r. From this, it follows that db′ ∈ JrK∼u .
To prove our claim that 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, h|u〉 is a run, we prove
the stronger fact that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ |h|, 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, hi|u〉 is
a run. We prove this by induction on i.
Base case. The base case 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, h0|u〉 is trivial since
db′ ∈ ΩΓD and h0|u = , therefore 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, h0|u〉 is a run.
Induction Step. Assume that 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, hi−1|u〉 is a run.
We now show that 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, hi|u〉 is a run as well. Let
〈〈u′, q〉, a, res〉 be the last C-event in hi. There are two cases:
• u′ 6= u. From this, hi|u = hi−1|u. Therefore, 〈〈db′, U,
P 〉, hi−1|u〉 = 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, hi|u〉 and our claim directly
follows from the induction hypothesis.
• u′ = u. From this, hi|u = hi−1|u · 〈〈u, q〉, a, res〉.
Assume, for contradiction’s sake, that 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, hi|u〉
is not a run. From 〈〈db′, U, P 〉, hi−1|u〉 is a run (which
directly follows from the induction hypothesis), it follows
that there are only three cases:
1) f(〈db′, U, P 〉, 〈u, q〉, hi−1|u) 6= a. Since a is the
security decision associated with the last event in hi, it
follows that a = f(〈db, U, P 〉, 〈u, q〉, hi−1). From this,
it follows that f(〈db, U, P 〉, 〈u, q〉, hi−1) 6= f(〈db′, U,
P 〉, 〈u, q〉, hi−1|u). From knowledge’s definition, it fol-
lows that knowledge(hi−1, u) = knowledge(hi−1|u,
u). From this and Proposition C.1, it follows that
f(〈db, U, P 〉, 〈u, q〉, hi−1) = f(〈db′, U, P 〉, 〈u, q〉,
hi−1|u), leading to a contradiction.
2) a = ⊥ but res 6= †. This contradicts the fact that the
history is derived from h, which comes from a proper
run.
3) a = > but res 6= [q]db′ . From res 6= [q]db′ and res =
[q]db (since res comes from the run r), it follows that
[q]db 6= [q]db′ . There are two cases:
– [q]db = >. From this and the definition of
knowledge , it follows that q ∈ knowledge(h, u).
Therefore, [q]db
′
= > follows from db′ ∈ {db′ ∈
ΩΓD |
∧
φ∈knowledge(h,u)[φ]
db′}, leading to a con-
tradiction.
– [q]db = ⊥. From this and the definition of
knowledge , it follows that ¬q ∈ knowledge(h,
u). From this and db′ ∈ {db′ ∈ ΩΓD |∧
φ∈knowledge(h,u)[φ]
db′}, it follows that [¬q]db′ =
>. From this, [q]db′ = ⊥ = [q]db , leading to a
contradiction.
This completes the proof of our claim.
We now prove that ANGERONA provides the desired secu-
rity guarantees.
Proposition C.3. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration,
ATK be a C-ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained by
parametrizing Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , and ATK ′ =
λu ∈ U .JATK (u)KD be the (C, f)-attacker model associated
to ATK . The PDP shown in Algorithm 4, parametrized with
ATK , provides data confidentiality with respect to C and
ATK ′.
Proof. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration, ATK be a
C-ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained by parametriz-
ing Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , and ATK ′ = λu ∈
U .JATK (u)KD be the (C, f)-attacker model associated to
ATK . Furthermore, let f be the PDP shown in Algorithm 4.
Assume, for contradiction’s sake, that f does not provide
confidentiality with respect to C and ATK ′. From this, it
follows that there is a run r = 〈〈db, U, P 〉, h〉, a user u ∈ U , a
secret 〈u, φ, l〉 ∈ P , and a 0 ≤ i ≤ |h|−1 such that JATK ′K(u,
ri)(JφK) < l and JATK ′K(u, ri+1)(JφK) ≥ l. As a result, the
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i-th C-query is the one that leaked information. There are two
cases:
• The C-query is 〈u, q〉, for some q. There are three cases:
– The result of the PDP is > and the query q holds
in the current state. From this, it follows that there
is a database state (namely, the one in r) where
the query q holds and the database is consistent
with knowledge(hi, u). From this, it follows thatJATK ′K(u, ri)(JqK) > 0. From this and Proposi-
tion C.5, it follows that pox (C,ATK , hi, 〈u, q〉,>)
returns true. From this and the fact that the query has
been authorized, it follows that secure(C,ATK , hi+1,
〈u, φ, l〉) returned true. From this, the fact that r is
actually a run (since q is satisfied in r.db), and Propo-
sition C.4, it follows that JATK ′K(u, ri+1)(JφK) < l,
leading to a contradiction.
– The result of the PDP is > and the query q does
not hold in the current state. From this, it follows
that there is a database state (namely, the one in
r) where the query ¬q holds and the database is
consistent with knowledge(hi, u). From this, it follows
that JATK ′K(u, ri)(J¬qK) > 0. From this and Propo-
sition C.5, it follows that pox (C,ATK , hi, 〈u, q〉,⊥)
returns true. From this and the fact that the query has
been authorized, it follows that secure(C,ATK , hi+1,
〈u, φ, l〉) returned true. From this, the fact that r is
actually a run (since q is satisfied in r.db), and Propo-
sition C.4, it follows that JATK ′K(u, ri+1)(JφK) < l,
leading to a contradiction.
– The result of the PDP is ⊥ (namely the query is not
authorized). From this and Proposition C.1, it follows
that for any run r′ ∼u ri the PDP result is the same.
Therefore, JriK∼u = Jri+1K∼u . From this, JATK ′K(u,
ri)(JφK) < l, and ATKLOG semantics, it follows thatJATK ′K(u, ri+1)(JφK) < l, leading to a contradiction.
• The C-query is 〈u′, q〉, where u′ 6= u and q is a
query. From this, it follows that JATK ′K(u, ri)(JφK) =JATK ′K(u, ri+1)(JφK) since u’s belief does not change
in response to a query from another user (since ri|u =
ri+1|u). From this and JATK ′K(u, ri)(JφK) < l, it fol-
lows that both JATK ′K(u, ri+1)(JφK) < l and JATK ′K(u,
ri+1)(JφK) ≥ l, leading to a contradiction.
Since all cases ended in contradiction, this completes the proof
of our claim.
Proposition C.4. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration,
ATK be a C-ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained
by parametrizing Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , ATK ′ =
λu ∈ U .JATK (u)KD be the (C, f)-attacker model associated
to ATK , r be a run in runs(C, f), and 〈u, ψ, l〉 be a secret
in r.S. Then, secure(C,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ, l〉) returns true iffJATK ′K(u, 〈s, h〉)(JψK) < l, for any state s that is compatible
with h.
Proof. Let r = 〈s, h〉 be a run such that s is
compatible with h. The secure procedure returnsJATK (u)KD(JψK|⋂φ∈knowledge(h,u)JφK) < l. From
Proposition C.2, it follows that JrK∼u = {db ∈ ΩΓD |∧
φ∈knowledge(h,u)[φ]
db = >} = ⋂φ∈knowledge(h,u)JφK. We
can therefore rewrite secure’s result as JATK (u)KD(JψK|J〈s,
h〉K∼u) < l. This is exactly the definition of JATK ′K(u, 〈s,
h〉)(JψK) < l.
Proposition C.5. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration,
ATK be a C-ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained
by parametrizing Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , ATK ′ =
λu ∈ U .JATK (u)KD be the (C, f)-attacker model associated
to ATK , r be a run in runs(C, f), and 〈u, q〉 be a query.
Then, pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u, q〉, v) returns true iff JATK ′K(u,
〈s, h〉)(Jr(q, v)K) > 0 for any state s that is compatible with
h, where r(q,>) = q and r(q,⊥) = ¬q.
Proof. Let r = 〈s, h〉 be a run such that s is compati-
ble with h. The pox procedure returns JATK (u)KD(Jr(q,
v)K|⋂φ∈knowledge(h,u)JφK) > 0. From Proposition C.2, it
follows that JrK∼u = {db ∈ ΩΓD | ∧φ∈knowledge(h,u)[φ]db =
>} = ⋂φ∈knowledge(h,u)JφK. We can therefore rewrite pox ’s
result as JATK (u)KD(Jr(q, v)K|J〈s, h〉K∼u) < l. This is ex-
actly the definition of JATK ′K(u, 〈s, h〉)(Jr(q, v)K) > 0.
C. Complexity Proof
First, we formalize literal queries, a fragment of relational
calculus that can be composed with relaxed acyclic programs
without modifying acyclicity. Afterwards, we prove that for
acyclic ATKLOG models and literal queries, ANGERONA has
PTIME data complexity.
A literal query is a quantifier-free relational calculus (Σ,
dom)-formula either of the form R(c) or ¬R(c), where
R ∈ Σ and c ∈ dom|R|. We say that a literal query R(c)
(or ¬R(c)) is compatible with a relaxed acyclic program p
(with witness (O,D,U)) iff µp,D,U (R) 6= ∅ implies c ↓K∈
pdom(R, p, µp,D,U (R)). We now show that literal queries
can be composed with acyclic PROBLOG programs without
introducing cycles.
Proposition C.6. Let D = 〈Σ,dom〉 be a database schema,
p be a relaxed acyclic program, (O,D,U) be a witness for p,
R be a predicate symbol in Σ, c ∈ dom|R| be a tuple, and φ
be a boolean D-query. If φ is a literal query compatible with
p, then p∪PL(φ) is a relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program as
well.
Proof. Let D = 〈Σ,Γ〉 be a database schema, p be a relaxed
acyclic program, and φ be a boolean D-query. Furthermore,
let φ be a literal query. Assume, for contradiction’s sake, that
p ∪ PL(φ) is not a relaxed acyclic program. This happens
iff the program α(β(p ∪ PL(φ))) is not an acyclic program.
This happens iff the program α(β(p ∪ PL(φ))) contains an
unguarded unsafe structure S in the dependency graph of
α(β(p∪PL(φ))). The only interesting case is when S contains
rules from PL(φ). If φ = R(c), then PL(φ) contains a single
rule fresh ← R(c), where fresh is a fresh predicate symbol.
Similarly, if φ = ¬R(c), then PL(φ) contains two rules
fresh1 ← fresh2 and fresh2 ← ¬R(c), where fresh1 and
fresh2 are fresh predicate symbols. From this and the fact that
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all rules in PL(φ) are both strongly and weakly connected for
U , it follows that there is always unguarded unsafe structure
S′ that can be obtained from S by removing the rules in
PL(φ). This contradicts the fact that p is a relaxed acyclic
program.
Here, we show that for acyclic ATKLOG models,
ANGERONA has PTIME data complexity.
Proposition C.7. Let C be a system configuration and f
be the PDP shown in Figure 4. For any acyclic C-ATKLOG
model ATK , any action (u, q) such that q is a literal query
compatible with p, and any run r ∈ runs(C, f) such that
(1) all sentences in knowledge(r.h, u), for any u ∈ r.U , are
literal queries compatible with p, and (2) all secrets in r.S
are literal queries compatible with p, the algorithm shown in
Figure 4 has PTIME data complexity.
Proof. Let B be the PROBLOG program obtained from ATK .
The data complexity of f is its complexity when only the
database r.db and edb(B) change. The algorithm in Figure 4
calls three times the secure procedure and twice the pox
procedure. The set knowledge(h, u) can be constructed in
O(|h|). From this, it follows that the program p has size
O(|edb(B)|+ |rules(B)|+ |h|). Furthermore, since all queries
are literal queries, B is a relaxed acyclic PROBLOG program,
and Proposition C.6, it follows that p is a relaxed acyclic
PROBLOG program as well. From this and Proposition B.18,
the inference can be performed in O(r2 · er ·max (2, r)2+r),
where r ∈ O(|rules(B)| + (|r| + |edb(K)|)|rules(K)|) and
e ∈ O(|edb(B)|). Since rules(B), r, and K are fixed, then
the data complexity of the secure procedure is O(|edb(B)|k),
for some k ∈ N. From this and the fact that Algorithm 4 three
times the secure procedure and twice the pox procedure per
secret in r.S, it follows that the data complexity of Algorithm 4
is PTIME.
D. Completeness Proof
We first introduce the notion of unconditionally secrecy-
preserving query. Informally, a query 〈u′, q〉 is unconditionally
secrecy-preserving given a run r and a secret 〈u, ψ, l〉 iff
disclosing the result of 〈u′, q〉 in any run r′ ∼u r does not
violate the secret.
Definition C.1. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a configuration, f be a
C-PDP, and ATK be a (C, f)-attacker model. A query q is
unconditionally secrecy-preserving for a (C, f)-run r, a user
u, a secret 〈u, ψ, l〉, and ATK iff JATK K(u, r)(ψ) < l implies
that (a) if JATK K(u, r)(q) > 0, then JATK K(u, r)(ψ | {db ∈JrK∼u | [q]db = >}) < l, and (b) if JATK K(u, r)(¬q) > 0,
then JATK K(u, r)(ψ | {db ∈ JrK∼u | [q]db = ⊥}) < l. 
We say that a PDP is complete if it authorizes all uncondi-
tionally secrecy-preserving queries. ANGERONA is complete.
This directly follows from (1) Proposition C.2, (2) the use of
exact inference procedures for PROBLOG programs, and (3)
the fact that ANGERONA directly checks whether queries are
unconditionally secrecy-preserving or not.
Proposition C.8. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration,
ATK be a C-ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained
by parametrizing Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , ATK ′ =
λu ∈ U .JATK (u)KD be the (C, f)-attacker model associated
to ATK , r = 〈〈db, U, P 〉, h〉 be a run, and 〈u, q〉 be a C-
query. If q is unconditionally secrecy-preserving for u, for all
secrets 〈u, ψ, l〉 ∈ secrets(P, u), r, and f authorizes 〈u, q〉.
Proof. Let C = 〈D,Γ〉 be a system configuration, ATK be a
C-ATKLOG model, f be the C-PDP obtained by parametrizing
Algorithm 4 with C and ATK , ATK ′ = λu ∈ U .JATK (u)KD
be the (C, f)-attacker model associated to ATK , r = 〈〈db,
U, P 〉, h〉 be a run, and 〈u, q〉 be a C-query. Assume, for
contradiction’s sake, that our claim does not hold. Namely,
there is query 〈u, q〉 such that (1) the query is unconditionally
secrecy-preserving u, for all secrets 〈u, ψ, l〉 ∈ secrets(P,
u), r, and ATK ′, and (2) ANGERONA (parametrized with
ATK ) does not authorize 〈u, q〉. Since ANGERONA does not
authorize 〈u, q〉, it means that ANGERONA(C, 〈db, U, P 〉, h,
ATK , 〈u, q〉) = ⊥. From this, it follows that there is a secret
〈u, ψ, l〉 ∈ secrets(P, u) such that:
• secure(C,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ, l〉) = >, and
• one of the two cases hold:
– pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u, q〉,>) = > and secure(C,ATK ,
h′, 〈u, ψ, l〉) = ⊥, where h′ = h · 〈〈u, q〉,>, top〉, or
– pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u, q〉,⊥) = > and secure(C,ATK ,
〈db, U, P 〉, h′′, 〈u, ψ, l〉) = ⊥, where h′′ = h · 〈〈u, q〉,
>,⊥〉.
Without loss of generality, we assume that pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u,
q〉,>) = > and secure(C,ATK , h′〈u, ψ, l〉) = ⊥, where h′ =
h · 〈〈u, q〉,>, top〉 (the proof for the other case is identical).
From secure(C,ATK , h, 〈u, ψ, l〉) = >, Proposition C.4, and
the fact that s is compatible with h, it follows that JATK ′K(u,
r)(ψ) < l. From pox (C,ATK , h, 〈u, q〉,>) = >, Proposi-
tion C.4, and the fact that s is compatible with h, it follows
that JATK ′K(u, r)(q) > 0. From this and Proposition C.1,
it follows that there is a system state s′ = 〈db′, U, P 〉 such
that (1) q holds in db′, (2) s′ is compatible with h|u, and
(3) r′ = 〈s′, h|u〉 is a run indistinguishable from r. From
this, secure(C,ATK , h′, 〈u, ψ, l〉) = ⊥, secure(C,ATK , h′,
〈u, ψ, l〉) = secure(C,ATK , 〈db, U, P 〉, h′|u, 〈u, ψ, l〉), and
Proposition C.4, it follows that JATK ′K(u, 〈s′, h′|u〉)(ψ) ≥ l.
From this and the definition of h′|u, it follows that JATK ′K(u,
r′)(ψ | {db ∈ JrK∼u | [q]db = >}) ≥ l. From this, r ∼u r′,
and JATK ′K(u, r) = JATK ′K(u, r′) if r ∼u r′, it follows thatJATK ′K(u, r)(ψ | {db ∈ JrK∼u | [q]db = >}) ≥ l. Therefore,
we have that JATK ′K(u, r)(ψ) < l, JATK ′K(u, r)(q) > 0,
and JATK ′K(u, r)(ψ | {db ∈ JrK∼u | [q]db = >}) ≥ l.
This contradicts the fact that q is an unconditionally secrecy-
preserving query and completes the proof of our claim.
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